| Capellupo v Nassau Health Care Corp. |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 05490 [97 AD3d 619] |
| July 11, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Paul J. Capellupo, Respondent, v Nassau Health CareCorporation, Appellant. |
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In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for false arrest, false imprisonment, andintentional infliction of emotional distress, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from somuch of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (DeStefano, J.), entered April 25, 2011,as denied those branches of its motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first,third, and fourth causes of action on the ground that those causes of action are barred by thedoctrine of collateral estoppel.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and thosebranches of the defendant's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first, third,and fourth causes of action are granted.
This appeal arises from the plaintiff's involuntary hospitalization on September 13, 2005.The underlying facts of the plaintiff's interaction with Nassau County police officers, and hissubsequent transportation and admission to Nassau County University Medical Center for 16days, are essentially undisputed by the parties.
After his release from confinement, the plaintiff commenced an action (hereinafter thefederal action) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York(hereinafter the District Court), against Nassau Health Care Corporation (hereinafter NHCC), thecorporate parent of Nassau County University Medical Center, as well as the Nassau CountyPolice Department, the individual police officers who arrested and detained him, and the doctorswho treated him. In the federal action, the plaintiff asserted causes of action pursuant to 42 USC§ 1983, alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well asstate common-law causes of action alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and intentionalinfliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff stipulated to voluntarily discontinue the federalaction against all of the defendants except NHCC. Thereafter, NHCC moved for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint in the federal action insofar as asserted against it. The DistrictCourt granted the motion, in part, and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. With regard to theclaims arising under federal law, the District Court held that NHCC had not violated theplaintiff's Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights, explaining that no reasonable finder of factcould conclude, based on the evidence submitted by NHCC, that NHCC had unlawfully deprivedthe plaintiff of his constitutional [*2]rights. Specifically, theDistrict Court held that the evidence established that the hospital physicians had properlyconcluded that the plaintiff posed a danger either to himself or to others and, therefore, hisinvoluntary admission into the hospital was warranted. Moreover, the District Court found thatthe hospital followed the procedural requirements of the Mental Hygiene Law, and that the careand treatment rendered by the doctors were appropriate, medically indicated, and in completeconformity with accepted standards of treatment and care. Accordingly, the plaintiff was neitherdeprived of his liberty without procedural due process, nor unreasonably seized by virtue of hisinvoluntary commitment. Upon dismissal of the claims arising under federal law, the DistrictCourt declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the state common-law causes ofaction, and dismissed those causes of action without prejudice.
The plaintiff then commenced this action in the Supreme Court, Nassau County, andasserted, essentially, the same state common-law causes of action previously asserted in thecomplaint in the federal action, with the addition of a medical malpractice cause of action. Aswas the case in the federal action, the instant action was voluntarily discontinued insofar asasserted against all of the named defendants other than NHCC, leaving NHCC as the soleremaining defendant.
NHCC answered the complaint in this action, and thereafter moved, inter alia, for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the instant action was barred by thedoctrine of collateral estoppel. NHCC argued that, in dismissing the complaint in the federalaction, the District Court had made certain findings of fact and conclusions of law in NHCC'sfavor and since the claims stated in the complaint in the instant action were identical to theclaims stated in the complaint in the federal action, the complaint in the instant action shouldlikewise be dismissed.
In an order entered April 25, 2011, the Supreme Court denied those branches of NHCC'smotion which were for summary judgment dismissing the false arrest, false imprisonment, andintentional infliction of emotional distress causes of action, concluding that, since those specificcauses of action were not previously adjudicated by the District Court, the doctrine of res judicatawas inapplicable to those claims. However, the Supreme Court granted those branches ofNHCC's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action whichalleged that the plaintiff's involuntary commitment violated the Mental Hygiene Law and thatNHCC committed medical malpractice by retaining the plaintiff against his will, concluding thatthe plaintiff was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of the propriety of hisinvoluntary commitment under the Mental Hygiene Law or the appropriateness of the care hereceived. The Supreme Court held that the District Court had both analyzed whether NHCC'sactions comported with the Mental Hygiene Law and concluded that they had complied with thatlaw's requirements. The Supreme Court further noted that the District Court had also concludedthat the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact to rebut NHCC's showing that the care andtreatment rendered to the plaintiff comported with generally accepted standards of medical care.Accordingly, the Supreme Court determined that those causes of action were barred by thedoctrine of collateral estoppel.
On appeal, NHCC contends that the Supreme Court erred in denying those branches of itsmotion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging false arrest,false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. NHCC argues that, since theDistrict Court concluded that the plaintiff's involuntary commitment was wholly proper, theplaintiff was collaterally estopped from attempting to relitigate that issue in the context of thestate common-law causes of action. We agree and reverse the order insofar as appealed from.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue which has necessarily beendecided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues disputed in the present action,provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to becontrolling (see Tydings v Greenfield,Stein & Senior, LLP, 11 NY3d 195, 199 [2008]; Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295,303-304 [2001], cert denied 535 US 1096 [2002]; Mahler v Campagna, 60 AD3d 1009, 1011 [2009]; York v Landa, 57 AD3d 980[2008]). The party seeking the benefit of the doctrine of collateral estoppel must establish that theidentical issue was necessarily decided in the prior action and is determinative in the presentaction (see Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d at 304). Once the party invoking the doctrine [*3]discharges his or her burden in that regard, the party to be estoppedbears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a full and fair opportunity to contest the priordetermination (id.).
In order to prevail on a cause of action seeking to recover damages for false arrest or falseimprisonment, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2)the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to theconfinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged (see Rivera v County of Nassau, 83AD3d 1032 [2011]). Commitment pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 9 is privileged inthe absence of medical malpractice (see Matter of E.K. v State of New York, 235 AD2d540 [1997]; Ferretti v Town of Greenburgh, 191 AD2d 608, 610 [1993]). Thus, in orderto recover damages for false arrest or false imprisonment under such circumstances, a plaintiffmust establish medical malpractice (see Matter of E.K. v State of New York, 235 AD2d540 [1997]; Ferretti v Town of Greenburgh, 191 AD2d at 610).
Here, the Supreme Court granted that branch of NHCC's motion which was for summaryjudgment dismissing the cause of action alleging medical malpractice on the ground that it wasbarred by the doctrine of res judicata, since the District Court had previously determined that "theplaintiff had failed to raise any genuine issues of material fact regarding [NHCC's] comportmentwith the generally accepted standards of medical care" in treating the plaintiff. The plaintiff didnot appeal or cross-appeal from that portion of the Supreme Court's order. Moreover, the DistrictCourt also found that the plaintiff's involuntary commitment was wholly proper, did not violatehis Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights, and complied with the procedural requirements ofthe Mental Hygiene Law. Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action allegingeither false arrest or false imprisonment, as his confinement was privileged and not otherwisetainted by medical malpractice (see Kraft v City of New York, 696 F Supp 2d 403, 421[2010], affd 441 Fed Appx 24 [2d Cir 2011] [where a federal court held that doctors hadprobable cause and reasonable grounds, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to seizethe plaintiff, the plaintiff's state common-law causes of action alleging false arrest and falseimprisonment against those doctors must fail, as the confinement was privileged]; Freemonde v City of New York, 1AD3d 560 [2003] [where the plaintiff challenged the propriety of his involuntarycommitment at a mental health hearing, the plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating theissue of whether his involuntary commitment was proper in a later state-court action to recoverdamages for false imprisonment]; Porter v Westchester County Med. Ctr., 252 AD2d 518[1998] [same]).
In light of the foregoing, NHCC established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as amatter of law dismissing the false arrest and false imprisonment causes of action on the groundthat they were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and the plaintiff failed to raise atriable issue of fact in opposition. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted thosebranches of NHCC's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing those causes ofaction.
In order to establish intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove fourelements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent to cause, or disregard of a substantialprobability of causing, severe emotional distress; (3) a causal connection between the conductand injury; and (4) severe emotional distress (see Bernat v Williams, 81 AD3d 679 [2011]). The tort ofintentional infliction of emotional distress predicates liability on the basis of conduct which is"so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds ofdecency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community"(Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 303 [1983] [internal quotationmarks omitted]; see Marilyn S. vIndependent Group Home Living Program, Inc., 73 AD3d 892, 894 [2010]). "[T]herequirements of the rule are rigorous, and difficult to satisfy" (Howell v New York PostCo., 81 NY2d 115, 122 [1993] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Without "sufficientlyoutrageous" conduct, no claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress can be established(id.).
The District Court's finding that the plaintiff's involuntary confinement was wholly proper, inthat it complied with the strictures of the Mental Hygiene Law, and did not violate the Fourth andFourteenth Amendments, and the District Court's conclusion that the plaintiff failed to raisetriable issues of fact as to whether the care and treatment he received did not meet the generallyaccepted standards of medical care, effectively foreclose any conclusion that the plaintiff's [*4]involuntary commitment constituted "extreme and outrageousconduct" sufficient to support a cause of action to recover damages for intentional infliction ofemotional distress (Kraft v City of New York, 696 F Supp 2d at 423 [the plaintiff failedto produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that a municipality's actions wereextreme and outrageous where doctors were held to have acted appropriately in involuntarilycommitting the plaintiff]), and NHCC's conduct here certainly does not rise to that level.
In light of the foregoing, NHCC established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of lawdismissing the cause of action alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress on the groundthat it was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and the plaintiff failed to raise a triableissue of fact in opposition. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch ofNHCC's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action. Dillon, J.P.,Eng, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.