| Matter of Lake St. Granite Quarry, Inc. v Town/Village ofHarrison |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 03487 [106 AD3d 918] |
| May 15, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Lake Street Granite Quarry, Inc.,Appellant, v Town/Village of Harrison et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Joseph A. Maria, P.C., White Plains, N.Y., for respondents.
In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to review adetermination of the Town Board of the Town/Village of Harrison dated January 20,2011, which, after a public hearing, confirmed a stop work order issued in connectionwith excavation and regrading on the petitioner/plaintiff's property, and action for ajudgment declaring that the petitioner/plaintiff has a vested right to continue its quarryoperation as a nonconforming use and that the excavation and regrading permitrequirements of chapter 133 of the Code of the Town/Village of Harrison areunconstitutional as applied to certain property owned by the petitioner/plaintiff, thepetitioner/plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County(Lorenzo, J.), entered September 8, 2011, which, in effect, dismissed theproceeding/action.
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provisions thereof,in effect, dismissing the causes of action for a declaratory judgment; as so modified, thejudgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, the causes of action for adeclaratory judgment are reinstated and severed, and the matter is remitted to theSupreme Court, Westchester County, for further proceedings on those causes of action.
The petitioner/plaintiff, Lake Street Granite Quarry, Inc. (hereinafter Lake Street), isthe owner of real property located in the Town/Village of Harrison (hereinafter theTown), and that property allegedly has been used as a quarry since 1922. On October 13,2009, the Town Building Inspector issued a stop work order because excavation andregrading was taking place on the subject property without a permit. Lake Street filed anappeal from the stop work order with the Town Board, and the Town Board, afterconducting a public hearing, confirmed the stop work order.
As mandated by the Town Code, an appeal from the stop work order was properlymade to the Town Board (see Town/Village of Harrison Code § 133-19[C] [2]), and in deciding to confirm the order, the Board was acting in its plenaryadministrative capacity (see Bailey v Smith, 75 AD2d 573 [1980]). Under thesecircumstances, the applicable standard of review pursuant to CPLR 7803 (3) is whether adetermination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error oflaw, or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion (see Matter of Baker v Village ofElmsford, 70 AD3d 181, 187 [2009]; Matter of Moy v Board of TownTrustees of Town of Southold, 61 [*2]AD3d 763[2009]; Matter of Zupa v Boardof Trustees of Town of Southold, 54 AD3d 957 [2008]; Matter of Halperin v City of NewRochelle, 24 AD3d 768 [2005]). The Supreme Court properly concluded thatthe Town Board's determination was not illegal, affected by an error of law, arbitrary andcapricious, or an abuse of discretion. Lake Street did not challenge the BuildingInspector's determination that excavation and regrading were occurring on the subjectproperty at the time the stop work order was issued, and it did not demonstrate that theexcavation and regrading permit requirements of chapter 133 of the Code of theTown/Village of Harrison should not be applied to it or the prohibited work beingperformed on the property. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied thosebranches of the petition/complaint which were pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, toannul the Town Board's determination, and properly, in effect, dismissed those causes ofaction which sought relief pursuant to CPLR article 78.
Nonetheless, in the absence of a dispositive motion addressed to the causes of actionwhich sought declaratory relief, the Supreme Court improperly, in effect, dismissed thosecauses of action (see Matter ofRosenberg v New York State Off. of Parks, Recreation, & Historic Preserv., 94AD3d 1006, 1007-1008 [2012]). In a hybrid proceeding and action, separateprocedural rules apply to those causes of action which are asserted pursuant to CPLRarticle 78, on the one hand, and those which seek declaratory relief, on the other hand(see id. at 1008). "The Supreme Court may not employ the summary procedureapplicable to a CPLR article 78 cause of action to dispose of causes of action to recoverdamages or seeking a declaratory judgment" (id.; see Matter of 24 Franklin Ave.R.E. Corp. v Heaship, 74 AD3d 980, 980 [2010]). "Thus, where no party makesa request for a summary determination of the causes of action which seek to recoverdamages or declaratory relief, it is error for the Supreme Court to summarily dispose ofthose causes of action" (Matter of Rosenberg v New York State Off. of Parks,Recreation, & Historic Preserv., 94 AD3d at 1008; see Matter of G&C Transp., Inc. vMcGrane, 72 AD3d 819 [2010]; During v City of New Rochelle, N.Y., 55 AD3d 533, 534[2008]). Here, since no party made such a motion, the Supreme Court should not havesummarily disposed of the causes of action which sought declaratory relief, and thematter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for furtherproceedings on those causes of action. We express no opinion as to the merits of thosecauses of action.
Lake Street's remaining contentions are without merit. Dillon, J.P., Chambers, Austinand Roman, JJ., concur.