Hom v Hom
2012 NY Slip Op 08491 [101 AD3d 816]
December 12, 2012
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 6, 2013


Kai Hong Hom, Respondent,
v
Bill Hom, Appellant, et al.,Defendants.

—[*1]Cyruli Shanks Hart & Zizmor, LLP, New York, N.Y. (James E. Schwartz and Marc J.Schneider of counsel), for appellant.

Morton S. Minsley, New York, N.Y., for respondent.

In an action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that the plaintiff is the sole owner of certainreal property and the proceeds of two financial accounts, the defendant Bill Hom appeals from ajudgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Risi, J.H.O.), entered March 10, 2011, which,after a nonjury trial, is in favor of the plaintiff and against him, inter alia, declaring that theplaintiff is the sole owner of the subject real property and financial accounts.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff owned real property with his late wife. In 1988 they executed a deed purportingto transfer the premises to themselves and their son, the appellant Bill Hom (hereinafter theappellant), as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. The plaintiff's wife died two years later.In subsequent years, the plaintiff opened a bank account with Abacus Federal Savings Bank anda brokerage account with HSBC Brokerage, both of which were opened jointly in the names ofthe plaintiff and the appellant.

In 2006 the plaintiff commenced this action seeking, inter alia, a judgment declaring that heis the sole owner of the property and the two financial accounts, and directing that the appellant'sname be removed from all indicia and records of title or ownership. After a nonjury trial, theSupreme Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the appellant, inter alia,declaring that the plaintiff is the sole owner of the property and the financial accounts. Indetermining that the plaintiff did not have a present intention to transfer an interest in theproperty to the appellant, despite having placed his name on the deed, the Supreme Court foundthat the appellant had not paid any consideration toward the purchase of the property, or anycontribution toward its upkeep. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no completedinter vivos gift of an interest in the property. With respect to the financial accounts, the SupremeCourt determined that the appellant's name was added to the two accounts solely forconvenience.

In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, the power of this Court is as broad asthat of the trial court, and this Court may render the judgment it finds "warranted by the facts,"bearing in mind that in a close case, the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses[*2]and hearing the testimony (Northern WestchesterProfessional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983]; see DePaula v State of New York, 82AD3d 827 [2011]; Kaygreen RealtyCo. v IG Second Generation Partners, L.P., 68 AD3d 933 [2009]). Here, the SupremeCourt's findings were warranted by the facts and will not be disturbed. The Supreme Courtcredited the plaintiff's testimony that the appellant did not make any contributions toward thepurchase of the premises or to have his name added to the deed, and discredited the appellant'stestimony to the contrary. " 'Where the findings of fact rest in large measure on considerationsrelating to the credibility of witnesses, deference is owed to the trial court's credibilitydeterminations' " (Papovitch vPapovitch, 84 AD3d 1045, 1046 [2011], quoting Praimnath v Torres, 59 AD3d 419, 419-420 [2009]).

Moreover, the evidence supported the Supreme Court's finding that there was no completedinter vivos gift of an interest in the premises. "An inter vivos gift requires that the donor intend tomake an irrevocable present transfer of ownership; if the intention is to make a testamentarydisposition effective only after death, the gift is invalid unless made by will" (Gruen vGruen, 68 NY2d 48, 53 [1986]; seeGreene v Greene, 92 AD3d 838 [2012]; Ross v Ross Metals Corp., 87 AD3d 573, 575 [2011]). The plaintifftestified that the appellant's name was added to the deed so that, upon the deaths of him and hiswife, the premises would be transferred to the appellant, and not their daughters, in accordancewith Chinese tradition. The appellant conceded that he heard his parents express this purpose tothe attorney who prepared the deed. Further, the Supreme Court credited the plaintiff's testimonythat he continued to pay all expenses of the premises with no contribution from the appellant, andit was undisputed that the appellant never reported any rental income from the premises on histax returns (see Byrd v Brown, 208 AD2d 582 [1994]; cf. Pell St. Nineteen Corp. vYue Er Liu Mah, 243 AD2d 121 [1998]).

The Supreme Court's finding that the appellant's name was added to the bank and brokerageaccounts solely for convenience also was warranted by the facts. In general, the deposit of fundsinto a joint bank or brokerage account constitutes prima facie evidence of an intent to create ajoint tenancy (see Banking Law § 675; Matter of Yaros, 90 AD3d 1063 [2011]; Matter of Corcoran, 63 AD3d 93,96 [2009]). The statutory presumption created by Banking Law § 675 can be rebutted,however, " 'by providing direct proof that no joint tenancy was intended or substantialcircumstantial proof that the joint account had been opened for convenience only' " (Matter ofYaros, 90 AD3d at 1064, quoting Matter of Richichi, 38 AD3d 558, 559 [2007]; see Crescimanno v Crescimanno, 33AD3d 649 [2006]; Fragetti v Fragetti, 262 AD2d 527 [1999]; Matter of Phelps vKramer, 102 AD2d 908 [1984]).

The plaintiff testified that he added the appellant's name to the accounts at the suggestion ofbank officials, so that the appellant could retrieve the funds upon his death. Given the lack ofdocumentary substantiation, the Supreme Court discredited the appellant's testimony that hedeposited any funds into either account, or into previous accounts which were the source for theinitial deposits. The court credited the plaintiff's testimony that the accounts were funded with hisown money, without contribution by the appellant. Deference is owed to this credibilitydetermination (see Papovitch vPapovitch, 84 AD3d 1045 [2011]; Praimnath v Torres, 59 AD3d 419 [2009]). Although the appellantmade one withdrawal from the Abacus Federal Savings Bank account, such withdrawal was notraised at trial and was thus unexplained. The plaintiff made all other transactions, received allbrokerage statements, and held the only passbook for the bank account. Further, the plaintiff hadlimited command of the English language and the appellant was the only child residing with himwhen the accounts were opened (see Plotnikoff v Finkelstein, 105 AD2d 10 [1984];Brezinski v Brezinski, 94 AD2d 969 [1983]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court's findingthat the plaintiff rebutted the statutory presumption of Banking Law § 675 was warrantedby the facts and will not be disturbed.

The appellant's remaining contention is without merit. Dillon, J.P., Florio, Lott and Sgroi, JJ.,concur.


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