| People v Jones |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 04507 [107 AD3d 1584] |
| June 14, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v JamarJones, Appellant. |
—[*1] Jamar Jones, defendant-appellant pro se. Frank A. Sedita, III, District Attorney, Buffalo (Ashley R. Small of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a resentence of the Erie County Court (Michael F. Pietruszka, J.),rendered August 31, 2011. Defendant was resentenced upon his conviction of attemptedassault in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.
It is hereby ordered that the resentence so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: In November 1999, defendant entered an Alford plea toattempted assault in the first degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.10 [1]) andcriminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (§ 265.02 [former (4)]), insatisfaction of an indictment charging him with assault in the first degree (§ 120.10[1]) and criminal use of a firearm in the first degree (§ 265.09 [1] [a]). The periodof postrelease supervision mandated by Penal Law § 70.45 was not mentionedduring the plea colloquy or at sentencing, nor did County Court impose a period ofpostrelease supervision at sentencing. In 2011, the New York State Department ofCorrectional Services informed the court that defendant was a "designated person" withinthe meaning of Correction Law § 601-d (1), and sought resentencing of defendant"because a mandatory period of postrelease supervision was not included in his originaldeterminate sentences" (Peoplev Elliott, 93 AD3d 957, 958 [2012]).
At the beginning of the resentencing proceeding, defense counsel indicated thatdefendant wished to withdraw his plea, and requested an adjournment to permit him tomake such a motion. The court granted that request, along with a subsequent request foran additional adjournment, granted defendant's first motion for substitution of counsel,and permitted oral argument of defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. The court thendenied defendant's second request for substitution of counsel and, with the People'sconsent, resentenced defendant to the original sentence without a period of postreleasesupervision. Contrary to defendant's contention in his pro se supplemental brief, weconclude that he was not entitled to withdraw his plea "inasmuch as the court properlyresentenced defendant pursuant to Penal Law § 70.85" (People v Williams, 82 AD3d1576, 1577-1578 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 810 [2011]).[*2]
We reject defendant's further contention in hispro se brief that the court erred in denying his second request for substitution of counsel.Defendant's disagreements with counsel over strategy did not establish the requisite goodcause for substitution of counsel (see People v Medina, 44 NY2d 199, 208-209[1978]; see generally People v Sides, 75 NY2d 822, 824 [1990]). Defendant'scontention that he did not have time to consult with new counsel prior to the argument ofhis motion to withdraw the plea is belied by the record. Contrary to defendant'scontention in his main brief, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defensecounsel's request for a third adjournment of the resentencing proceeding (see Peoplev Ippolito, 242 AD2d 880, 880-881 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 874[1997]; see also People vBrown, 101 AD3d 1627, 1628 [2012]). We have reviewed defendant'sremaining contention in his pro se supplemental brief and conclude that it is withoutmerit. Present—Smith, J.P., Fahey, Carni, Valentino and Whalen, JJ.