| O'Connor v Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free Sch. Dist. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 01246 [103 AD3d 862] |
| February 27, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Eugene O'Connor,Respondent, v Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free School District,Appellant. |
—[*1]
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant appealsfrom an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Bruno, J.), dated March 23, 2012,which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motionfor summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
On May 9, 2007, Keith O'Connor, who was then 15 years of age, was participating inbaseball practice at a school owned and operated by the defendant, Hewlett-WoodmereUnion Free School District (hereinafter the school district), when he was struck in theface with a baseball that had been hit on the ground with a fungo bat. O'Connor's fathercommenced this action against the school district on behalf of O'Connor and himself.The complaint alleged that the accident occurred when the ball took an "unpredictable"hop as a result of a difference in elevation at the point where the infield grass and infielddirt met in front of second base. The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissingthe complaint on the ground that the action was barred by the doctrine of primaryassumption of risk. The Supreme Court denied the motion.
Under the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, a person who voluntarilyparticipates in a sporting activity generally consents, by his or her participation, to thoseinjury-causing events, conditions, and risks which are inherent in the activity (seeMorgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d 471, 484 [1997]; Turcotte v Fell, 68NY2d 432, 439 [1986]). Risks inherent in a sporting activity are those which are known,apparent, natural, or reasonably foreseeable consequences of the participation (seeMorgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d at 484; Turcotte v Fell, 68 NY2d at439). It is not necessary to the application of the doctrine for the injured person to haveforeseen the exact manner in which the injury occurred, "so long as he or she is aware ofthe potential for injury of the mechanism from which the injury results" (Maddox vCity of New York, 66 NY2d 270, 278 [1985]; Joseph v New York Racing Assn., 28 AD3d 105, 108[2006] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "If the risks of the activity are fullycomprehended or perfectly obvious, [the] plaintiff has consented to them and [the]defendant has performed its duty" (Turcotte v Fell, 68 NY2d at 439; see Brown v City of NewYork, 69 AD3d 893, 893 [2010]; Marshall v City of New Rochelle, 15 AD3d 456 [2005]; Restaino v Yonkers Bd. ofEduc., 13 AD3d 432 [2004]; Dobert v State of New York, 8 AD3d 873 [2004]). Thisincludes risks associated with the construction of the playing surface (see Ziegelmeyer v United StatesOlympic Comm., 7 NY3d 893 [2006]; Sykes v County of Erie, 94NY2d 912 [2000]; Maddox v City of New York, 66 NY2d 270 [1985]; Castro v City [*2]of New York, 94 AD3d 1032 [2012]; Mondelli v County of Nassau,49 AD3d 826 [2008]). However, the doctrine does not serve as a bar to liability ifthe risk is unassumed, concealed, or unreasonably increased (see Benitez v New YorkCity Bd. of Educ., 73 NY2d 650, 654 [1989]).
In support of its motion, the defendant submitted proof showing that O'Connor wasan experienced baseball player who had practiced and played baseball on the subjectfield numerous times prior to the date of the accident, and that he was aware of the "lipcondition" where the infield grass met the infield dirt in front of second base.Accordingly, the defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as amatter of law by establishing that, under the doctrine of primary assumption of risk,O'Connor assumed the risk of injury by voluntarily participating in baseball practicedespite his knowledge of the condition of the field (see Castro v City of NewYork, 94 AD3d at 1032; Mondelli v County of Nassau, 49 AD3d 826 [2008]). Inopposition to the defendant's showing, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.In particular, the plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendantunreasonably increased the risk of injury above and beyond the usual dangers inherent inthe sport at the time of the accident (see Nigro v New York Racing Assn., Inc., 93 AD3d 647[2012]; Bendig v BethpageUnion Free School Dist., 74 AD3d 1263, 1264 [2010]; cf. Weinberger v SolomonSchechter Sch. of Westchester, 102 AD3d 675 [2013]). Moreover, O'Connor'svoluntary participation in baseball practice on the date of the accident did not implicatethe doctrine of inherent compulsion (see Benitez v New York City Bd. of Educ.,73 NY2d at 658).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant's motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint.
The defendant's remaining contention has been rendered academic in light of ourdetermination. Skelos, J.P., Balkin, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.