Herman v Lifeplex, LLC
2013 NY Slip Op 03815 [106 AD3d 1050]
May 29, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 26, 2013


Samuel Herman, Appellant,
v
Lifeplex, LLC,Respondent, et al., Defendant.

—[*1]Isaacson, Schiowitz & Korson, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Jeremy Schiowitz ofcounsel), for appellant.

Goergen, Manson & McCarthy, Middletown, N.Y. (David B. Manson of counsel),for respondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from anorder of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Jamieson, J.), dated April 17, 2012,which granted the motion of the defendant Lifeplex, LLC, for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of thedefendant Lifeplex, LLC, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar asasserted against it is denied.

The plaintiff allegedly sustained personal injuries while engaged in a game of tennisat an indoor facility operated by the defendant Lifeplex, LLC (hereinafter Lifeplex). Asthe plaintiff was "pedaling backwards" in an attempt to hit a ball, he came into contactwith a curtain separating the tennis court from an adjacent wall. He then allegedlystepped on an empty plastic water bottle that had been left behind the curtain, causinghim to slip backwards and fall.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries.Lifeplex moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as assertedagainst it, contending, among other things, that the plaintiff assumed the risk inherent inplaying the sport of indoor tennis and that it did not have actual or constructive notice ofthe placement of the water bottle. The Supreme Court granted Lifeplex's motion.

"The doctrine of primary assumption of risk provides that a voluntary participant in asporting or recreational activity 'consents to those commonly appreciated risks which areinherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from suchparticipation' " (Alqurashi vParty of Four, Inc., 89 AD3d 1047, 1047 [2011], quoting Morgan v State ofNew York, 90 NY2d 471, 484 [1997]). The doctrine does not serve as a bar toliability if the risk is unassumed, concealed, or unreasonably increased (see Viola v Carmel Cent. SchoolDist., 95 AD3d 1206, 1207 [2012]; Rosenbaum v Bayis Ne'Emon, Inc., 32 AD3d 534, 535[2006]). The doctrine of primary assumption of risk "encompasses risks associated withthe construction of the playing surface" (Morlock v Town of N. Hempstead, 12 AD3d 652, 652[2004]), " 'and any open and obvious condition on it' " (Casey v Garden City Park-NewHyde Park School Dist., 40 AD3d 901, 902 [2007], quoting Welch v Boardof Educ. of City of N.Y., 272 AD2d 469, 469 [2000]; see Viola v Carmel Cent.School Dist., 95 AD3d at 1207). Here, Lifeplex failed to eliminate triable issues offact as to whether the condition that allegedly caused the [*2]plaintiff's injury was within the playing area of the tenniscourt, and whether the condition was concealed. Thus, Lifeplex failed to make a primafacie showing that the plaintiff assumed a risk inherent in the sport of tennis (seeMorgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d at 484, 488).

Moreover, in moving for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, Lifeplex hadthe initial burden of establishing "that it neither created nor had actual or constructivenotice of the allegedly defective condition that caused the accident" (Kielty v AJS Constr. of L.I.,Inc., 83 AD3d 1004, 1005 [2011]; see Indelicato v Parkway N. Assoc., L.P., 98 AD3d 946,947 [2012]). "To meet its initial burden on the issue of . . . constructivenotice, the defendant must offer some evidence as to when the area in question was lastcleaned or inspected relative to the time when the plaintiff fell" (Birnbaum v New York RacingAssn., Inc., 57 AD3d 598, 598-599 [2008]; see Mahoney v AMC Entertainment, Inc., 103 AD3d 855[2013]). Mere reference to general cleaning practices, with no evidence regarding anyspecific cleaning or inspection of the area in question, is insufficient to establish a lack ofconstructive notice (see Mahoney v AMC Entertainment, Inc., 103 AD3d at 855;Goodyear v Putnam/NorthernWestchester Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 86 AD3d 551, 552 [2011];Birnbaum v New York Racing Assn., Inc., 57 AD3d at 598-599). Here, Lifeplexdid not proffer any evidence demonstrating when the subject area was last cleaned orinspected prior to the plaintiff's accident, and, thus, failed to eliminate all triable issues offact with regard to its claim that it lacked constructive notice of the placement of thewater bottle (see Mahoney v AMC Entertainment, Inc., 103 AD3d at 855; Feola v City of New York, 102AD3d 827 [2013]).

Since Lifeplex did not sustain its prima facie burden of establishing its entitlement tojudgment as a matter of law, it is not necessary to consider the sufficiency of theplaintiff's opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).

Accordingly, Lifeplex's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaintinsofar as asserted against it should have been denied. Rivera, J.P., Leventhal, Austin andMiller, JJ., concur.


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