| Williams v Williams |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 00482 [102 AD3d 957] |
| January 30, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Philip A. Williams, Respondent, v Sharon L.Williams, Appellant. |
—[*1] Lazar & Schwartz, Hopewell Junction, N.Y. (Kathryn S. Lazar of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant appeals, as limited by herbrief, from stated portions of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County(Brands, J.), entered December 23, 2010, which, upon a decision of the same court datedSeptember 21, 2010, made after a nonjury trial, inter alia, awarded her spousalmaintenance in the sum of only $1,100 per week for a duration of only four years.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
"[T]he amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sounddiscretion of the trial court, and every case must be determined on its own unique facts"(Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d710, 711 [2007] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Giokas v Giokas, 73 AD3d688, 688 [2010]; Baron vBaron, 71 AD3d 807, 809 [2010]; Meccariello v Meccariello, 46 AD3d 640, 641 [2007]). "'The court may order maintenance in such amount as justice requires, considering, interalia, the standard of living of the parties during the marriage, the income and property ofthe parties, the distribution of marital property, the duration of the marriage, the health ofthe parties, the present and future earning capacity of both parties, the ability of the partyseeking maintenance to become self-supporting, and the reduced or lost lifetime earningcapacity of the party seeking maintenance' " (Scher v Scher, 91 AD3d 842, 847 [2012], quoting Kretv Kret, 222 AD2d 412, 412 [1995]; see Domestic Relations Law §236 [B] [6] [a]; Giokas v Giokas, 73 AD3d at 689; Baron v Baron, 71AD3d at 809). Here, considering the relevant factors, the award of maintenance in thesum of $1,100 per week for a duration of four years was a provident exercise ofdiscretion.
The defendant failed to satisfy her burden of proving that the source of part of thefunds utilized to purchase the property located on Lime Mill Road was her separateproperty (see Phillips vHaralick, 70 AD3d 663, 665 [2010]; Masella v Masella, 67 AD3d 749, 750 [2009]; Bennett v Bennett, 13 AD3d1080, 1082 [2004]). Thus, as the Supreme Court properly determined, it is maritalproperty (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [c]) and, therefore,subject to equitable distribution.[*2]
The defendant's remaining contention is withoutmerit. Mastro, J.P., Dickerson, Lott and Austin, JJ., concur.