| Matter of Watson v Fiala |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 08923 [101 AD3d 1649] |
| December 21, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| In the Matter of Charles E. Watson, Individually and Doing Business asC.E.W. Motors, Petitioner, v Barbara J. Fiala, New York State Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,Respondent. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Owen Demuth of counsel), forrespondent.
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to the Appellate Division of the SupremeCourt in the Fourth Judicial Department by judgment (denominated order) of the Supreme Court,Monroe County [William P. Polito, J.], entered January 18, 2012) to review the determinations ofrespondent. The determinations revoked petitioner's inspection station license and his certified inspectorlicense.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs, thedeterminations are confirmed and the petition is dismissed in its entirety.
Memorandum: Respondent charged petitioner, individually and doing business as C.E.W. Motors,with violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 303 (e) (3) and 15 NYCRR 79.17 (b) (1) and 79.24(i), concerning an inspection petitioner performed on a "concealed identity vehicle." Petitioner appearedbefore the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) without the benefit of counsel and, following a hearing, theALJ found petitioner guilty of all three charges. Finding that "[petitioner's] testimony exhibited the mostcomplete and thorough disregard of the State laws and the Commissioner's regulations whenperforming New York State inspections that [he had] hear[d] in . . . 19 years," the ALJrevoked the inspector's card issued to petitioner as well as C.E.W. Motors' inspection station license.
Petitioner hired an attorney and filed administrative appeals challenging the ALJ's determinations. Ineach of the administrative appeals, petitioner sought review of "both the findings and the revocation" ofhis inspector's card and license. He contended that vacatur was justified because he proceeded withoutthe benefit of counsel, there was insufficient evidence supporting the "conviction(s)," and the penaltyimposed was disproportionately severe. Petitioner did not file a transcript of the administrative hearingwith his administrative appeals, although he had received notifications informing him that it was hisobligation to do so.
The Administrative Appeals Board (Board) affirmed the determinations, noting that petitioner'sadministrative appeals raised "issues of fact [that] would require transcript review." With respect topetitioner's challenges to the penalty, the Board affirmed the penalties, finding [*2]that they "were not an abuse of discretion."
Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge the Board's determinations.Although petitioner contended in the petition that he was challenging only the penalty, he also contendedthat the determinations should be vacated because they were "unsupported by substantial evidence."We thus conclude that Supreme Court properly addressed the merits of petitioner's challenge to thepenalty and thereafter properly transferred the matter to this Court. We now affirm the judgment andconfirm the determinations.
Petitioner contends that the determinations should be vacated because he appeared at theadministrative hearing without the benefit of counsel. That contention lacks merit. "Aside from certainnarrow exceptions . . . , the right to counsel . . . does not extend to civilactions or administrative proceedings . . . Due process considerations in such casesrequire only that a party to an administrative hearing be afforded the opportunity to be represented bycounsel. Here, the record indicates that [petitioner] was provided with an adequate opportunity toobtain legal representation" (Matter of Baywood Elec. Corp. v New York State Dept. ofLabor, 232 AD2d 553, 554 [1996]).
Contrary to petitioner's further contention, the penalty of revocation is not "so disproportionate tothe offense, in the light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness" (Matterof Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck,Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 233 [1974] [internal quotation marks omitted]). To the extentthat petitioner may be deemed to contend that the determinations are not supported by substantialevidence, that contention cannot be addressed due to petitioner's failure to file a transcript of theadministrative hearing (see Matter of Brady v Department of Motor Vehs., 98 NY2d 625, 626[2002]; Matter of Cipry Auto., Inc. v NewYork State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 72 AD3d 816, 817 [2010]; see generally Vehicleand Traffic Law §§ 228 [5]; 398-f [3] [b] [3]). Present—Scudder, P.J., Centra,Valentino, Whalen and Martoche, JJ.