| Matter of Pria J.L. (Sharon L.) |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 00412 [102 AD3d 576] |
| January 29, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| In the Matter of Pria J.L. and Another, Children Alleged tobe Neglected. Sharon L., Appellant; Administration for Children's Services,Respondent. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Drake A. Colley of counsel),for respondent. Tamara A. Steckler, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Amy Hausknecht ofcounsel), attorney for the children.
Order of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Clark V. Richardson, J.),entered on or about August 10, 2011, which, to the extent appealed from as limited bythe briefs, brings up for review a fact-finding determination that respondent mother hadneglected her daughter, unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs,the finding of neglect vacated, and the petition dismissed.
Respondent was charged with neglecting her 12-year-old daughter, Pria, andderivatively neglecting her 10-year-old daughter, Amber, by aiding and abetting theinfliction of excessive corporal punishment upon the 12 year old by her 27-year-oldbrother, Dion, on June 8, 2010 (see Family Ct Act §§ 1046 [b] [i];1012 [f] [i] [B]; Matter ofJoseph C. [Anthony C.], 88 AD3d 478 [1st Dept 2011]). Family Court foundthat respondent had neglected Pria, but not Amber because an isolated event wasinvolved. Respondent and the attorney for the children appeal from the finding of neglectand the latter seeks dismissal of the petition.
Sandra Gracey, a child protective specialist who met with the child the day after theincident at issue, Patricia Sanger, another caseworker, and respondent, Sharon L.,testified at the trial in May 2011. The evidence indicated that on or about June 8, 2010respondent, Sharon L., orally argued with her 12-year-old daughter because the child hadnot come directly home after school and had convinced her younger sister, Amber, tostay out as well. Dion, Pria's adult brother, involved himself in the argument, andaccording to information given to Gracey by Pria, began hitting her. Pria then ran down astaircase and claimed that Dion ran after her and pushed her, causing her to fall andinjure her knee. When her brother told her to get up, Pria stated that she could not get upbecause her knee hurt. Dion then called upstairs, requesting that respondent give him abelt. Respondent asked Amber to give her a belt to give to Dion, which the latter then[*2]used to hit Pria on her "hind leg with the belt." Dionthen carried Pria back upstairs, "accidentally" banging her knee against the bannister.Neighbors, hearing the commotion, called the police, who came and, after Pria said shecould not get up and walk, called for an ambulance. Pria was taken to Beth IsraelHospital, and Dion was arrested. The caseworker who interviewed Pria the next dayobserved Pria wearing a brace and using a cane because of the injury to her knee, butPria was fine when next seen by the caseworker several days later.
Although a temporary order of protection (TOP) was issued on behalf of Pria againsther brother as a result of the incident, respondent allowed the brother, who occasionallystayed over, to spend the night of June 24 on an air mattress in the same room with Priaand Amber. No problems were reported.
Respondent testified that, on the day of the incident, Pria had been disrepectful andargumentative with her, and that Pria and Dion got into an argument, with Pria insistingthat Dion was not her father. Respondent also stated that when she saw Pria and Dion atthe bottom of the stairway, Dion was walking back and forth holding his pants becausehe had not finished dressing for his work as a security guard. She believed that Dion hadasked for a belt to finish dressing and that he had started to put it on, but, when Pria said,"I hate you," removed the belt and started hitting Pria. Respondent stated that she toldDion to "stop whatever you are doing" and cursed at him. Respondent indicated that shehad accompanied Pria to the hospital, but she did not attend any of Dion's court dates andheard nothing about the TOP until her mother told her about it on June 21 or 22.Respondent stated that when she next saw Dion on June 24, he denied that an order ofprotection had been issued. The caseworker informed respondent the next day that anorder had been issued.
There was no evidence of any prior incident of corporal punishment by respondent oranyone on her behalf. Nor was there any evidence of serious injury to Pria. Although theAdministration for Children's Services (ACS) removed Pria and Amber fromrespondent's home, putting them under the care of their fathers and then their maternalgrandmother, both girls very much wanted to return to respondent, spoke with her bytelephone daily, and visited with her regularly. They were unhappy living with the otherrelatives and being apart.
On June 28, 2011, the Family Court issued its decision, finding that while ACS hadproved that Pria had been neglected, there was no basis for a finding of derivativeneglect as to Amber because there was only a single incident of corporal punishment andPria had acted provocatively. The court "utterly reject[ed]" respondent's claim that Dionneeded the belt to get dressed for his security guard position, indicating that it was not"plausible" and that respondent, fully aware of the heated argument between her son anddaughter, had aided and abetted the infliction of corporal punishment. The court alsostated: "That this was an isolated incident does not in and of itself require dismissal. Asingle incident may be sufficient . . . where the court finds that thegravamen of the complaint was not accidental"
The court further found that there was "insufficient reliable evidence to establish thatrespondent knew of the existence of the order of protection" or that she knowingly andvoluntarily violated that order by allowing Dion to sleep on the floor in Pria and Amber'sroom. Indeed, the court found "there is insufficient evidence to show that the respondent,in fact did allow Dion to sleep in his sister's room at all at the time encompassed by thetemporary order of protection."
On August 10, 2011, the court ordered that the children be released to therespondent's custody with ACS supervision for six months. The court stated that"notwithstanding the finding [*3]itself, which, of course,[is] towards the parent, . . . Pria has issues, and has an attitude, which needsto be addressed, because otherwise, it's just going to continue to put the mother in thesame awkward position that she's been in." Among other things, respondent was requiredto cooperate with a psychological assessment for Pria, resume therapy with Pria, andcooperate with ACS supervision. ACS did not appear before this Court at oral argument,but the attorney for the children reported that there have been no further incidents sincethe daughters were paroled to respondent's care.
In seeking reversal of the finding of neglect and dismissal of the petition, respondentand the attorney for the children aver that even when accepting all the findings of theFamily Court, respondent at most aided and abetted the infliction of corporal punishmenton one of her children on one occasion only. While the child was injured sufficiently towarrant medical intervention, the injury occurred when she either fell running away fromher brother or was pushed by her brother, or when her knee hit the bannister, and not as aresult of the use of the belt furnished by respondent. Further, the brother was the onearrested by the police and charged with assault, not respondent. In addition, Family Courtrejected the claim that respondent knowingly violated a TOP. We agree with respondentand the Legal Aid Society.
A "neglected child" is defined as one whose "physical, mental or emotional conditionhas been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of thefailure of his parent . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care. . . by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm" (Family CtAct § 1012 [f] [i] [B]). We find no reason to disturb the court's credibilitydetermination that respondent's explanation for furnishing the belt to her son (i.e., that heneeded the belt to complete his work outfit) was not plausible (see Matter of Amire B. [SelikaB.], 95 AD3d 632, 632 [1st Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 855[2013]). However, the finding of neglect based on this single incident should bereversed. There is no evidence that any emotional or significant physical injury occurredas a result of this incident. At most the child's provocative behavior caused anoverreaction on the part of her brother, condoned by her mother. In cases where a legalguardian is found negligent for condoning infliction of corporal punishment on a childby another, there has been a pattern of punishment, as opposed to an isolated incident(see e.g. Matter of Rayshawn R., 309 AD2d 681, 682 [1st Dept 2003]). Here wehave only one event.
We have previously reversed findings of neglect based on a single incident orisolated event (see e.g. Matterof Christian O., 51 AD3d 402 [1st Dept 2008] [reversing finding of neglectwhere a parent kicked the child in the ankle, causing injury when the 11 year old camehome late, because it was an isolated event in which the parent lost his temper]; Matter of Joshua R., 47 AD3d465 [1st Dept 2008] [reversing findings of abuse and derivative abuse where a fathershoved food into a child's mouth, causing him to vomit, and slapped the child so hardthat he had a bloody nose and a bruised and lacerated eye, even though there wasevidence that the father hit the child with a belt two years earlier], lv denied 11NY3d 703 [2008]; Matter of Rosina W., 297 AD2d 639 [2d Dept 2002][reversing finding of abuse based on an isolated incident of slapping an argumentative 17year old, causing swelling and a bloodshot eye]; Matter of Kennya S. [Kensader S.], 89 AD3d 570 [1st Dept2011] [reversing finding of neglect based on an isolated incident of excessive corporalpunishment resulting in mild physical injuries]; Matter of Chanika B., 60 AD3d 671 [2d Dept 2009][reversing neglect finding based on an isolated incident of slapping a child and causing abloody nose]). The incident forming the basis for the [*4]finding here is, if anything, less compelling than thosedescribed in the above cited cases.
Accordingly, the finding of neglect should be vacated and the petition dismissed.Concur—Andrias, J.P., Saxe, Moskowitz, Freedman and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.