| Matter of New Surfside Nursing Home, LLC v Daines |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 00745 [103 AD3d 637] |
| February 6, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of New Surfside Nursing Home, LLC, et al.,Appellants, v Richard F. Daines et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Richard Dearing andSudarsana Srinivasan of counsel), for respondents.
In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to review twodeterminations of the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, bothdated March 30, 2010, enforcing audit results of the petitioners/plaintiffs' patient reviewinstrument submissions for certain years, and action for declaratory relief, thepetitioners/plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of a judgment of theSupreme Court, Queens County (Kelly, J.), dated September 15, 2010, as, upon adecision of the same court dated August 9, 2010, denied the petition and dismissed theproceeding.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The petitioners/plaintiffs (hereinafter the petitioners) run nursing homes in Queens.In 1998, the petitioner New Surfside Nursing Home, LLC (hereinafter New Surfside),instituted a Neurobiological Program to provide care to mentally ill and brain-injuredpatients. The program accepted patients discharged from facilities licensed by the NewYork State Office of Mental Health (see generally Hirschfeld v Teller, 14 NY3d 344 [2010]).The Neurobiological Program later expanded to other nursing homes under relatedownership, including the petitioner Meadow Park Rehabilitation and Health Care Center,LLC (hereinafter Meadow Park).
As part of the process of Medicaid reimbursement, the petitioners semiannuallysubmitted patient review instrument (hereinafter PRI) data to the New York StateDepartment of Health (hereinafter the DOH) (see 10 NYCRR 86-2.11 [b]). PRIsubmissions provide information assessing each patient's medical diagnosis, treatment,and care (see 10 NYCRR 86-2.30; Matter of Terrace HealthCare Ctr., Inc. v Novello, 54 AD3d643, 644 [2008]). Each patient is placed into 1 of 16 "resource utilization" groups,and assigned a case mix index (hereinafter CMI) number (see 10 NYCRRAppendix 13-A). The weighted average of all patients' CMI values is a nursing home'sCMI, upon which a portion of the facility's Medicaid reimbursement is based (see10 NYCRR 86-2.10 [a] [5]; [c] [6]). The petitioners classified the patients in theNeurobiological Program in the highest category of "Restorative Therapy/HeavyRehabilitation."[*2]
In February 2003, the DOH completed an auditof New Surfside's July 2000 PRI submission, and in July 2004 it completed an audit ofMeadow Parks's May 2000 PRI submission (see 10 NYCRR 86-2.30 [e]).Subsequent audits were completed for PRI submissions for subsequent years. In the auditresults, the DOH controverted the petitioners' "Restorative Therapy/HeavyRehabilitation" designation of the patients in the Neurobiological Program, therebyreducing the Medicaid reimbursements to which the petitioners were entitled. Thepetitioners nevertheless continued to classify the patients in the Neurobiological Programin the highest category of "Restorative Therapy/Heavy Rehabilitation." In letters datedMarch 30, 2010, the DOH sent the petitioners revised Medicaid rate sheets implementingthe changes to the petitioners' PRI submissions made in the audits. The DOH alleged thatthe petitioners made substantial profits of $14.2 million (New Surfside) and $6.2 million(Meadow Park) during the years in question.
The petitioners commenced this hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 toreview the DOH's determinations controverting their PRI submission designations forpatients in the Neurobiological Program and enforcing the results of the audits, andaction for declaratory relief. They sought a judgment, inter alia, annulling the auditresults, enjoining the respondents from implementing and enforcing the revised Medicaidrate sheets, and directing the respondents to issue new revised Medicaid rate sheets basedupon the original Restorative Therapy/Heavy Rehabilitation designations. The SupremeCourt, inter alia, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding. The petitionersappeal, and we affirm the judgment insofar as appealed from.
In this proceeding in which the petitioners challenge an agency determination thatwas not made after a quasi-judicial hearing, we must consider whether the determinationwas made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, or wasarbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion (see CPLR 7803 [3]; Matter of Halperin v City of NewRochelle, 24 AD3d 768, 770 [2005]). In such a proceeding, courts "examinewhether the action taken by the agency has a rational basis" and will overturn that actiononly "where it is 'taken without sound basis in reason' or 'regard to the facts' " (Matter of Wooley v New YorkState Dept. of Correctional Servs., 15 NY3d 275, 280 [2010], quoting Matter of Peckham vCalogero, 12 NY3d 424, 431 [2009]; see Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. ofUnion Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, WestchesterCounty, 34 NY2d 222, 232 [1974]), or where it is "arbitrary and capricious" (Matter of Deerpark Farms, LLC vAgricultural & Farmland Protection Bd. of Orange County, 70 AD3d 1037,1038 [2010]). Further, courts must defer to an administrative agency's rationalinterpretation of its own regulations in its area of expertise (see Matter of Peckham vCalogero, 12 NY3d 424, 431 [2009]; Matter of Nazareth Home of the Franciscan Sisters v Novello, 7NY3d 538, 544 [2006]; Matter of Manko v New York State Div. of Hous. & CommunityRenewal, Off. of Rent Admin., 88 AD3d 719 [2011]; Matter of Jennings vCommissioner, N.Y.S. Dept. of Social Servs., 71 AD3d 98, 109 [2010]).
Here, the DOH's enforcement of the audit results through issuance of the revisedMedicaid rate sheets was not arbitrary and capricious. By regulation, the DOH is requiredto correct a facility's CMI in accordance with audit results, and to adjust payments toreflect changes in the facility's CMI (see 10 NYCRR 86-2.30 [e] [5]; 86-2.11[a]). The DOH cannot be estopped from exercising these duties by any delay in issuingthe revised Medicaid rate sheets (see Matter of Frye v Commissioner of Fin. of Cityof N.Y., 62 NY2d 841, 844 [1984]).
The petitioners' challenges to the audit results themselves are untimely, as they werenot brought within four months after the petitioners' receipt of the audit results(see CPLR 217 [1]; Matter of Terrace HealthCare Ctr., Inc. v Novello, 54 AD3d643 [2008]; ConcourseRehabilitation & Nursing Ctr., Inc. v Novello, 45 AD3d 366, 367 [2007]). Thecases relied upon by the petitioners, cited by our dissenting colleague for the propositionthat the audit results were not final and binding until revised Medicaid rate sheets wereissued in 2010, do not involve audit results and do not compel a different result (seeNew York State Assn. of Counties v Axelrod, 78 NY2d 158, 165 [1991]; Matterof Westmount Health Facility v Commissioner of N.Y. State Dept. of Health, 205AD2d 991 [1994]; Matter of New York State Health Facilities Assn. v Axelrod,199 AD2d 752, 753 [1993], revd sub nom. Matter of Consolation Nursing Home vCommissioner of N.Y. State Dept. of Health, 85 NY2d 326 [1995]). Furthermore,contrary to our dissenting colleague's position, the petitioners "fully understood theimplication of DOH's determination" upon receipt of those results (Matter of AlterraHealthcare [*3]Corp. v Novello, 306 AD2d 787, 788[2003]). Indeed, New Surfside commenced an article 78 proceeding within four monthsof receiving its audit results in 2003, but it failed to pursue the matter, which waseventually marked off the calendar.
In any event, the DOH's determination to apply existing regulations in conducting theaudits was not arbitrary and capricious. "The rules of an administrative agency, dulypromulgated, are binding upon the agency as well as upon any other person who mightbe affected" (Matter of Frick v Bahou, 56 NY2d 777, 778 [1982]; see Matterof Henn v Perales, 186 AD2d 740 [1992]). A facility is not entitled to Medicaidreimbursements sought in violation of applicable regulations, even where the serviceswere properly rendered (see Matter of Cornerstone of Med. Arts Ctr. Hosp. vNovello, 304 AD2d 445 [2003]; Matter of A.R.E.B.A. Casriel v Novello,298 AD2d 134 [2002]). The assertions made by the managing member and a formeradministrator of New Surfside that, sometime in 1998, a DOH official and anindependent contractor represented that the petitioners would be permitted enhancedreimbursement not provided for in existing regulations, even if credited, do not establishan enforceable agreement between the DOH and the petitioners. Furthermore, to theextent that the petitioners allege that they relied upon any such representations, estoppelcannot be invoked to prevent the DOH from discharging its statutory duties (see Matter of Schorr v New YorkCity Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 10 NY3d 776, 779 [2008]; Matter ofNew York State Med. Transporters Assn. v Perales, 77 NY2d 126, 130 [1990]; Matter of Miney v Donovan,68 AD3d 876, 878 [2009]).
The petitioners' remaining contentions are either without merit or not properly beforethis Court. Dickerson, J.P., Chambers and Miller, JJ., concur.
Austin, J., dissents, and votes to reverse the judgment insofar as appealed from, onthe law, reinstate the petition, and grant the petition to the extent of annulling thedeterminations of the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health datedMarch 30, 2010, annulling the audit results enforced by those determinations, anddirecting the respondents to reimburse the petitioners in accordance with the last auditedMedicaid reimbursement rate sheets submitted by the petitioners in 2000, and otherwisedeny the petition, in accordance with the following memorandum: On March 30, 2010,the New York State Department of Health (hereinafter the DOH) issued some eight yearsof previously withheld revised Medicaid reimbursement rate sheets to the petitioners allin one fell swoop. These revised rate sheets were predicated upon several audits whichwere left to languish unenforced for years, despite regulatory obligations mandatingperiodic adjustment by the DOH. During this lengthy interregnum, the DOH activelyinjected ambiguity and uncertainty into whether the subject audits were intended to befinal and binding determinations, and did not treat them as such until the issuance of therevised rate sheets. It was only at that point that the petitioners, New Surfside NursingHome, LLC (hereinafter New Surfside), and Meadow Park Rehabilitation and HealthCare Center, LLC (hereinafter Meadow Park), were notified that they were required torepay excess reimbursement sums of $14,516,679.15 and $12,683,074.91, respectively.
To affirm the Supreme Court's determination that the petitioners' challenges to theDOH's audit results were time-barred would be to allow the DOH to inequitably penalizethe petitioners for the ambiguity it created.
While invocation of the doctrine of estoppel against a governmental agency isgenerally foreclosed in order to avoid fraud, it is not absolutely precluded and isavailable in exceedingly rare circumstances (see Matter of New York State Med.Transporters Assn. v Perales, 77 NY2d 126, 130 [1990]; Matter of ParkviewAssoc. v City of New York, 71 NY2d 274, 282 [1988], cert denied 488 US801 [1988]). I believe that this case is one of those rare circumstances.
For this reason and the additional reasons herein set forth, I respectfully dissent, andvote to reverse the Supreme Court's judgment and grant the petition to the extent ofannulling the challenged determinations of the DOH so as to reinstate the last auditedrate sheets submitted by the petitioners in 2000.[*4]
"An article 78 proceeding must be commencedwithin four months after the administrative determination to be reviewed becomes 'finaland binding upon the petitioner' " (Matter of Yarbough v Franco, 95 NY2d 342,346 [2000], quoting CPLR 217 [1]; see New York State Assn. of Counties vAxelrod, 78 NY2d 158, 165 [1991]; Matter of Village of Westbury v Departmentof Transp. of State of N.Y., 75 NY2d 62, 72 [1989]; Matter of Brown v New York StateRacing & Wagering Bd., 60 AD3d 107, 112 [2009]). However, the finality ofany DOH determination that affects a facility's Medicaid reimbursement rates isimpugned when the DOH injects "ambiguity and uncertainty as to when and whether thedetermination became—or was intended to be—final and binding" (NewYork State Assn. of Counties v Axelrod, 78 NY2d at 166). "[W]hen anadministrative body itself creates ambiguity and uncertainty . . . affected[parties] and their counsel should not have to risk dismissal for prematurity oruntimeliness by necessarily guessing when a final and binding determination has or hasnot been made. Under these circumstances, 'the courts should resolve any ambiguitycreated by the public body against it in order to reach a determination on the merits andnot deny a party his [or her] day in court' " (Mundy v Nassau County Civ. Serv.Commn., 44 NY2d 352, 358 [1978], quoting Matter of Castaways Motel vSchuyler, 24 NY2d 120, 126-127 [1969]).
A determination is not final and binding until its consequences are ascertainable andits impact can be accurately assessed (see New York State Assn. of Counties vAxelrod, 78 NY2d at 165; Matter of New York State Health Facilities Assn. vAxelrod, 199 AD2d 752, 753 [1993], revd sub nom. on other grounds Matter ofConsolation Nursing Home v Commissioner of N.Y. State Dept. of Health, 85 NY2d326 [1995]). Thus, the triggering act for a CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge anambiguous "final" administrative determination pertaining to Medicaid reimbursement iscommonly the facility's receipt of a rate recomputation notice apprising it of its actualreimbursement rates (see Matter of New York State Health Facilities Assn. vAxelrod, 199 AD2d at 753; Matter of Consolation Nursing Home vCommissioner of N.Y. State Dept. of Health, 194 AD2d 149, 152 [1993], revdon other grounds 85 NY2d 326 [1995]; Matter of Westmount Health Facility vCommissioner of N.Y. State Dept. of Health, 205 AD2d 991, 993 [1994]).
The holdings of the Appellate Division, First Department, pertaining to the generalfinality of audits in Matter ofTerrace HealthCare Ctr., Inc. v Novello (54 AD3d 643, 643 [2008]) and Concourse Rehabilitation &Nursing Ctr., Inc. v Novello (45 AD3d 366, 367 [2007]), as relied upon by themajority, differ factually from the instant case and, thus, are distinguishable.
Unlike Terrace HealthCare and Concourse Rehabilitation, the recordhere demonstrates that the DOH did not treat the results of the audits as final and bindingagainst the petitioners until its issuance of revised Medicaid rate sheets in 2010, yearsafter its last audit was forwarded to the petitioners. Instead, DOH officials acknowledgedto the petitioners the inadequacy of existing regulations, worked on altering the basis forthe audit determinations, and, despite downward adjustment in the subject audits,permitted categorization of neurobiological patients in the highest category while thoseofficials endeavored to promulgate new regulations.
Not only did the DOH abstain from enforcing the subject audits, the earliest of whichwas performed in 2003, until 2010, but, throughout that time, the DOH continued toreimburse the petitioners based upon their pre-audit rate schedules from 2000. The DOHevidently did so acknowledging that the audits were predicated upon outmodedregulations which were not designed to address the needs of neurobiological patients.During this extended period of time, the DOH ignored several of its own regulationsrequiring it to periodically adjust the Medicaid reimbursement rates (see e.g. 10NYCRR 86-2.11 [a], [d] [mandating periodic rate adjustment "to reflect changes in thecase mix of facilities" and the "number of patients in each patient classification group"]).Such a substantial delay in enforcement lent itself to the petitioners' reasonable view thatthe audit results were nonbinding and created uncertainty as to their actual impact whentaken in conjunction with repeated assurances from various DOH officials profferingoperational and reimbursement cures to the admitted inadequacies inherent in theexisting regulations in addressing neurobiolgical patients.
Unlike the circumstances in Matter of Alterra Healthcare Corp. v Novello(306 AD2d 787 [2003]), where the alleged injection of ambiguity by the DOH regardingthe finality of its decision was [*5]predicated upon asingle meeting and overwhelmed by consistent and repeated reaffirmations of the DOH'sasserted position (see id. at 788-789), here the DOH consistently and repeatedlyundermined the finality of its determination with regard to determining the appropriateMedicaid reimbursement rates for the petitioners' neurobiological patients.
Upon receiving the first disputed audit result in 2003, New Surfside commenced aproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 against certain DOH officials challenging theresults, though the matter was subsequently marked off the calendar. Shortly thereafter,the DOH's Director of the Office of Health Systems Management (hereinafter theDirector) and several other high-level DOH officials convened with an attorneyrepresenting the petitioners. At that meeting, "[a] commitment was made that the [DOH]would review the staffing requirements for these [Neurobiological Program] residentsand put forward reimbursement regulations for a new discrete rate category." Moreover,the Director "agreed that the DOH would move forward with regulations to establish anew reimbursement category for neuro-biological residents." Thereafter, DOH officialsdid work on analyzing and preparing new operational regulations and reimbursementprovisions, while simultaneously refraining from enforcing the subject audit resultsagainst the petitioners. Written communications in 2003 and 2005 from the formerDirector of the DOH Bureau of Long Term Care Reimbursement stated that acommitment had been made that the DOH would review staffing requirements and moveforward with proposed regulations. Proposed operational regulations for neurobiologicalunits were published for public comment in 2008, although ultimately they were notadopted.
Through the actions and assertions of its officials, the DOH injected ambiguity anduncertainty as to when and whether the audit results were intended to be final andbinding. Contrary to the DOH's contention, the financial impact of the audits was notobjectively "inevitable" under the circumstances. The finality of the audits did notbecome unequivocal until the DOH ultimately issued revised rate sheets to the petitionersin 2010. This proceeding was commenced within four months of the petitioners' receiptof those rate sheets. Therefore, it was timely.
On the merits, upon annulment of the challenged audit results and the determinationsenforcing those results, the petitioners are entitled to rely upon the last audited rate sheetsthat they submitted in 2000.
Accordingly, I would reverse the Supreme Court's judgment insofar as appealedfrom, and grant the petition to the extent indicated herein.