Vera v Soohoo
2012 NY Slip Op 07104 [99 AD3d 990]
October 24, 2012
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, November 28, 2012


Gladys Vera, Appellant,
v
Derek K. Soohoo, Defendant,and St. Joseph's Hospital, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent. Surinder Malhotra,Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

—[*1]The Pagan Law Firm, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Tania M. Pagan of counsel), for appellant.

Voute, Lohrfink, Magro & McAndrew, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Hal Robertsof

counsel), for defendant/third-party plaintiff-respondent.

Rende, Ryan & Downes, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Roland T. Koke of counsel), forthird-party defendant-respondent.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice, the plaintiff appeals froman order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Colabella, J.), dated June 4, 2010, whichdenied her motion to vacate an order of the same court dated January 11, 2010, dismissing theaction pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27 upon her failure to proceed to trial, and to restore theaction to the trial calendar.

Ordered that the order dated June 4, 2010, is reversed, on the law and in the exercise ofdiscretion, with costs, and the plaintiff's motion to vacate the order dated January 11, 2010, andto restore the action to the trial calendar is granted.

On July 15, 1999, the plaintiff's decedent entered the defendant St. Joseph's Hospital(hereinafter the Hospital) with severe epistaxis. He was transferred to another hospital on July27, 1999, and died in December 1999. In 2002, the plaintiff, the decedent's wife, commenced thisaction, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice against, among others, the Hospital.In June 2005, the Hospital moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar asasserted against it. Its motion was granted in part and denied in part, and in 2007 this Courtaffirmed that partial denial of summary judgment (see Vera v Soohoo, 41 AD3d 586 [2007]). In March 2008, after theplaintiff and the Hospital had agreed to a trial date in May 2008, the Hospital commenced athird-party action against Surinder Malhotra, an otolaryngologist who had treated the decedentduring his stay at the Hospital. The plaintiff made several discovery requests of Malhotra, but hedid not comply with those requests. The plaintiff made three good faith attempts at resolving theissues surrounding discovery, but to no avail. The plaintiff ultimately moved for the impositionof sanctions against Malhotra or to compel him to comply with her discovery requests. TheSupreme Court granted that branch of the motion which was to compel Malhotra to comply withthe discovery [*2]requests, and further adjourned the trial.Finally, at a status conference on September 11, 2009, the Supreme Court scheduled the trial forJanuary 4, 2010.

On January 4, 2010, David Pierguidi of The Pagan Law Firm, P.C., appeared on behalf of theplaintiff, and notified the Supreme Court that the plaintiff's expert, who was of paramountimportance to the plaintiff's case, was unavailable to testify. Counsel provided the SupremeCourt with an affidavit from the expert, in which he stated that he would be away on vacationfrom January 5 through January 13, and that the vacation could not be canceled. Counselinformed the Supreme Court that the parties had conferred and would all be available to try thecase in the middle of February. The Supreme Court, after noting that the case was eight years old,offered to adjourn the matter until January 14. Counsel for Malhotra inquired as to how long theplaintiff's case would last, noting that he had a case on January 25, in Rockland County, and acase in federal court scheduled for February 1. The plaintiff's counsel responded that his casealone would take three days to try, and alerted the court that his firm had a conflict with anothercase that was being tried in Kings County. In response, the Supreme Court directed the law clerkto read the procedural history of the case into the record. While she was still doing so, theSupreme Court cut her off, stating, "that's enough." Then, without further comment or questionsabout plaintiff's counsel's claimed scheduling conflict, the Supreme Court, sua sponte, dismissedthe action pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27, stating "this is a fault [sic] dismissal." The courtsubsequently issued a written order indicating that the action was being dismissed for counsel'sfailure to proceed to trial on January 4, 2010.

The plaintiff timely moved to vacate the order and restore the action to the trial calendar. Inthe moving papers, the plaintiff's counsel affirmed that the trial date offered by the SupremeCourt, January 14, 2010, conflicted with a case entitled Bryan v Hurwitz that his firmwas scheduled to try on January 19, 2010, and that Bryan v Hurwitz had a 1999 indexnumber. In an order dated June 4, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's motion, findingthat, while she had a potentially meritorious cause of action, she had failed to provide areasonable excuse for her inability to proceed on January 4, 2010, or January 14, 2010.

Under 22 NYCRR 202.27, a court may dismiss an action when a plaintiff is unprepared toproceed to trial at the call of the calendar (see Fink v Antell, 19 AD3d 215 [2005]; Johnson v BrooklynHosp. Ctr., 295 AD2d 567, 569 [2002]; Farley v Danaher Corp., 295 AD2d 559, 560[2002]). In order to be relieved of that default, a plaintiff must demonstrate both a reasonableexcuse for the default and a potentially meritorious cause of action (see e.g. Felsen v Stop & Shop SupermarketCo., LLC, 83 AD3d 656 [2011]).

Here, the plaintiff's proffered reason for being unable to proceed on January 4, 2010, was thather expert was unavailable to testify because of a scheduled vacation between January 5 andJanuary 13, 2010, which the expert could not cancel. That excuse was a reasonable one (see Vorontsova v Priolo, 61 AD3d556, 556-557 [2009]; Conde vWilliams, 6 AD3d 569, 570 [2004]; Goichberg v Sotudeh, 187 AD2d 700, 701[1992]; cf. Kandel v Hoffman, 309 AD2d 904 [2003]; Spodek v Lasser Stables,89 AD2d 892 [1982]). Indeed, the Supreme Court accepted that excuse, as evidenced by its offerduring the colloquy on January 4 to adjourn the trial to January 14. In addition, in its orderdenying the plaintiff's motion to vacate the default, the Supreme Court stated that it had beenwilling to adjourn the trial to accommodate the expert's vacation, tacitly acknowledging that ithad concluded that the excuse was reasonable. Nevertheless, it held in that order that theplaintiff's action should be dismissed, in part, because the record was silent as to when theplaintiff's counsel informed his expert of the trial date, when the expert scheduled his vacation,and when counsel learned of the expert's vacation schedule. However, that claimed justificationfor dismissing the plaintiff's action, which is adopted by the dissent, is not supported by therecord since the Supreme Court never mentioned any of those enumerated deficiencies during thecolloquy on January 4, 2010.

Similarly, in its order denying the motion to vacate the default, the Supreme Court explainedthat the dismissal was based, in part, on the plaintiff's failure to proceed on January 14, 2010, arationale which was not advanced in the court's written order dismissing the action. Moreover,contrary to the Supreme Court's explanation, failure to proceed on January 14 could not [*3]be a premise for dismissing the action, as the court never orderedthe parties to appear on that date, and the plaintiff's counsel could not be in default if he did nothave a legal duty to perform, the very definition of a default (see Pelaez v Westchester Med. Ctr., 15 AD3d 375, 376 [2005]).The plaintiff's counsel also could not be in default for failing to proceed on January 14 for thesimple reason that the January 14 date had not yet passed when the action was dismissed(see 22 NYCRR 202.27 ["At any scheduled call of a calendar or at anyconference, if all parties do not appear and proceed or announce their readiness to proceedimmediately or subject to the engagement of counsel, the judge may note the default on therecord" (emphasis added)]).

Moreover, during the colloquy on January 4, the plaintiff's counsel, along with the attorneysfor the Hospital and Malhotra, alerted the court to scheduling conflicts so a schedule could beworked out, but the Supreme Court precipitously dismissed the action. In fact, prior to thedismissal, the plaintiff's counsel stated that all of the parties could be ready for trial inmid-February. Thus, the plaintiff's counsel was never afforded an opportunity to fully explain hisfirm's conflict. Had the Supreme Court actually set January 14 as the trial date and directed theparties to appear, the plaintiff's counsel would have had the opportunity to obtain substitutecounsel or to have the courts determine priority of the trials based on the existence of an actualengagement of counsel (see 22 NYCRR 125.1).

Even accepting the post hoc conclusion that the action was validly dismissed for the failureto proceed on January 14, a reasonable excuse for that failure was provided. The plaintiff'scounsel explained that his firm had another trial involving a medical malpractice claim scheduledin Kings County for January 19, 2010, that the case had been marked as final, and that it wasolder than this case. The plaintiff's counsel noted that, in the instant action, the presentation of hiscase alone would take three days, and, thus, depending on the length of the case presented by theHospital and Malhotra, there was the potential for a conflict between the Kings County case andthis case. Thus, it is evident from the record that counsel was trying to avoid the "overbooking ofcases" (Pichardo-Garcia v Josephine'sSpa Corp., 91 AD3d 413, 414 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Perez v New York City Hous.Auth., 47 AD3d 505, 505 [2008]). While we agree with the dissent that there was noactual conflict on January 14, the point is that there was the potential for conflict on January 19when the two trials might overlap, and the plaintiff's counsel was attempting to avoid creating aconflict for his firm. Moreover, contrary to our dissenting colleague's assertion, counsel indicatedthat The Pagan Law Firm, P.C., consisted of only three lawyers, and that William Pagan was theonly attorney from the firm qualified to try medical malpractice cases. The dissent characterizesthis contention as "unsubstantiated and self-serving after-the-fact," since it was not made untilcounsel for the plaintiff submitted reply papers on the motion to vacate. However, this contentionwas made in response to arguments advanced by the Hospital and Malhotra, which is the properfunction of reply papers (see Matter ofHarleysville Ins. Co. v Rosario, 17 AD3d 677, 677-678 [2005]; Lebar Constr. Corp.v HRH Constr. Corp., 292 AD2d 506, 507 [2002]). Therefore, under the circumstances ofthis case, we conclude that the plaintiff provided a reasonable excuse for the inability to proceedon January 4, 2010, and January 14, 2010 (see Mayo v New York Tel. Co., 175 AD2d390, 391 [1991]; see also Krivda vLiberty Lines Express, Inc., 27 AD3d 260, 261 [2006]; cf. McKenna v Connors, 36 AD3d1062, 1063 [2007]).

Furthermore, the Hospital and Malhotra would not have been prejudiced by adjourning thematter to the middle of February 2010, particularly since they agreed that they would be availableto try the case then (see Chelli v KellyGroup, P.C., 63 AD3d 632, 633 [2009]; Kahlke v Buscemi, 12 AD3d 488, 489 [2004]; Basetti vNour, 287 AD2d 126, 129 [2001]; Mayo v New York Tel. Co., 175 AD2d at 391;see also Krivda v Liberty Lines Express, Inc., 27 AD3d at 261).

There is no dispute that the plaintiff's action potentially has merit, and public policy stronglyfavors resolving cases on the merits (seeNickell v Pathmark Stores, Inc., 44 AD3d 631, 632 [2007]; M.S. Hi-Tech, Inc. v Thompson, 23AD3d 442, 443 [2005]). The plaintiff should not be deprived of her day in court because ofsome difficulty in rescheduling a trial date that was convenient for all the parties (see Burgessv Brooklyn Jewish Hosp., 272 AD2d 285 [2000]). We recognize that the Supreme Court hasbroad discretion in controlling its trial calendar, but that discretion must be exercised in ajudicious manner, particularly when an improvident exercise of that discretion will result in the[*4]dismissal of a potentially meritorious cause of action (see generally People v Griffin, 92AD3d 1, 3 [2011]).

Finally, our dissenting colleague notes that this action is nearly a decade old and, in doing so,implies that the delay in prosecuting it is entirely attributable to the plaintiff. To the contrary, therecord demonstrates that the plaintiff was ready to proceed to trial in May 2008, when theHospital suddenly impleaded Malhotra as a third-party defendant. Thereafter, Malhotra wasintransigent in complying with the plaintiff's discovery requests, necessitating motion practice tocompel compliance. In the absence of these dilatory tactics, the action may very well have beentried years ago.

The plaintiff's remaining contention has been rendered academic in light of ourdetermination. Florio, Chambers and Lott, JJ., concur.

Dillon, J.P., dissents and votes to affirm the order dated June 4, 2010, with the followingmemorandum: I respectfully dissent.

The trial assignment part has broad discretion in the scheduling of trials. A review ofdecisions and orders regarding trial adjournments is measured by an improvident exercise ofdiscretion standard (see Matter of DuaneS., Jr. [Duane S.], 88 AD3d 727, 728 [2011]; Diamond v Diamante, 57 AD3d 826, 827 [2008]; Atwater v Mace, 39 AD3d 573,574 [2007]; Matter of Kagno v Kagno, 296 AD2d 410, 410-411 [2002]).

On September 11, 2009, during a status conference, the Supreme Court scheduled the trial ofthis matter for January 4, 2010. On that date, the plaintiff's counsel requested an adjournmentbecause an expert witness was on vacation and unavailable to testify. The Supreme Court soughtto accommodate the plaintiff's scheduling difficulty by offering to adjourn the trial to January 14,2010.

Inexplicably, the suggested adjournment date was unacceptable to the plaintiff's counsel, notbecause it presented any actual scheduling conflict on January 14, 2010, but because it mightconflict with a Kings Country trial that was scheduled to begin several days thereafter. In theinstant matter, the plaintiff's counsel stated that a period of only three days was required to put onthe plaintiff's case. The Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 22NYCRR 202.27 due to the plaintiff's inability or refusal to proceed to trial, despite three monthsnotice of the date.

The plaintiff moved to vacate the dismissal. The plaintiff acknowledged in her movingpapers that to be entitled to the vacatur of a 22 NYCRR 202.27 default, she needed todemonstrate (1) a reasonable excuse for failing to proceed, (2) a potentially meritorious cause ofaction, (3) the lack of intent to abandon the cause of action, and (4) lack of prejudice to theopposing party (see Basetti v Nour, 287 AD2d 126 [2001]). In my view, the SupremeCourt properly denied the plaintiff's motion to vacate, as there was no reasonable excuseproffered for the unwillingness or inability to proceed on the January 14, 2010, adjourned dateoffered by the trial assignment judge. The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excusefor vacating a default lies within the sound discretion of the trial court (see Matter ofGambardella v Ortov Light., 278 AD2d 494 [2000]; Parker v City of New York, 272AD2d 310, 311 [2000]; David vShaji, 27 Misc 3d 128[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50590[U] [2010]). Here, the plaintiff'scounsel never explained whether the plaintiff's expert was not given enough notification of thescheduled trial date, or whether the expert was given enough notification yet chose to leave forvacation despite the trial. The majority states that counsel indicated that William Pagan was theonly attorney at the law firm who was qualified to try medical malpractice cases. However,counsel's claim was unsubstantiated and self-serving after-the-fact, as he failed to advance thatargument until his reply on the motion to vacate. Most significantly, there was no [*5]actual conflict for the plaintiff's counsel on the suggested January14, 2010, adjourned date. As such, counsel failed to set forth a reasonable excuse warranting afurther adjournment based upon the engagement of counsel (see 22 NYCRR 125.1).

Generally, trial assignment judges, as a matter of judicial efficiency and professionalcourtesy, may accommodate scheduling difficulties encountered by the attorneys who appearbefore them. Such an accommodation was attempted by the court in this matter, but refused bythe plaintiff's counsel. Since the trial court has the inherent authority to control and manage itscalendar (see Schreiber-Cross v State ofNew York, 57 AD3d 881, 884 [2008]), the Supreme Court's denial of the plaintiff'smotion to vacate her default in this nearly decade-old case, under these particular circumstances,did not constitute an improvident exercise of discretion.


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