| Coyle v Bommarito |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 03544 [106 AD3d 1324] |
| May 16, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Carol Coyle et al., Respondents, v ClaireseBommarito, Defendant, and Brynn Wintle, Appellant. |
—[*1] Rehfuss, Liguori & Associates, PC, Latham (John W. Liguori of counsel), forrespondents.
Stein, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Ferradino, J.), entered October15, 2012 in Saratoga County, which denied defendant Brynn Wintle's motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint against her.
Plaintiff Carol Coyle (hereinafter plaintiff), a special education aide at a high schoolin the Town of Clifton Park, Saratoga County, was injured while attempting to break upa physical altercation between two female high school students—defendantsherein. As a result, plaintiff and her husband, derivatively, commenced this action againstthem. A default judgment was issued against defendant Clairese Bommarito upon herfailure to appear in the action. Thereafter, defendant Brynn Wintle moved for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint against her. Finding triable issues of fact, SupremeCourt denied Wintle's motion and this appeal ensued.
We affirm. Plaintiffs' theory of liability against Wintle is based upon the "dangerinvites rescue" doctrine. This doctrine imposes liability upon a defendant who, "by his[or her] culpable act[,] has placed another person in a position of imminent peril whichinvites a third person, the [*2]rescuing plaintiff, to cometo his [or her] aid" (Provenzo v Sam, 23 NY2d 256, 260 [1968]; see Wagnerv International Ry. Co., 232 NY 176, 180 [1921]; Gifford v Haller, 273AD2d 751, 752 [2000]). In order for the doctrine to apply, the rescuer must have had areasonable belief that the person being rescued was in peril (see Provenzo v Sam,23 NY2d at 261; Carney v Buyea, 271 App Div 338, 342 [1946]). Thereasonableness of a decision to intervene is generally a question for the factfinder (see O'Connor v SyracuseUniv., 66 AD3d 1187, 1191 [2009], lv dismissed 14 NY3d 766 [2010];Gifford v Haller, 273 AD2d at 752; see also Hughes v Murnane Bldg. Contrs., Inc., 89 AD3d1507, 1508 [2011]).
In support of her motion, Wintle proffered, among other things, her own testimonythat she had been doing jumping jacks in the school hallway when she heard someonecall her name from behind her. According to Wintle, Bommarito grabbed her frombehind and Wintle immediately fell to the ground, where she stayed crawled up in a ballin a defensive position while Bommarito swung her arms at Wintle. Wintle also testifiedthat, although Bommarito was swinging her arms around, she never actually madecontact with Wintle. Essentially, Wintle asserts that no view of the evidence wouldsupport the conclusion that plaintiff had a reasonable belief that either of the girls were inperil so as to invite plaintiff to attempt to intervene.
In opposition to the motion, plaintiffs offered plaintiff's deposition testimony that sheobserved two individuals in the altercation—a taller one and a shorter one. Whileplaintiff did not know how the fight started, she saw the shorter girl on the ground andthe taller one standing above her using "hammer blows" upon her. Plaintiff yelled out forassistance, but no one arrived. When the strikes continued, plaintiff was concerned thatthe shorter girl would be "badly hurt, brain damaged, [or] maimed, and [plaintiff] felt[she] couldn't wait any longer." Plaintiff, therefore, decided that she needed to intervene.The fact that the shorter girl, who plaintiff believed to be in peril, was not actuallyharmed in the altercation does not preclude a finding that plaintiff's belief was reasonable(see O'Connor v Syracuse Univ., 66 AD3d at 1191). Considering the factualissues presented here, we agree with Supreme Court that the question of whetherplaintiff's decision to intervene was reasonable cannot be determined as a matter of law(see id.; compare Ha-Sidi v South Country Cent. School Dist., 148 AD2d580, 581-582 [1989]).
Wintle also argues that she was not the culpable party in the altercation and,therefore, her actions were not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. In this regard,Wintle alleges that Bommarito was the aggressor and she never hit or struck back. Inaddition, Wintle submitted a notarized statement from a nonparty witness who confirmedthat Bommarito attacked Wintle. For her part in the incident, Wintle was only suspendedfor two days—which she claims was punishment for her having yelled out anexpletive at Bommarito after the fight—while Bommarito was suspended for 12weeks, evidencing Bommarito's culpability. Based upon this evidence, Wintle made aprima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue ofproximate cause (see Grandeauv South Colonie Cent. School Dist., 63 AD3d 1484, 1485-1486 [2009]; see also Flederbach v Lennett,65 AD3d 1011, 1012 [2009]).
With the burden shifted to plaintiffs to demonstrate a triable issue of fact, they againrely upon plaintiff's deposition testimony regarding her observations of the altercation.Despite Wintle's claim that she was on the ground while Bommarito swung at her, it isundisputed that Wintle—being approximately 5 feet 7 inches tall—issignificantly taller than Bommarito, who is approximately 5 feet tall. We reject Wintle'scontention that plaintiff's use of the word "impression" in describing her observation ofthe taller student striking the shorter one renders her testimony too speculative to beconsidered. Although plaintiff's ability to recall details about [*3]the incident was limited, when we view the evidence in alight most favorable to plaintiffs as the nonmoving parties and accept plaintiff's factualallegations as true (seeLopez-Viola v Duell, 100 AD3d 1239, 1242 [2012]), we are satisfied thatplaintiff's testimony was sufficiently certain to establish that Wintle struck Bommarito(compare Hawley v Binghamton Mets Baseball Club, 262 AD2d 729, 731[1999]). Considering these factual discrepancies and the resulting credibility issues,Supreme Court properly concluded that questions of fact exist regarding proximatecause, which also precluded summary judgment.
To the extent not specifically addressed herein, Wintle's remaining claim has beenreviewed and found to be unavailing.
Peters, P.J., Rose and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, withcosts.