Matter of State of New York v Alfredo M.
2012 NY Slip Op 05179 [96 AD3d 1068]
June 27, 2012
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 1, 2012


In the Matter of State of New York, Respondent,
v
AlfredoM., Appellant.

[*1]Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Mineola, N.Y. (Lesley M. DeLia, Arthur A. Baer, andDennis B. Feld of counsel), for appellant.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Steven C. Wu and Claude S.Platton of counsel), for respondent.

In a proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 10 for the civil management ofAlfredo M., a sex offender allegedly requiring civil management, Alfredo M. appeals from anorder of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Dowling, J.), dated March 21, 2011, which, upon afinding, made after a nonjury trial, that he suffers from a mental abnormality as defined in MentalHygiene Law § 10.03 (i), and upon a determination, made after a dispositional hearing,that he is currently a dangerous sex offender requiring civil confinement, granted the petition anddirected that he be committed to a secure treatment facility for care, treatment, and control untilsuch time as he no longer requires confinement.

Ordered that the notice of appeal by Mental Hygiene Legal Service is deemed to be a noticeof appeal by Alfredo M. (see Matter of Tagliaferri v Weiler, 1 NY3d 605 [2004]); and itis further,

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The appellant is a recidivist sex offender, who has sexually abused numerous minors. Theappellant was convicted of a sex offense stemming from an incident that took place on or aboutApril 14, 1989, involving a 13-year-old adolescent boy. Subsequently, the appellant wasconvicted of a sex offense stemming from incidents that took place over the course of athree-month period in 1993, involving a 7-year-old prepubescent boy. The appellant was alsoconvicted of a sex offense stemming from incidents that took place over the course of thatthree-month period, involving an 8-year-old prepubescent boy. Finally, the appellant wasconvicted of the subject sex offense, which stemmed from incidents that took place over thecourse of a six-month period in 2004-2005, involving a 15-year-old adolescent boy.

In reviewing a finding made after a nonjury trial, the power of this Court is as broad as thatof the trial court, and this Court may render the judgment that it finds warranted by the facts,taking into account that in a close case the trial judge had the advantage of seeing and hearing thewitnesses (see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60NY2d 492, [*2]499 [1983]; Matter of State of New York v Andrew J.W., 85 AD3d 805, 806[2011]; Matter of State of New York vLeon F., 84 AD3d 1098, 1100 [2011]; Matter of State of New York v Clarence D., 82 AD3d 776, 777[2011]). The Supreme Court's finding that the appellant suffers from a "[m]ental abnormality,"that is, "a congenital or acquired condition, disease or disorder that affects the emotional,cognitive, or volitional capacity of a person in a manner that predisposes him or her to thecommission of conduct constituting a sex offense and that results in that person having seriousdifficulty in controlling such conduct" (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [i]), is warranted bythe facts. The psychologist who testified at the trial explained that she could not diagnose theappellant as suffering from "paraphilia not otherwise specified, pedophilia" because such adiagnosis can only be made if an individual's sexual activity focuses on prepubescent childrenover a period of at least six months. Here, she noted that the incidents involving the prepubescentboys occurred within a six-month period. However, she diagnosed the appellant as suffering from"paraphilia not otherwise specified, hebephilia," as such a diagnosis can be made if anindividual's sexual activity focuses on adolescent children over a period of at least six months,and here, the incidents involving the adolescent boys occurred over a period of more than sixmonths (see Matter of State of New York v Spencer D., 96 AD3d 768 [2012]).

Furthermore, clear and convincing evidence supports the Supreme Court's determination thatthe appellant is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement in a secure facility (seeMental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [e]; § 10.07 [f]; Matter of State of New York v Jemal M., 91 AD3d 961, 962[2012]; Matter of State of New York vAnonymous, 82 AD3d 1250, 1252 [2011]). Skelos, J.P., Leventhal, Belen and Roman,JJ., concur.


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