Matter of Rulinsky v West
2013 NY Slip Op 04454 [107 AD3d 1507]
June 14, 2013
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, July 31, 2013


In the Matter of Valentina Rulinsky, Respondent, vJermaine West, Appellant.

—[*1]Paul M. Deep, Utica, for respondent-petitioner-appellant.

Monica R. Barile, Attorney for the Child, New Hartford.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Oneida County (Randal B. Caldwell, J.),entered October 7, 2011 in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6. Theorder, inter alia, granted the petition of petitioner-respondent seeking to modify a priororder of custody and visitation, and denied the petition of respondent-petitioner for anorder of contempt based on the alleged failure of petitioner-respondent to comply withthe prior order.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed withoutcosts.

Memorandum: In this proceeding pursuant to article 6 of the Family Court Act,respondent-petitioner father appeals from an order that, following a hearing, granted thepetition of petitioner-respondent mother seeking to modify a prior order of custody andvisitation (prior order) by terminating visitation with the father, who was incarcerated.The order, inter alia, also denied the father's petition for an order of contempt based onthe alleged failure of the mother to comply with the prior order. The prior order requiredthe mother to bring the parties' biological child, who was 10 years old at the time of thecommencement of this proceeding, to visit the father at the Auburn Correctional Facilitytwice a year.

We reject the father's contention that the mother failed to establish the requisitechange in circumstances warranting a review of the prior order. "An order of visitationcannot be modified unless there has been a sufficient change in circumstances since theentry of the prior order [that], if not addressed, would have an adverse effect on thechild['s] best interests" (Matterof Anderson v Roncone, 81 AD3d 1268, 1268 [2011], lv denied 16NY3d 712 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Matter of Ragin vDorsey [appeal No. 1], 101 AD3d 1758, 1758 [2012]). "[W]hile not dispositive, theexpress wishes of older and more mature children can support the finding of a change incircumstances" (Matter of Dorsav Dorsa, 90 AD3d 1046, 1047 [2011]; see Matter of VanDusen v Riggs, 77 AD3d 1355, 1356[2010]; Matter of Burch vWillard, 57 AD3d 1272, 1273 [2008]). Here, the evidence establishes that, sincethe entry of the prior order and as the child has matured, she has developed a strongdesire not to visit the father. Additionally, Family Court credited the mother's testimonythat the father was using visitation time to attempt to reconcile with the mother ratherthan to interact with their child. Thus, we conclude that there has been a sufficientchange of circumstances to warrant " 'an inquiry into whether the best interests of the[child] [*2]warranted a change in custody' " (Matter of Dingeldey vDingeldey, 93 AD3d 1325, 1326 [2012]; see Matter of Bowers vBowers, 266 AD2d 741, 742 [1999]).

We further reject the father's contention that the record fails to support the court'sdetermination that visitation with him was not in the child's best interests. We recognizethat "[v]isitation with a noncustodial parent is presumed to be in a child's best interestseven when the parent is incarcerated" (Matter of Chambers v Renaud, 72 AD3d 1433, 1434[2010]; see Matter of Flood vFlood, 63 AD3d 1197, 1198 [2009]). In order to rebut the presumption, theparty opposing visitation must establish by a preponderance of the evidence "that underall the circumstances visitation [with the incarcerated parent] would be harmful to thechild's welfare" (Matter ofGranger v Misercola, 21 NY3d 86, 91 [2013]). Here, the court did not make adetermination with respect to whether the presumption in favor of visitation with thefather had been rebutted. Nevertheless, we conclude that the record is adequate to enableus to determine that the mother established by a preponderance of the evidence that,under all the circumstances, "visitation would be harmful to the child's welfare"(id. at 91; see generallyMatter of Vincent A.B. v Karen T., 30 AD3d 1100, 1101 [2006], lv denied7 NY3d 711 [2006]).

With respect to the analysis of the best interests of the child in the absence of anypresumption, we note that visitation "need not always include contact visitation at theprison" (Matter of Ruple vHarkenreader, 99 AD3d 1085, 1087 [2012]; see Matter of Cole v Comfort, 63 AD3d 1234, 1235[2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 706 [2009]; Matter of Conklin v Hernandez, 41 AD3d 908, 910[2007]). Moreover, "a court's determination regarding custody and visitation issues,based upon a first-hand assessment of the credibility of the witnesses after an evidentiaryhearing, is entitled to great weight and will not be set aside unless it lacks an evidentiarybasis in the record," i.e., is not "supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record"(Matter of Krug v Krug, 55AD3d 1373, 1374 [2008]). While the fact that the father " 'is incarcerated will not,by itself, render visitation [with him] inappropriate' " (Matter of Thomas vThomas, 277 AD2d 935, 935 [2000]), that fact, when considered in conjunction withthe evidence establishing the father's lack of prior contact with the child, the father'sfailure to interact with the child during visitation and the child's express desire not tovisit with the father, provides a sufficient basis for the court's determination thatterminating visitation with the father was in the child's best interests (see Matter ofBougor v Murray, 283 AD2d 695, 695-696 [2001]; Bowers, 266 AD2d at742). We therefore find no basis to disturb the court's determination, which was madeafter a Lincoln hearing and a full evidentiary hearing at which the father waspresent and testified (cf. Thomas, 277 AD2d at 935).

The father failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court should havedismissed the modification petition due to the mother's alleged lack of compliance withhis discovery demand inasmuch as a "request for the imposition of a penalty pursuant toCPLR 3126 is improperly made for the first time on appeal" (Rivera v City of New York, 90AD3d 735, 736 [2011]). We further reject the father's contention that the court erredin dismissing his petition seeking an order of contempt for the mother's alleged failure tocomply with the prior order. Where a party "seeks an adjudication of civil contemptbased upon a violation of a court order, he or she must establish a willful and deliberateviolation of a lawful court order expressing a clear and unequivocal mandate" (Collins v Telcoa Intl. Corp., 86AD3d 549, 549 [2011]; see Matter of Hicks v Russi, 254 AD2d 801, 801[1998]), and that, "as a result of the violation, a right or remedy of a party to the litigationwas prejudiced" (Matter ofHughes v Kameneva, 96 AD3d 845, 846 [2012]; see Judiciary Law§ 753; McCain v Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216, 226 [1994]). Here, the mother'sact of filing the modification petition was a proactive measure in the best interests of thechild and is not the type of willful and deliberate violation punishable by contempt.Present—Centra, J.P., Fahey, Carni, Lindley and Whalen, JJ.


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