| Paterno v Strimling |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 04416 [107 AD3d 1233] |
| June 13, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Michael A. Paterno et al., Respondents, v Steven M.Strimling et al., Defendants, and Gateways Organization, Inc.,Appellant. |
—[*1] Basch & Keegan, Kingston (Derek J. Spada of counsel), for respondents.
Lahtinen, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Melkonian, J.), enteredApril 12, 2012 in Ulster County, which, among other things, after a nonjury trial, foundin favor of plaintiffs on the issue of the liability of defendant Gateways Organization,Inc. for acts of defendant Steven M. Strimling.
Plaintiffs commenced this action for personal injuries sustained when their vehiclewas struck from behind by a vehicle operated by defendant Steven M. Strimling(hereinafter Strimling) and owned by his mother, defendant Phoebe K. Strimling. At thetime of the accident, Strimling was running an errand for defendant GatewaysOrganization, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation that was hosting a religious event forunmarried individuals. In their second amended complaint, plaintiffs asserted, amongother things, that Gateways was vicariously liable for the acts of Strimling. Gateways'motion for summary judgment dismissing the second amended complaint was denied bySupreme Court (Egan Jr., J.).
A nonjury trial ensued on the issue of whether Gateways was vicariously liable forStrimling's alleged negligence. Supreme Court (Melkonian, J.) rendered a writtendecision and [*2]order in September 2011 dismissing theaction as to Gateways upon the ground that there was no employer-employee relationshipbetween Gateways and Strimling. In October 2011, plaintiffs moved pursuant to CPLR4404 (b) and 2221 to set aside the verdict, as well as to renew and reargue, on the groundthat their theory of vicarious liability at trial had not been premised solely upon anemployer-employee relationship, but had also included an assertion and proof that even ifStrimling was a volunteer, he was acting as an agent of Gateways. Supreme Courtgranted plaintiffs' motion, finding that the proof at trial had established "a sufficientdegree of direction and control existed over . . . Strimling by Gateways toconstitute an agency relationship."[FN*] Gateways appeals.
Gateways argues that plaintiffs' motion was defective because no new proof wassubmitted in support of the motion. Initially, we note that a motion to reargue—asdistinguished from a motion to renew—does not require new proof and can bepremised upon the court overlooking or misapprehending pertinent facts or law (see Loris v S & W RealtyCorp., 16 AD3d 729, 730 [2005]). Moreover, since the motion was madefollowing Supreme Court's decision in a nonjury trial, plaintiffs' motion—althoughciting to both CPLR 2221 and 4404 (b)—was, in effect, a motion to set aside aportion of a decision pursuant to CPLR 4404 (b) (see generally Carr-Harris v Carr-Harris, 98 AD3d 548, 551[2012]), and a motion under that statute is not limited to situations where new evidence isdiscovered (see CPLR 4404 [b]). Plaintiffs contended in their motion thatSupreme Court had misapprehended their theory of liability as being limited to whetherthere was an employer-employee relationship and failed to fully consider their agencytheory of liability. Just as the failure to submit an issue to a jury can constitute an error oflaw (see e.g. Shinder v Altorki, 309 AD2d 799, 799 [2003]), a court's decisionafter a nonjury trial that misapprehends the theory of liability and fails to address a keycomponent thereof can provide a ground for the court to set aside its decision pursuant toCPLR 4404 (b).
We find unpersuasive Gateways' further contention that plaintiffs had not assertedthe principal-agent theory of liability prior to making their motion to set aside thedecision. The second amended complaint broadly asserts vicarious liability withoutlimiting it to an allegation of an employer-employee relationship, plaintiffs opening attrial urged liability under respondent superior regardless of whether Strimling wasconsidered an employee or volunteer, and plaintiffs' posttrial proposed findings of factand conclusions of law included, among other things, assertions that Strimling was actingas Gateways' agent in furtherance of Gateways' interest at the time of the accident.
After exercising our broad authority to independently review the evidence presentedin this nonjury trial (see e.g.Halpin v Cheikhet, 90 AD3d 1211, 1212 [2011]), we find no reason to reversethe determination that Strimling was acting as Gateways' agent at the time of theaccident. A principal-agent relationship can include a volunteer when the requisiteconditions, including control and acting on another's behalf, are shown (see Fils-Aime v Ryder TRS,Inc., 40 AD3d 917, 917-918 [2007]; Robinson v Downs, 39 AD3d 1250, 1252 [2007]).Gateways was [*3]operating a program where it expected700 to 800 attendees, who each paid $700 to attend. Strimling's fee to attend was waivedas it had been previously and, with his fee waived, he helped with various tasks that hadto be accomplished to run the event. Strimling's responsibilities included arriving early tohelp set up, and he was supposed to remain after the event to pack up items for the returntrip. Strimling referred to his responsibilities as work and a job, reflecting hisunderstanding of control by Gateways. Although he was not paid directly by Gateways,his $700 fee was waived and one of the individuals from Gateways in charge of the eventalso gave him $200. There was proof that the accident occurred when an individual whohad authorized Strimling's free attendance realized that two-way radios were needed andStrimling was summoned from his room to go to a store to purchase such items.Strimling was given a Gateways' credit card and embarked on a trip to a store solely topurchase the requested items for Gateways when the accident occurred. He did so despitethe fact that the timing of the request created a significant likelihood that Strimlingwould be put in the difficult position of traveling at a time of the evening that wasprohibited by his religious beliefs. The proof sufficiently supports Supreme Court'sdecision.
Rose, J.P., Spain and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, withcosts.
Footnote *: Although SupremeCourt did not specifically state in its decision that it was thus finding Gateways liable forthe acts of Strimling, the purpose of the nonjury trial was to resolve the vicarious liabilityissue, and it is clear that such a holding was the intent of its decision.