Matter of Sherwyn Toppin Mktg. Consultants, Inc. v New YorkState Liq. Auth.
2013 NY Slip Op 00748 [103 AD3d 648]
February 6, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 27, 2013


In the Matter of Sherwyn Toppin Marketing Consultants,Inc., Doing Business as Temptations Tavern, Petitioner,
v
New York StateLiquor Authority, Respondent.

—[*1]Ambrose W. Wotorson, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Martin Mehler of counsel), forpetitioner.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Cecelia C. Chang, LauraR. Johnson, and Andrew Amend of counsel), for respondent.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New YorkState Liquor Authority dated November 2, 2011, which adopted the recommendation ofan administrative law judge dated June 13, 2011, made after a hearing, sustainingcharges that the petitioner had violated Alcoholic Beverage Control Law §§106 (5) and 118 (1) and (3) and rule 36.1 (q) of the Rules of the New York State LiquorAuthority (9 NYCRR 53.1 [q]), and cancelled the petitioner's liquor license.

Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and theproceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.

On March 17, 2011, the respondent, the New York State Liquor Authority(hereinafter the SLA), commenced an administrative enforcement proceeding(hereinafter the SLA proceeding) against the petitioner to cancel or revoke itson-premises liquor license due to its alleged violation of, inter alia, Alcoholic BeverageControl Law §§ 106 (5) and 118 (1) and (3) and rule 36.1 (q) of the Rules ofthe New York State Liquor Authority. The SLA alleged, among other things, that thepetitioner sold alcoholic beverages during prohibited hours of sale on April 17, 2010(Charge No. 5), permitted the consumption of alcoholic beverages on its premises morethan one half-hour after the start of prohibited hours of sale of alcoholic beverages onApril 17, 2010 (Charge No. 6), January 23, 2011 (Charge No. 10), and February 12,2011 (Charge No. 12), caused a continuing pattern of noise, disturbance, misconduct, ordisorder at its premises which adversely affected the health and welfare of theneighborhood on and before March 17, 2011 (Charge No. 13), and that its premisesbecame a focal point for police attention on and before March 9, 2011, due to theoccurrence of noise, disturbance, misconduct, and disorder in front of the premises or inits parking lot (Charge No. 14).

At approximately the same time, the City of New York commenced an action(hereinafter the nuisance action) in the Supreme Court, Kings County, alleging that thepremises, which was owned by the petitioner and operated as a nightclub known asTemptations, constituted [*2]a public nuisance pursuantto Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-703 (hereinafter the nuisanceabatement law) due to events which transpired at the premises on, among other dates,April 17, 2010, January 22, 2011, February 12, 2011, and March 5, 2011. The SLA wasnamed as a defendant in the nuisance action in compliance with Alcoholic BeverageControl Law § 124.

After conducting a hearing in the nuisance action, the Supreme Court issued aninterim order dated April 4, 2011. In the interim order, the court found that the City hadnot established by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner violated the nuisanceabatement law or any provision of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law and had provenonly one incident involving the after-hours consumption of an alcoholic beverage. Thecourt issued a final order in the nuisance action dated June 15, 2011, which wasconsistent with the interim order.

In the SLA proceeding, an administrative law judge held a hearing. In a writtendetermination dated June 13, 2011, the administrative law judge found there wassubstantial evidence submitted by the SLA to sustain Charge Nos. 5, 6, 10, 12, 13, and14. The petitioner submitted a controversion of the administrative law judge's findingswith respect to the charges which were sustained. On November 2, 2011, the SLA madea final determination, which adopted the administrative law judge's recommendation asto the charges and cancelled the petitioner's liquor license. The petitioner commencedthis proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review the SLA's final determination.

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the administrative law judge's determinationin the SLA proceeding was not barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateralestoppel.

Res judicata "precludes a party from litigating 'a claim where a judgment on themerits exists from a prior action between the same parties involving the same subjectmatter' " (Matter of Josey vGoord, 9 NY3d 386, 389 [2007], quoting Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d 260, 269 [2005]; see Landau, P.C. v LaRossa,Mitchell & Ross, 11 NY3d 8, 13 [2008]). "Under New York's transactionalapproach to the doctrine of res judicata, 'once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, allother claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, evenif based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy' " (Parolisi v Slavin, 98 AD3d488, 489 [2012], quoting O'Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 357[1981]). The doctrine applies not only to the parties of record in the first action, but alsoto those in privity with those parties (see Parolisi v Slavin, 98 AD3d at 490).

"The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue which has necessarilybeen decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues disputed in the presentaction, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision nowalleged to be controlling" (Capellupo v Nassau Health Care Corp., 97 AD3d 619, 621[2012]; see Tydings vGreenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP, 11 NY3d 195, 199 [2008]). "The partyseeking the benefit of collateral estoppel bears the burden of proving that the identicalissue was necessarily decided in the prior proceeding, and is decisive of the presentaction" (City of New York vCollege Point Sports Assn., Inc., 61 AD3d 33, 42 [2009]; see Buechel vBain, 97 NY2d 295, 304 [2001], cert denied 535 US 1096 [2002]; Maiello v Kirchner, 98 AD3d481, 482 [2012]). Once that burden is met, the party opposing the application ofcollateral estoppel "bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a full and fairopportunity to contest the prior determination" (City of New York v College PointSports Assn., Inc., 61 AD3d at 42; see Maiello v Kirchner, 98 AD3d at 482;Capellupo v Nassau Health Care Corp., 97 AD3d at 621-622).

The doctrines are "generally applicable to quasi-judicial administrativedeterminations that are 'rendered pursuant to the adjudicatory authority of an agency todecide cases brought before its tribunals employing procedures substantially similar tothose used in a court of law' " (Matter of Josey v Goord, 9 NY3d at 390, quotingRyan v New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494, 499 [1984]). However, res judicatashould be applied to an administrative determination "only if such application isconsistent with the nature of the particular administrative adjudication" (Matter ofVenes v Community School Bd. of Dist. 26, 43 NY2d 520, 524 [1978]; seeMatter of Josey v Goord, 9 NY3d at 390).[*3]

Moreover, where a party to an action orproceeding is a nominal party and played no role and did not participate, even where theparty is named as a plaintiff or defendant, the doctrines of res judicata and collateralestoppel should not be applied (see Gunzburg v Gunzburg, 152 AD2d 537, 539[1989]; Mayers v D'Agostino, 87 AD2d 519, 520 [1982], affd 58 NY2d696 [1982]).

Here, the application of the doctrine of res judicata would not be consistent with thefunction of the SLA, the peculiar necessities of a proceeding to cancel or revoke a liquorlicense, and the nature of the precise power being exercised by the SLA pursuant to theAlcoholic Beverage Control Law (see Matter of Josey v Goord, 9 NY3d at 390;Matter of Venes v Community School Bd. of Dist. 26, 43 NY2d at 524).Moreover, neither doctrine applies, since the SLA was simply a nominal party to thenuisance action and was not in privity with the City (see Alcoholic BeverageControl Law § 124; Matter of Juan C. v Cortines, 89 NY2d 659, 668[1997]; Gunzburg v Gunzburg, 152 AD2d at 539). Further, neither doctrineapplies since, in the nuisance action, the Supreme Court placed a higher and differentburden of proof upon the City than the substantial evidence standard used in the SLAproceeding (see Kalra v Kalra, 149 AD2d 409, 410 [1989]; Matter of Ross vTown Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 78 AD2d 656, 657 [1980]).

"Judicial review of an administrative determination made after a hearing required bylaw, and at which evidence was taken, is limited to whether that determination issupported by substantial evidence" (Matter of Albany Manor, Inc. v New York State Liq. Auth., 44AD3d 759, 759 [2007]). Substantial evidence has been defined as "such relevantproof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimatefact, and 'is less than a preponderance of the evidence, overwhelming evidence orevidence beyond a reasonable doubt' " (Matter of Ridge Rd. Fire Dist. v Schiano, 16 NY3d 494,499 [2011], quoting 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights,45 NY2d 176, 180-181 [1978]). "The standard demands only that a given inference isreasonable and plausible, not necessarily the most probable" (Matter of Ridge Rd.Fire Dist. v Schiano, 16 NY3d at 499 [internal quotation marks and citationsomitted]). "[W]here substantial evidence exists" to support a determination beingreviewed by the courts, "that determination must be sustained, irrespective of whether asimilar quantum of evidence is available to support other varying conclusions"(Matter of Collins v Codd, 38 NY2d 269, 270 [1976]).

Here, substantial evidence supports the SLA's determination that, as specified in thecharges which were sustained, the petitioner sold alcohol after hours, permitted theconsumption of alcohol on its premises after hours, caused a continuing pattern of noise,disturbance, and misconduct which adversely affected the neighborhood, and operated itspremises in such a manner that it became a focal point for police attention (seeAlcoholic Beverage Control Law §§ 106 [5]; 118 [1], [3]; 9 NYCRR 53.1[q]; Matter of Albany Manor, Inc. v New York State Liq. Auth., 44 AD3d at759).

Further, the penalty imposed by the SLA is not so disproportionate to the offenses asto be shocking to one's sense of fairness (see Matter of Cantina El Bukis Corp. v New York State Liq.Auth., 46 AD3d 557, 558 [2007]; Matter of Couples at V.I.P. v New YorkState Liq. Auth., 272 AD2d 615, 616 [2000]).

Accordingly, the SLA's determination must be confirmed, the petition denied, andthe proceeding dismissed on the merits. Angiolillo, J.P., Dickerson, Hall and Austin, JJ.,concur.


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