Carfi v Forget
2012 NY Slip Op 08893 [101 AD3d 1616]
December 21, 2012
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 6, 2013


Joseph J. Carfi, Appellant, v David C. Forget et al.,Respondents.

—[*1]Lynch Schwab, PLLC, Syracuse (Andrew J. Schwab of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Law Offices of Karen L. Lawrence, Dewitt (Barney F. Bilello of counsel), fordefendants-respondents.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (James P. Murphy, J.),entered August 1, 2011 in a personal injury action. The order granted the motion of defendantsfor summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries he sustainedwhen the vehicle in which he was a passenger was struck by a vehicle owned by defendant DawnM. Forget and operated by defendant David C. Forget. We conclude that Supreme Court properlygranted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground thatplaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).We note at the outset that, although plaintiff alleged that he sustained several categories ofserious injury in his bill of particulars, his appellate brief alleges only that he sustained apermanent consequential limitation of use of his cervical spine. Plaintiff therefore has abandonedhis contentions with respect to the remaining categories of serious injury (see Beaton v Jones, 50 AD3d1500, 1501 [2008]).

Defendants met their initial burden on the motion of establishing that plaintiff did not sustaina serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use category, and plaintiff failedto raise a triable issue of fact to defeat the motion (see Lux v Jakson, 52 AD3d 1253, 1254 [2008]; McConnell v Freeman, 52 AD3d1190, 1191 [2008], lv denied 55 AD3d 1420 [2008]). In support of their motion,defendants submitted the affirmed report of the orthopedic surgeon who examined plaintiff ondefendants' behalf. After examining plaintiff and reviewing his medical records, the orthopedicsurgeon concluded within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that there was no objectiveevidence that plaintiff sustained a "causally related injury of any significance." He concludedinstead that plaintiff likely sustained a cervical strain as a result of the accident. Althoughplaintiff was diagnosed with a herniated disc three years after the accident, the orthopedicsurgeon concluded that such injury was unrelated to the accident and was consistent withdegenerative disc disease. Moreover, the orthopedic surgeon concluded that [*2]plaintiff was not impaired or disabled by that condition. He notedthat plaintiff exhibited no palpable spasm, motor deficits, or objective sensory deficits and thatplaintiff's cervical spine flexion, extension, lateral deviation, and right-sided rotation were allwithin normal limits. Only plaintiff's left-sided rotation was "mildly decreased," i.e., 55 degreescompared with normal rotation of 60 to 90 degrees. Defendants also submitted excerpts fromplaintiff's deposition, in which plaintiff testified that he missed only one day of work after theaccident and that he did not see his primary care physician or any other doctors for pain orstiffness in his neck for approximately two and a half years after the accident.

In opposition to defendants' motion, plaintiff submitted, inter alia, the affirmation of histreating neurosurgeon, who reviewed plaintiff's pre- and post-accident imaging studies andconcluded that plaintiff sustained two herniated discs as a result of the accident. Plaintiff alsosubmitted MRI and X ray reports reflecting the existence of two herniated discs in his cervicalspine. Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to the causation ofthe herniated discs, we conclude that the court properly granted defendants' motion becauseplaintiff failed to submit objective medical evidence establishing plaintiff's limitations orrestrictions of use resulting from those injuries (see Accurso v Kloc, 77 AD3d 1295, 1297 [2010]). It is well settledthat "[p]roof of a herniated disc, without additional objective medical evidence establishing thatthe accident resulted in significant physical limitations, is not alone sufficient to establish aserious injury" (Pommells v Perez,4 NY3d 566, 574 [2005]; see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345, 353 n 4[2002]; Caldwell v Grant [appeal No. 2], 31 AD3d 1154, 1155-1156 [2006]). "Whether alimitation of use or function is . . . 'consequential' (i.e., important . . . )relates to medical significance and involves a comparative determination of the degree orqualitative nature of an injury based on the normal function, purpose and use of the body part"(Dufel v Green, 84 NY2d 795, 798 [1995]; see Accurso, 77 AD3d at 1296).

Here, plaintiff also submitted the letter affirmation from a nontreating orthopedic surgeon inopposition to defendants' motion, which states that upon physical examination plaintiff exhibitednormal flexion, "mild" restrictions in left rotation, "moderate" restrictions in extension, leftlateral bending and right-rotation, and "marked" restrictions in right lateral bending. Thatorthopedic surgeon did not, however, quantify plaintiff's range of motion restrictions or provide aqualitative assessment "compar[ing] the plaintiff's limitations to the normal function, purposeand use of [the cervical spine]" (Toure, 98 NY2d at 350; see Dann v Yeh, 55 AD3d 1439,1440 [2008]; Caldwell, 31 AD3d at 1156). Although the affirmation of plaintiff's treatingneurosurgeon referenced range of motion losses "documented by [him]self and variousphysicians," he likewise failed to provide a quantitative or qualitative assessment thereof (seeToure, 98 NY2d at 350; Caldwell, 31 AD3d at 1156). Moreover, although bothsurgeons opined that plaintiff sustained a "permanent consequential loss" of function or use ofhis cervical spine as a result of the accident, those conclusory assertions are insufficient to raise atriable issue of fact (see Anderson vCapital Dist. Transp. Auth., 74 AD3d 1616, 1617 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d709 [2010]; Barry v Future CabCorp., 71 AD3d 710, 711 [2010]; Burridge v Gaines, 294 AD2d 892, 893[2002]).

Finally, we conclude that plaintiff's submission of an affidavit in which he described hisphysical limitations—i.e., that he cannot turn his head "normally," operate a lawnmower,or "shovel[ ] [his] driveway"; that he has to be "careful" with his activities to prevent the onset ofpain; and that prolonged standing triggers headaches and increased neck pain—isinsufficient to establish a permanent consequential limitation of use inasmuch as plaintiff'sexperts "did not address or quantify any limitations in the activities of plaintiff resulting from[his] injuries" (Accurso, 77 AD3d at 1297). Present—Centra, J.P., Peradotto,Sconiers, Valentino and Martoche, JJ.


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