| Stewart v Kier |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 07455 [100 AD3d 1389] |
| November 9, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| Michelle Stewart, Respondent, v Suzanne Kier et al., Respondents,and Annie Waldron et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Gallo & Iacovangelo, LLP, Rochester (David D. Spoto of counsel), for plaintiff-respondent. Law Offices of Laurie G. Ogden, Rochester (David F. Bowen of counsel), fordefendant-respondent Charlene Hauser. Barth Sullivan Behr, Buffalo (Andrew J. Kowalewski of counsel), for defendant-respondentSuzanne Kier.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Ann Marie Taddeo, J.),entered November 18, 2011 in a personal injury action. The order denied the motion ofdefendants Annie Waldron and Sammie Hannah for summary judgment.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the lawwithout costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint and cross claims against defendantsAnnie Waldron and Sammie Hannah are dismissed.
Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries she sustained ina motor vehicle accident when she was a passenger in a vehicle operated by Annie Waldron andowned by Sammie Hannah (defendants). The accident occurred when a vehicle operated bydefendant Suzanne Kier collided with the vehicle operated by Waldron. Kier and Waldron weredriving in opposite directions on a two-lane highway, and the vehicle driven by Kier enteredWaldron's lane of travel. Immediately after the collision, a vehicle driven by defendant CharleneHauser, who had been traveling behind Waldron, collided with the back of Waldron's vehicle.Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross claims againstthem, contending that the emergency doctrine applied and that Waldron's actions were reasonableunder the circumstances. We agree with defendants that Supreme Court erred in denying theirmotion.
Under the emergency doctrine, " 'when [a driver] is faced with a sudden and unexpectedcircumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes[*2]the [driver] to be reasonably so disturbed that [he or she]must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the [driver] maynot be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context'. . . , provided the [driver] has not created the emergency" (Caristo vSanzone, 96 NY2d 172, 174 [2001], quoting Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77NY2d 322, 327 [1991], rearg denied 77 NY2d 990 [1991]). It is also well established thata driver is "not required to anticipate that [another driver's] vehicle, traveling in the oppositedirection, would cross over into his [or her] lane of travel" (Cardot v Genova, 280 AD2d983, 983 [2001]).
Here, defendants met their initial burden by establishing as a matter of law that theemergency doctrine applied, inasmuch as Kier's vehicle unexpectedly crossed over intoWaldron's lane of travel and deposition testimony established that Waldron had little or no timeto react or avoid the collision (see Caristo, 96 NY2d at 174). In response, plaintiff failedto raise an issue of fact with respect to the applicability of the emergency doctrine or thereasonableness of Waldron's actions. Although "it generally remains a question for the trier offact to determine whether an emergency existed and, if so, whether the [driver's] response theretowas reasonable" (Schlanger v Doe,53 AD3d 827, 828 [2008]), summary judgment is appropriate where, as here, " 'the driverpresents sufficient evidence to establish the reasonableness of his or her actions [in an emergencysituation] and there is no opposing evidentiary showing sufficient to raise a legitimate question offact' " (McGraw v Glowacki, 303 AD2d 968, 969 [2003]; see Ward v Cox, 38 AD3d 313,314 [2007]). The contentions of plaintiff, Kier, and Hauser that Waldron may have had sufficienttime to react to the crossover vehicle or that Waldron was driving at an excessive rate of speedfor the road conditions are speculative and thus are insufficient to raise an issue of fact to defeatthe motion (see generally Bellassai vRoberts Wesleyan Coll., 59 AD3d 1125, 1126 [2009]). Present—Centra, J.P.,Fahey, Peradotto, Carni and Sconiers, JJ.