Matter of Halpert v Shah
2013 NY Slip Op 04337 [107 AD3d 800]
June 12, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, July 31, 2013


In the Matter of Simon Halpert et al.,Appellants,
v
Nirav R. Shah, Respondent.

—[*1]

Mischel & Horn, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Scott T. Horn and Naomi M. Taub ofcounsel), for appellants.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Michael S. Belohlavekand Valerie Figueredo of counsel), for respondent.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to review a determination ofthe New York State Department of Health dated July 24, 2012, which, among otherthings, revoked the operating certificate of Park Manor Adult Home, the petitionersappeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaughan, J.), datedOctober 24, 2012, which denied the petition and, in effect, dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The petitioners are the operators of Park Manor Adult Home (hereinafter the Home),a licensed adult home with 55 residents located in Brooklyn. On or about May 24, 2011,the New York State Department of Health (hereinafter the DOH) initiated anadministrative enforcement proceeding against the petitioners based upon numerousalleged statutory and regulatory violations found at the Home. A hearing was conductedbefore an administrative law judge; however, before the administrative law judge issueda hearing report and recommendations, the parties resolved the enforcement proceedingby entering into a "Stipulation and Order" (hereinafter the stipulation) dated March 19,2012.

In the stipulation, the petitioners admitted that there was "substantial evidence" of thealleged violations and agreed to pay a civil penalty of $40,000. The terms of thestipulation required the petitioners to rectify the subject violations by completing nineseparate tasks within certain time constraints. The stipulation also provided that, upon theDOH's determination that the petitioners did not timely and substantially comply with theterms of the stipulation, the DOH, in its "sole discretion," could, inter alia, revoke thepetitioners' operating certificate without first providing the petitioners with anevidentiary hearing. By letter dated July 24, 2012, the DOH revoked the operatingcertificate of the Home, citing the petitioners' failure to substantially comply with theterms of the stipulation. The DOH also placed the Home on its "Do Not Refer List"pursuant to Social Services Law § 460-d (11). The petitioners commenced theinstant proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to review the DOH'sdetermination. The Supreme Court denied the petition and, in effect, dismissed theproceeding, and the petitioners appeal.[*2]

The agency determination under review was notmade after a quasi-judicial evidentiary hearing. Thus, we review the determination underthe standard set forth in CPLR 7803 (3), and consider only whether the determinationwas made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, was arbitraryand capricious, or was an abuse of discretion (see Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 NY3d 1042 [2013]; Matter of Halperin v City of NewRochelle, 24 AD3d 768, 770 [2005]). Under this standard, courts "examinewhether the action taken by the agency has a rational basis" and will overturn that actiononly "where it is 'taken without sound basis in reason' or 'regard to the facts' " (Matter of Wooley v New YorkState Dept. of Correctional Servs., 15 NY3d 275, 280 [2010], quoting Matter of Peckham vCalogero, 12 NY3d 424, 431 [2009]; see Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. ofUnion Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, WestchesterCounty, 34 NY2d 222, 232 [1974]), or where it is "arbitrary and capricious" (Matter of Deerpark Farms, LLC vAgricultural & Farmland Protection Bd. of Orange County, 70 AD3d 1037,1038 [2010]). Here, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the DOH'sdetermination was not arbitrary and capricious, because it was rationally based on thepetitioners' failure to substantially comply with their obligations under the stipulation (see Matter of Community RelatedServs., Inc. v Carpenter-Palumbo, 84 AD3d 1450 [2011]; Matter of Lakeside Manor Homefor Adults, Inc. v Novello, 43 AD3d 1057 [2007]; Matter of Dwyer v County ofSuffolk, Sheriff's Dept., 29 AD3d 904 [2006]; Matter of Spata v Levy,306 AD2d 534 [2003]; Matter of Watson v Shew, 282 AD2d 467 [2001];Matter of 47-40 41st Realty Corp. v New York State Div. of Hous. & CommunityRenewal, 225 AD2d 547 [1996]).

The petitioners' contention that the penalty imposed by the DOH was an abuse ofdiscretion is without merit. "Judicial review of an administrative penalty is limited towhether the measure or mode of penalty or discipline imposed constitutes an abuse ofdiscretion as a matter of law . . . [A] penalty must be upheld unless it is 'sodisproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness,' thusconstituting an abuse of discretion as a matter of law" (Matter of Kelly v Safir,96 NY2d 32, 38 [2001], quoting Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union FreeSchool Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34NY2d 222, 237 [1974] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Featherstone v Franco,95 NY2d 550, 554 [2000]; CPLR 7803 [3]). Under the circumstances presented here,including the repeated and multiple violations found to exist at the Home, and in light ofthe fact that the stipulation specifically set forth that, in the DOH's sole discretion,revocation of the operating certificate of the Home was a penalty that could be imposed,the penalty imposed was not so disproportionate to the petitioners' offense as to beshocking to one's sense of fairness (see Matter of Sherwyn Toppin Mktg. Consultants, Inc. v New YorkState Liq. Auth., 103 AD3d 648 [2013]; Matter of Community RelatedServs., Inc. v Carpenter-Palumbo, 84 AD3d at 1455; Matter of Occhiogrosso v NewYork State Off. of Children & Family Servs., 72 AD3d 1092 [2010]; cf.Uzzillia v Commissioner of Health of State of N.Y., 47 AD2d 492 [1975]).

The petitioners' remaining contentions are improperly raised for the first time onappeal. Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Dickerson and Cohen, JJ., concur.


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