Wilson v Colosimo
2012 NY Slip Op 09249 [101 AD3d 1765]
December 28, 2012
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 6, 2013


Harold Wilson et al., Appellants, v Christopher Colosimo et al.,Respondents.

—[*1]Hogan Willig, Amherst (Eric B. Grossman of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellants.

Trevett Cristo Salzer & Andolina, P.C., Rochester (Erica M. Direnzo of counsel), fordefendants-respondents.

Appeal from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (ThomasA. Stander, J.), entered September 15, 2011. The order and judgment granted the motion ofdefendants for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied the cross motion of plaintiffs forpartial summary judgment.

It is hereby ordered that the order and judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified on thelaw by denying the motion in part and reinstating the complaint, as amplified by the bill of particulars,with respect to the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categoriesof serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) and as modified the order andjudgment is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking damages for injuries that Harold Wilson(plaintiff) allegedly sustained when the recycling truck he was driving was rear-ended by a vehicleowned by defendant R.J. Chevrolet, Inc., doing business as Bob Johnson Chevrolet, and operated bydefendant Christopher Colosimo. According to plaintiffs' supplemental bill of particulars, plaintiffallegedly sustained a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use, the significantlimitation of use and the 90/180-day categories of serious injury. Defendants initially moved forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injurypursuant to Insurance Law § 5102 (d) that was proximately caused by the accident. Plaintiffsopposed the motion and cross-moved for partial summary judgment on their claim for economic loss inexcess of basic economic loss. Supreme Court granted defendants' motion and denied plaintiffs' crossmotion. We note that the order does not address the dismissal of plaintiffs' claim for economic loss,which does not require a showing of serious injury (see generally Montgomery v Daniels, 38NY2d 41, 47-48 [1975]; Colvin vSlawoniewski, 15 AD3d 900, 900 [2005]). In its bench decision, however, the courtawarded defendants summary judgment dismissing that claim on the authority of CPLR 3212 (b).Where, as here, " 'there is a conflict between an order and a decision,' " the decision controls (Stivers v [*2]Brownell, 63 AD3d 1516, 1517-1518 [2009]). We concludethat the court erred in granting those parts of defendants' motion with respect to the permanentconsequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of serious injury. We thereforemodify the order accordingly.

Defendants met their initial burden on the motion by submitting an expert's affirmation establishingas a matter of law that there was "no sign of injury to the cervical, thoracic or lumbar spine, and amarked exaggeration of the response to testing in the upper and lower extremities and no objectivefindings concerning neck, shoulders, lumbar spine, hips, knees, ankles, and feet." Defendants' expertattributed plaintiff's complaints of pain to preexisting injuries and "multilevel degenerative changes."Furthermore, because defendants' expert concluded that the only objective medical findings of an injuryto plaintiff were related to a preexisting degenerative condition of his spine, "plaintiff[s] had the burdento come forward with evidence addressing defendant[s'] claimed lack of causation" (Carrasco vMendez, 4 NY3d 566, 580 [2005]; seeMendola v Doubrava, 99 AD3d 1247, 1248 [2012]; Webb v Bock, 77 AD3d 1414, 1415 [2010]).

In opposition to defendants' motion, however, plaintiffs raised triable issues of fact with respect tothe permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of serious injuryby submitting the affidavit and attached report of plaintiff's treating chiropractor as well as an affidavitand attached reports and records from a physician specializing in occupational medicine. Thosedocuments "contain the requisite objective medical findings that raise issues of fact whether plaintiffsustained a serious injury" as a result of the instant accident (Roll v Gavitt, 77 AD3d 1412, 1413 [2010]; see Terwilliger v Knickerbocker, 81 AD3d1350, 1351 [2011]; Harris vCarella, 42 AD3d 915, 916-917 [2007]; cf. Caldwell v Grant [appeal No. 2], 31AD3d 1154, 1155 [2006]).

Nevertheless, we agree with defendants that the court properly granted that part of their motionregarding the 90/180-day category of serious injury. Defendants submitted competent evidenceestablishing that plaintiff's activities " 'were not curtailed to a great extent' and that [he] therefore did notsustain a serious injury under the 90/180[-day] category of serious injury" (Schreiber v Krehbiel, 64 AD3d 1244,1246 [2009]). Plaintiffs submitted nothing in opposition to defendants' motion with respect to thatcategory and thus failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether plaintiff "was unable to performsubstantially all of the material acts that constituted [his] usual and customary daily activities during therequisite period of time" (Burke v Moran,85 AD3d 1710, 1711 [2011]; see generally Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230, 236 [1982]).

Finally, we conclude that the court properly denied plaintiffs' cross motion and granted defendantssummary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 (b) on plaintiffs' claim for economic loss in excess of basiceconomic loss. Although a claim for economic loss does not require the plaintiff to have sustained aserious injury (see generally Montgomery, 38 NY2d at 47-48; Colvin, 15 AD3d at900; Barnes v Kociszewski, 4 AD3d824, 825 [2004]), plaintiffs here "failed to produce any evidence in admissible form whichsupports such a claim" (Watford vBoolukos, 5 AD3d 475, 476 [2004]; see Insurance Law §§ 5102 [a][1]-[3]; 5104 [a]). While plaintiffs correctly contend that they need not await the full $50,000 payoutfor basic economic losses from their first-party no-fault policy before making a claim under InsuranceLaw § 5102 (a) for those additional economic losses that exceed the basic economic lossthreshold, they still failed to establish that plaintiff's total economic losses here did actually"exceed basic economic loss" (Watkins v Bank of Castile, 172 AD2d 1061, 1062[1991] [emphasis added]; see Diaz vLopresti, 57 AD3d 832, 833 [2008]). Present—Scudder, P.J., Centra, Fahey, Carniand Valentino, JJ.


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