| Leonard E. Riedl Constr., Inc. v Homeyer |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 02897 [105 AD3d 1391] |
| April 26, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| Leonard E. Riedl Construction, Inc.,Respondent, v Michael Homeyer et al., Appellants. (Appeal No.1.) |
—[*1] Goris & O'Sullivan, LLC, Cazenovia (Mark D. Goris of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent.
Appeal from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, OnondagaCounty (Donald A. Greenwood, J.), entered November 28, 2011. The order andjudgment granted plaintiff a money judgment.
It is hereby ordered that the order and judgment so appealed from is unanimouslyaffirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for, inter alia,breach of contract based upon defendants' alleged failure to pay for work performed byplaintiff pursuant to a construction contract. In appeal No. 1, defendants appeal from anorder and judgment entered after a nonjury trial that awarded plaintiff damages in theamount of $70,175.55, i.e., $54,466 in damages for the balance owed under the contract,and $15,709.55 in interest provided for in the contract. In appeal No. 2, defendantsappeal from an order granting plaintiff's application for attorney's fees and costs incurredin obtaining the order and judgment in appeal No. 1.
Contrary to defendants' contention in appeal No. 1, the court's conclusion thatplaintiff did not waive its right to payment is supported by a fair interpretation of theevidence (see Farace v State of New York, 266 AD2d 870, 870 [1999]; seegenerally Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60NY2d 492, 499 [1983]). "It is well settled that a general release is governed by principlesof contract law . . . and that, where a release is unambiguous, the intent ofthe parties must be ascertained from the plain language of the agreement" (Dommer Constr. Corp. v SavarinoConstr. Servs. Corp., 85 AD3d 1617, 1617-1618 [2011] [internal quotationmarks omitted]). "However, when the evidence in the record including, inter alia, thecircumstances surrounding the release, as well as the parties' course of dealings, evincesthat the parties' intentions were not reflected in the general terms of the release, therelease does not conclusively establish a defense as a matter of law" (Orangetown Home Improvements,LLC v Kiernan, 84 AD3d 902, 903-904 [2011]; see Penava Mech. Corp. vAfgo Mech. Servs., Inc., 71 AD3d [*2]493, 495[2010]). Thus, " '[w]here a waiver form purports to acknowledge that no furtherpayments are owed, but the parties' conduct indicates otherwise, the instrument will notbe construed as a release' " (E-JElec. Installation Co. v Brooklyn Historical Socy., 43 AD3d 642, 644 [2007];see generally CNP Mech., Inc. vAllied Bldrs., Inc., 84 AD3d 1748, 1749 [2011]).
Here, plaintiff's representative signed a document entitled "Contractor's Final Waiverand Affidavit," which provided that the construction project was "fully completed"; "allbills for labor and/or materials furnished in connection with the construction of saidbuildings and work of improvement have been fully paid"; and plaintiff "waives any andall lien rights which he may have or may have had on account of or arising out of theconstruction of said buildings and work of improvement." Nevertheless, the evidence attrial established that, at the time that document was signed, the work had not beencompleted and defendants had verbally agreed to make additional payments for thecompletion of additional work. The evidence at trial further established that defendantscomplied with that verbal agreement by making additional payments to plaintiff afterplaintiff's representative had signed the purported waiver. The court thus properlyconcluded that the parties did not treat the document signed by plaintiff's representativeas a final and complete waiver of any further claims by plaintiff (see generally E-JElec. Installation Co., 43 AD3d at 644). Contrary to defendants' further contentionsin appeal No. 1, the evidence at trial supports the court's award of damages and thecourt's conclusion that plaintiff is entitled to contractual interest on that portion of theunpaid balance that was not withheld by defendants pursuant to General Business Law§ 756-a (2) (a) (i) (see generally Farace, 266 AD2d at 870).
With respect to appeal No. 2, the parties' contract provides that "[t]he prevailingparty shall be entitled to all costs, including but not limited to reasonable attorney fees,related to any proceeding" to enforce the terms of the contract. Contrary to defendants'contention, plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees under the contract because plaintiffherein "prevail[ed] on the central claims advanced, and receive[d] substantial relief inconsequence thereof" (Sykes vRFD Third Ave. I Assoc., LLC, 39 AD3d 279, 279 [2007]).Present—Scudder, P.J., Peradotto, Carni, Lindley and Whalen, JJ.