People v Brown
2013 NY Slip Op 03110 [106 AD3d 754]
May 1, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 26, 2013


The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Daniel Brown, Appellant.

[*1]Lynn W. L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Katherine A. Levine and Erica Horwitz ofcounsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se.

Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Keith Dolan,and Stefani Johnson of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Parker, J.), rendered November 18, 2009, convicting him of murder in the seconddegree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and assault in the seconddegree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial by various remarksmade by the prosecutor during summation is unpreserved for appellate review, since thedefendant made only a single general objection to one of the remarks now alleged tohave been improper (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hanson, 100 AD3d 771, 772 [2012]; People v Floyd, 97 AD3d837 [2012]). In any event, the challenged remarks were proper because they werewithin the broad bounds of rhetorical comment permissible in closing arguments, werefairly responsive to arguments and issues raised by defense counsel in summation, orconstituted fair comment on the evidence (see People v Galloway, 54 NY2d 396,399 [1981]; People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105, 109-110 [1976]). Under thecircumstances of this case, of this case, defense counsel's failure to object to thechallenged remarks did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel (see People v Friel, 53 AD3d667, 668 [2008]; People vRose, 47 AD3d 848, 849 [2008]).

The defendant's contention, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, that the evidencewas legally insufficient to support his conviction of murder in the second degree isunpreserved for appellate review, since he failed to move for a trial order of dismissalspecifically directed at the error (see People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492 [2008]; People v McAllister, 98 AD3d527 [2012]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to theprosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it waslegally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt withrespect to the conviction of murder in the second degree.

The defendant further contends in his pro se supplemental brief that the verdict wasagainst the weight of the evidence. In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct anindependent review [*2]of the weight of the evidence(see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we neverthelessaccord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony,and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], certdenied 542 US 946 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not againstthe weight of the evidence (seePeople v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

The defendant's remaining contention raised in his pro se supplemental brief iswithout merit. Rivera, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Roman, JJ., concur.


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