Matter of Stevenson v New York State Tax AppealsTrib.
2013 NY Slip Op 03137 [106 AD3d 1146]
May 2, 2013
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 26, 2013


In the Matter of Ann M. Stevenson, Individually and asExecutor of the Estate of Milton F. Stevenson, Deceased, Petitioner,
v
NewYork State Tax Appeals Tribunal et al., Respondents.

—[*1]Hiscock & Barclay, LLP, Syracuse (David G. Burch Jr. of counsel), forpetitioner.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Owen W. Demuth of counsel), forCommissioner of Taxation and Finance, respondent.

McCarthy, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in this Court pursuantto Tax Law § 2016) to review a determination of respondent Tax Appeals Tribunalwhich sustained notices of deficiency of personal income tax imposed under Tax Lawarticle 22.

Milton F. Stevenson (hereinafter decedent) was the majority shareholder of AnoplateCorporation, which was certified pursuant to General Municipal Law article 18-B as aQualified Empire Zone Enterprise (hereinafter QEZE). The corporation owned fiveparcels of property in the Onondaga County Sanitary District. Having elected to betreated as an S corporation, Anoplate's tax credits flowed through its shareholders(see Internal Revenue Code [26 USC] § 1366; Tax Law § 660),permitting decedent and petitioner, his wife, to claim decedent's proportionate share ofAnoplate's refundable QEZE credit when jointly filing their state resident personalincome tax returns for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006. Although the claimed refundswere initially issued, the Department of Taxation and Finance conducted an audit andissued notices of deficiency equal to the amounts of credit claimed for, among otherthings, sanitary unit [*2]charges.

Petitioner[FN*] filed a petition for redetermination, resulting in an Administrative Law Judge grantingthe petition and canceling the notices of deficiency. Upon appeal by the Division ofTaxation, respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal reversed the Administrative Law Judge'sdetermination and sustained the notices of deficiency. Petitioner commenced thisproceeding challenging the Tribunal's determination.

A taxpayer seeking an exemption from taxation bears the burden of proving anunambiguous entitlement thereto (see Matter of 677 New Loudon Corp. v State of N.Y. Tax AppealsTrib., 19 NY3d 1058, 1060 [2012]; Matter of United Parcel Serv., Inc. v Tax Appeals Trib. of the Stateof N.Y., 98 AD3d 796, 798 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 860 [2013]),showing that the proffered "interpretation of the statute is not only plausible, but also thatit is the only reasonable construction" (Matter of Moran Towing & Transp. Co. vNew York State Tax Commn., 72 NY2d 166, 173 [1988]; see Matter of FederalDeposit Ins. Corp. v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin., 83 NY2d 44, 49 [1993]; Matter of CBS Corp. v TaxAppeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 56 AD3d 908, 909-910 [2008], lvdenied 12 NY3d 703 [2009]). The application of a broad statutory term in a taxstatute to a particular situation entails a fact-based inquiry on a matter within theTribunal's expertise, requiring us to give deference to the Tribunal's finding on this issueand uphold it if it is supported by a rational basis (see Matter of Easylink Servs. Intl., Inc. v New York State TaxAppeals Trib., 101 AD3d 1180, 1181-1182 [2012]; Matter of Sacks v Tax AppealsTrib. of the State of N.Y., 99 AD3d 1120, 1121 [2012]; see also Matter of O'Brien vSpitzer, 7 NY3d 239, 242 [2006]).

The parties here agree on the facts and that petitioner is entitled to claim QEZEcredits for "eligible real property taxes" (Tax Law § 15 [a], [former (e)]), butdisagree as to whether the Sanitary District charges fall within the definition of thatphrase. For the reasons stated in our decision in Matter of Piccolo v New York StateTax Appeals Trib. (108 AD3d 107 [2013][decided herewith]), the term "eligible real property taxes" in Tax Law former § 15(former [e]) does not include special ad valorem levies and special assessments. Weagree with the Tribunal's determination that the charges at issue are ad valorem levies,not taxes.

A special ad valorem levy is defined to cover charges "imposed upon benefitted realproperty in the same manner and at the same time as taxes for municipal purposes todefray the cost, including operation and maintenance, of a special district improvementor service" (RPTL 102 [14]). A special assessment is a charge for similar purposes that is"imposed upon benefitted real property in proportion to the benefit received by suchproperty" (RPTL 102 [15]). The Sanitary District meets the definition of a special district(see RPTL 102 [16]), and was created to maintain and operate the sewer systemserving the properties within the district. "Taxes are public burdens imposed generallyfor governmental purposes benefitting the entire community, whereas an ad valorem levyis an assessment imposed for specific municipal improvements which confer a specialbenefit on the property assessed beyond that conferred generally" (Matter of CrandallPub. Lib. v City of Glens Falls, 216 AD2d 814, 815 [1995]; see Watergate IIApts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d 52, 58 [1978]). All parcels within a specialdistrict are generally deemed to receive, at least to some extent, some actual benefit fromthe district's services or [*3]improvements, rendering allsuch parcels assessable by the district (see Skinner v Village of Sylvan Beach,113 AD2d 1000, 1002 [1985]; see also Matter of Palmer v Town of Kirkwood,288 AD2d 540, 542 [2001]; compare New York Tel. Co. v Supervisor of Town of OysterBay, 4 NY3d 387, 394 [2005]). The resolution creating the Sanitary Districtstates that any costs of maintenance and operation of the district not "derived from seweruse rates . . . and other available funds . . . shall be assessed,levied and collected from the several lots and parcels of land in said [d]istrict in the samemanner and at the same time as other County charges on an ad valorem basis"(Resolution No. 260 [1978] of County of Onondaga). Although the partiesdispute—and the record does not clearly explain—whether the charges atissue are imposed in proportion to the benefit received or in the same manner as taxes formunicipal purposes, they qualify as either ad valorem levies or special assessments. Asneither of those categories falls within the definition of tax, the Tribunal rationallydetermined that the charges at issue were not taxes, and petitioner failed to meet herburden of proving that such charges could be claimed as the basis for a QEZE creditunder Tax Law § 15 (former [e]).

Mercure, J.P., Spain and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isconfirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.

Footnotes


Footnote *: Decedent died in 2009.Petitioner filed this proceeding both on her own behalf and as executor of decedent'sestate.


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