Harris v Harris
2012 NY Slip Op 05389 [97 AD3d 534]
July 5, 2012
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 22, 2012


Edward Harris, Appellant,
v
Helen M. Harris,Respondent.

—[*1]Steinberg, Fineo, Berger & Fischoff, P.C., Woodbury, N.Y. (Dana J. Finkelstein andJessica A. Gould of counsel), for appellant.

John G. Poli, III, P.C., Northport, N.Y., for respondent.

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief,from stated portions of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cohen, J.), enteredJanuary 11, 2011, which, upon a decision of the same court dated December 10, 2009, made aftera nonjury trial, inter alia, (a) directed him to continue to pay certain carrying charges on themarital residence pursuant to a pendente lite order dated June 24, 2008, until entry of thejudgment of divorce, (b) directed him to pay child support in the sum of $436.19 per week,commencing on January 1, 2010, (c) directed him to pay 63.41% of future unreimbursed healthcare expenses, and 65% of certain educational expenses, of the parties' children until theyreached the age of 21 years, (d) awarded the defendant maintenance in the sums of $1,000 permonth for two years after entry of the judgment of divorce, and $500 per month in the third yearfollowing entry of the judgment of divorce, (e) awarded the defendant the sum of $63,436.49,representing 25% of the funds remaining from a personal injury award made to him andmaintained in a jointly held account, and (f) awarded the defendant counsel fees in the sum of$15,000.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, on the facts, and in the exercise ofdiscretion, (1) by deleting from the 16th decretal paragraph thereof, which directed the plaintiffto pay the defendant maintenance, the phrase "following the entry of the Judgment of Divorce,"and substituting therefor the phrase "in the period commencing on January 1, 2010," (2) bydeleting the 17th and 18th decretal paragraphs thereof, which computed the plaintiff's childsupport obligation and directed the plaintiff to pay basic child support of $436.19 per week, plus63.41% of unreimbursed health care expenses, (3) by deleting the 29th decretal paragraph thereofwhich directed that the plaintiff's obligation pursuant to the pendente lite order continue untilentry of the judgment of divorce, and so much of the 4th decretal paragraph as directed that theplaintiff's obligations pursuant to the pendente lite order continue until entry of the judgment ofdivorce, and substituting therefor provisions directing that the plaintiff's obligations pursuant tothe pendente lite order terminated on January 1, 2010, and (4) by adding a provision thereto that,in the event that either party dies or the defendant remarries during the period when the plaintiffis obligated to pay maintenance, that obligation shall terminate; as so modified, the judgment isaffirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted tothe Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for new determinations of basic child support and theplaintiff's pro rata share of [*2]unreimbursed health careexpenses, and for a determination of any arrears due pursuant to the judgment, as modified bythis Court, and for the entry of an appropriate amended judgment.

The parties were married on January 11, 1987, and have two children, born October 26,1990, and May 18, 1993, respectively. The instant action for divorce was commenced onSeptember 4, 2007. In a pendente lite order dated June 24, 2008, the Supreme Court directed theplaintiff to pay the monthly carrying charges on the marital residence consisting, inter alia, ofmortgage payments.

The judgment appealed from directed the plaintiff to pay the sum of $436.19 per week inchild support computed pursuant to the Child Support Standards Act (hereinafter CSSA)(see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [b] [3]), plus 63.41% of futureunreimbursed health care expenses, and 65% of certain educational expenses, commencingJanuary 1, 2010. That judgment also directed the plaintiff to continue to pay carrying charges onthe marital residence occupied by the defendant and the children until entry of the judgment ofdivorce, and directed the plaintiff to pay the defendant maintenance in the sums of $1,000 permonth for two years after entry of the judgment of divorce, and $500 per month in the third yearfollowing entry of the judgment of divorce. The judgment of divorce was entered on January 11,2011. Therefore, because of the delay in entering the judgment of divorce, the plaintiff'sobligation to pay child support pursuant to that judgment, in addition to obligations pursuant tothe pendente lite order, were continued for one year beyond the entry of the judgment.

Both parties acknowledge that the award of basic child support was excessive. The defendantcorrectly observes that the Supreme Court improperly included the children's social securitybenefits in computing the plaintiff's income (see Matter of Graby v Graby, 87 NY2d 605[1996]; Matter of Vrooman v Vrooman, 244 AD2d 122 [1998]). The plaintiff contendsthat it may have been proper to direct payment of maintenance and child support determined aftertrial, commencing January 1, 2010; however, he asserts that the court improperly directed him topay the carrying charges on the marital residence, including mortgage payments, until the divorcejudgment was entered, while simultaneously directing him to pay child support computedpursuant to the CSSA commencing on January 1, 2010.

The Supreme Court's directive that the plaintiff pay child support pursuant to the CSSA andthe mortgage on the marital residence for the same period of time erroneously granted thechildren a double shelter allowance (seeLauria v Lauria, 45 AD3d 535 [2007]; Curatola v Curatola, 43 AD3d 974, 976 [2007]; Krantz vKrantz, 175 AD2d 865 [1991]). Further, in calculating the plaintiff's child supportobligation, which commenced on January 1, 2010, the Supreme Court deducted maintenancefrom the plaintiff's income notwithstanding that the plaintiff's obligation to pay maintenance onlycommenced on January 11, 2011, when the judgment of divorce was entered. Since the courterroneously deducted maintenance from the plaintiff's income in determining child supportcommencing January 1, 2010, it appears that the court contemplated that the judgment would beentered, and the maintenance obligation would commence, shortly after January 1, 2010. Theone-year delay in entering the judgment, until January 11, 2011, extended the plaintiff's supportobligations for an additional year.

In view of the foregoing, the plaintiff's obligation to pay maintenance for three years shouldhave commenced on January 1, 2010, and his obligations pursuant to the pendente lite ordershould have terminated on January 1, 2010. We modify the judgment accordingly.

Further, basic child support pursuant to the CSSA must be recalculated. The plaintiff's prorata share of unreimbursed health care expenses also must be recalculated, since it was directlyconnected to the basic child support calculation and based upon the plaintiff's share of combinedparental income (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c] [5]; Baranek v Baranek, 54 AD3d 789,791 [2008]). Therefore, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for newdeterminations of basic child support pursuant to the CSSA and the plaintiff's pro rata share ofunreimbursed health care expenses in accordance herewith.[*3]

Educational expenses may be awarded based upon "thecircumstances of the case and of the respective parties and in the best interests of the child, andas justice requires" (Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c] [7]; see Matter of Williams v Rodriguez, 66AD3d 914, 915 [2009]; Cimons vCimons, 53 AD3d 125, 131 [2008]). Under the circumstances of this case, theprovisions of the judgment directing the plaintiff to pay 65% of certain educational expenses ofthe children was a provident exercise of discretion.

Considering the long-term marriage of the parties (see Brough v Brough, 285 AD2d913, 915 [2001]), the predivorce standard of living (see Hartog v Hartog, 85 NY2d 36, 50[1995]), the present and future earnings capacities of the parties, and the ability of the defendantto become self-supporting (see Duffy vDuffy, 84 AD3d 1151, 1153 [2011]), the award of maintenance was proper. However,the Supreme Court should have directed that, in the event that either party dies or the defendantremarries during the period when the plaintiff was obligated to pay maintenance, that obligationwould terminate (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [a]; Haines v Haines, 44 AD3d 901,903 [2007]).

An issue at the nonjury trial was whether the plaintiff's award for pain and suffering, whichhe received during the marriage in a personal injury action, constituted marital property. Thejudgment appealed from awarded the defendant the sum of $63,436.49, representing 25% of thefunds remaining from that award maintained in a jointly held account.

At the time the plaintiff received the award for personal injuries, that award constitutedseparate property (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [d] [2]; Howe v Howe, 68 AD3d 38, 40[2009]). However, the plaintiff deposited that separate property into a jointly held investmentaccount, creating a presumption that those funds constituted marital property (see Renga v Renga, 86 AD3d 632,634 [2011]). Although that presumption is rebuttable (see id.), and a depositor may createa joint account with the right of survivorship "without necessarily transferring a presentbeneficial interest in the funds in the account" (Wacikowski v Wacikowski, 93 AD2d885, 885 [1983]), here, the plaintiff used money in the account to pay marital expenses. Thus,those funds did not retain their character as separate property (see Crescimanno v Crescimanno, 33 AD3d 649 [2006]).Accordingly, the weight of the credible evidence adduced at trial supports the Supreme Court'sconclusion that the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption that the subject funds were maritalproperty.

The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit (see Domestic Relations Law§ 237 [a]; Riley v Coughtry,13 AD3d 703 [2004]). Balkin, J.P., Leventhal, Belen and Roman, JJ., concur.


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