| Faler v Haines |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 02135 [104 AD3d 1120] |
| March 28, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Gary R. Faler et al., Appellants, v Brian Haines et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Pentkowski, Pastore & Freestone, Clifton Park (David H. Pentkowski of counsel),for respondents.
Spain, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Ferradino, J.), entered June 12,2012 in Saratoga County, which granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint.
Plaintiffs and defendants are neighbors in the Seeyle Estate West subdivision in theTown of Ballston, Saratoga County. All parties to this action have deeds to theirrespective properties from a common grantor containing 11 enumerated restrictivecovenants, principally designed to preserve the aesthetics of their neighborhood.Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking a permanent injunction and damages, allegingthat defendants violated several of such covenants when, in 2011, they installed six solarpanels in their side yard. Thereafter, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint or, in thealternative, for summary judgment. Finding a complete defense based upon documentaryevidence, Supreme Court dismissed the complaint (see CPLR 3211 [a] [1]).Plaintiffs appeal.
We now reverse. In support of dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), the onlydocumentary evidence that defendants rely upon is their deed containing the restrictivecovenants. Essentially, defendants assert, and Supreme Court found, that the restrictivecovenants on their face establish a defense as a matter of law. Plaintiffs allege that thesolar panels installed by defendants violate three particular restrictive covenants. Weagree that the seventh restrictive covenant is inapplicable, inasmuch at its prohibitionagainst "[s]torage of any materials, building materials, building equipment, furniture,household goods, garden equipment, [*2]garbage cans,animal cages, automobile equipment, propane tanks, signs, etc." in front and side yards,does not, on its face, encompass the erection of solar panels because the panels are notstored items, but permanent structures (see Dever v DeVito, 84 AD3d 1539, 1543 [2011], lvdismissed 18 NY3d 864 [2012]). Likewise, we agree that the solar panels clearly arenot "storage sheds" which are subject to strict limitations under the ninth restrictivecovenant (see id.; Buttonwood Ltd. Partnership v Blaine, 37 AD3d 910, 912[2007]).
We reach a different conclusion, however, with respect to plaintiff's assertion that thepanels violate the second restrictive covenant in the deeds, which states: "Said premisesshall not be used for the storage of building materials, automobiles or automobiles parts,nor shall any nuisances be maintained on said premises, which may be in any mannerdangerous or noxious or offensive to the neighborhood inhabitants" (emphasisadded). We find that plaintiffs have alleged facts that could support a cause of actionbased on violation of this covenant. Specifically, we hold that it was sufficient forplaintiffs to allege that the installation of six, 14-foot tall, 8-foot wide solar panels withina neighborhood that carries many aesthetic restrictions is, within the meaning of therestrictive covenant, a nuisance "which may be in any manner dangerous or noxious oroffensive to the neighborhood inhabitants." Defendants strenuously urge that the word"nuisance" must be afforded the same meaning we give it in the context of anindependent cause of action alleging a nuisance and, thus, plaintiffs should have pleadedall the elements necessary to support a cause of action for a private nuisance. Wedisagree, finding that the language of the deeded restrictive covenant must be interpretedto ascertain the meaning intended and, ultimately, the word "nuisance" as used there maybe determined to carry a different meaning than that given it in the context of the specificcause of action created by common law (see Brody v St. Onge, 167 AD2d 671,673 [1990]).[FN*]
In the interest of judicial economy, we also address defendants' alternative argumentthat they are entitled to summary judgment under CPLR 3212 (see Craine v NYSARC, Inc.,88 AD3d 1105, 1107 [2011]; Sanacore v Sanacore, 74 AD3d 1468, 1469-1470 [2010]).We hold that defendants did not meet their initial burden of demonstrating, as a matter oflaw, that the solar panels are not a nuisance within the meaning of the restrictivecovenant. In any event, plaintiffs' responsive papers, including an affidavit of a neighborand photographic evidence alleging that, at certain times of the day, the panels emit ablinding glare that poses a danger to motorists exiting his driveway, would be sufficientto raise a triable issue of fact on the issue (see Dever v DeVito, 84 AD3d at1542-1543; LaJoy v Luck Bros.,Inc., 34 AD3d 1015, 1017 [2006]; see also Pilatich v Town of New Baltimore, 100 AD3d1248, 1250 [2012]).
Peters, P.J., Lahtinen and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on thelaw, with costs, and motion denied.
Footnote *: Even applying thecommon-law definition, given that "[o]ne who, by intentional action or inaction,substantially and unreasonably interferes with others' use and enjoyment of their landshas committed a private nuisance" (Doin v Champlain Bluffs Dev. Corp., 68 AD3d 1605,1611-1612 [2009], lv dismissed 14 NY3d 832 [2010]), we would still find thatplaintiffs have stated a cause of action based on violation of the restrictive covenant(see Korenman v Zaydelman, 237 AD2d 711, 712 [1997]).