People v Jingzhi Li
2013 NY Slip Op 01425 [104 AD3d 704]
March 6, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 24, 2013


The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Jingzhi Li, Appellant.

[*1]Leonard J. Levenson, New York, N.Y., for appellant.

Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, SolomonNeubort, and Michael Brenner of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Parker, J.), rendered December 22, 2009, convicting him of attempted murder in thesecond degree (three counts) and assault in the first degree (three counts), upon a juryverdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in refusing to admitinto evidence a statement made by the defendant's arraignment counsel under the presentsense impression exception to the hearsay rule. The record demonstrates that arraignmentcounsel made the statement at issue as part of her argument for lower bail at thearraignment hearing after having time to reflect, that she was describing events thatoccurred in the past, rather than describing events she observed as they were occurring.Consequently, the statement was not admissible into evidence as a present senseimpression (see People v Vasquez, 88 NY2d 561, 574-575 [1996]; People v Parchment, 92 AD3d699, 699 [2012]; People vMatyszewski, 47 AD3d 646, 646-647 [2008]).

Contrary to the defendant's contentions, reversal is not warranted due to the latedisclosure of certain evidence, as violations of People v Rosario (9 NY2d 286[1961], cert denied 368 US 866 [1961]) and Brady v Maryland (373 US83 [1963]). The defendant failed to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice from thedelay in disclosure (see CPL 240.75; People v Martinez, 71 NY2d 937,940 [1988]; People v Uka,92 AD3d 907, 908 [2012]; People v Khatib, 81 AD3d 852, 852 [2011]; People v Poladian, 2 AD3d755, 755 [2003]). The material was available for use at trial upon its disclosure andwas, in fact, used by the defendant (see People v Fuentes, 48 AD3d 479, 479 [2008],affd 12 NY3d 259 [2009]; People v Wood, 40 AD3d 663, 664 [2007]; People v Myron, 28 AD3d681, 683-684 [2006], cert denied 549 US 1326 [2007]).

The imposition of consecutive sentences was not illegal (see Penal Law§ 70.25 [2]). Each of the attempted murders committed by the defendant was aseparate and distinct act committed against a separate victim (see People vBrathwaite, 63 NY2d 839, 843 [1984]; People v Holmes, 92 AD3d 957, 957 [2012]; People v Pujji, 74 AD3d1100, 1101 [2010]).[*2]

The sentence imposed was not excessive (seePeople v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]). Rivera, J.P., Chambers, Hall and Miller, JJ.,concur.


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