Matter of Malik S. (Jana M.)
2012 NY Slip Op 09257 [101 AD3d 1776]
December 28, 2012
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 6, 2013


In the Matter of Malik S., an Infant. Onondaga County Department ofSocial Services, Respondent; Jana M., Appellant. (Appeal No. 1.)

[*1]Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Philip Rothschild of counsel), forrespondent-appellant.

Gordon J. Cuffy, County Attorney, Syracuse (Sara J. Langan of counsel), forpetitioner-respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Onondaga County (Martha E. Mulroy, J.), enteredAugust 8, 2011 in a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b. The order, inter alia,revoked a suspended judgment and terminated the parental rights of respondent.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law withoutcosts and the matter is remitted to Family Court, Onondaga County, for a dispositional hearing inaccordance with the following memorandum: In appeal No. 1, respondent mother appeals from anorder that, inter alia, revoked a suspended judgment and terminated her parental rights with respect tothe child who is the subject of this proceeding. In appeal No. 2, the mother appeals from an ordersetting forth the terms and conditions regarding posttermination contact with the child.

With respect to appeal No. 1, it is well settled that, during the period of a suspended judgment, aparent " 'must comply with [the] terms and conditions set forth in the judgment that are designed toameliorate' " the circumstances which resulted in the original finding of permanent neglect (Matter ofKaleb U., 280 AD2d 710, 712 [2001]). If the agency establishes by a preponderance of theevidence that there has been noncompliance with any of the terms of the suspended judgment, FamilyCourt may revoke the suspended judgment and terminate parental rights (see Matter of Gracie YY., 34 AD3d1053, 1054 [2006]; Matter of NikkiasT., 32 AD3d 1220, 1221 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 716 [2006]). Here, petitionermet that burden inasmuch as the evidence established that the mother violated numerous terms of thesuspended judgment (see Matter of ElizabethJ. [Jocelyn J.], 87 AD3d 1406, 1406 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 804 [2011]; Matter of Ronald O., 43 AD3d 1351,1352 [2007]).

The mother's contention that petitioner was required to submit medical or psychological evidenceestablishing that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child is unpreserved forour review and without merit (see generally Matter of McCullough v Brown, [*2]21 AD3d 1349, 1349 [2005]). The mother also failed to preserve forour review her contention that the court should have extended the term of the suspended judgment(see Family Ct Act § 633 [b]; see generally Matter of Sean W. [Brittany W.], 87 AD3d 1318, 1319[2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 802 [2011]).

Nevertheless, petitioner and the mother allege new circumstances and request that we remit thismatter to the court for a dispositional hearing. It is well settled that "changed circumstances may haveparticular significance in child custody matters," and we may take notice of those new circumstances(Matter of Michael B., 80 NY2d 299, 318 [1992]). Here, the alleged new circumstancesinclude allegations that the adoptive placement was disrupted and the child is currently living in a grouphome, that no other adoptive placement has been located, that the child no longer wishes to beadopted, that the child has reestablished contact with his maternal grandmother, and that the maternalgrandmother intends to pursue legal custody. In light of those alleged new circumstances, " 'it is notclear that termination of the mother's parental rights is in the child's best interests' " (Matter of Shad S. [Amy C.Y.], 67 AD3d1359, 1360 [2009]; see Matter ofArthur C., 66 AD3d 1009, 1010 [2009]). We therefore reverse the order in appeal No. 1and remit the matter to Family Court for a dispositional hearing to determine the child's best interests.

With respect to appeal No. 2, in light of our determination in appeal No. 1, we reverse the ordergranting posttermination contact. Present—Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Lindley, Whalen andMartoche, JJ.


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