| Jacobson v Croman |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 04909 [107 AD3d 644] |
| June 27, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Guy J. Jacobson, Individually and on Behalf of 99-105Third Avenue Realty, LLC, Appellant, v Steven Croman et al., Respondents, etal., Nominal Defendant. |
—[*1] Meister Seelig & Fein LLP, New York (Kevin A. Fritz of counsel), forrespondents.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Bransten, J.), entered March 6,2012, which denied plaintiff's motion for leave to serve a third amended complaint,unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts and in the exercise of discretion, withoutcosts, and the motion granted.
The primary reason the IAS court denied plaintiff's motion was that he had failed tovacate his note of issue. However, the fact that a motion to amend is made after a note ofissue "does not of necessity call for its denial" (Smith v Industrial Leasing Corp.,124 AD2d 413, 415 [3d Dept 1986]).
To be sure, "where the amendment is sought after a long delay, and a statement ofreadiness has been filed, judicial discretion in allowing the amendment should bediscreet, circumspect, prudent and cautious" (Cseh v New York City Tr. Auth.,240 AD2d 270, 272 [1st Dept 1997] [internal quotation marks omitted]). However, thedelay in Cseh—more than 10 years (id. at 270-271)—wasfar longer than in the case at bar.
Another reason the IAS court denied plaintiff's motion was the passage of time.However, "[m]ere lateness is not a barrier to . . . amendment. It must belateness coupled with significant prejudice to the other side" (Edenwald Contr. Co. vCity of New York, 60 NY2d 957, 959 [1983] [internal quotation marks omitted])."The kind of prejudice required to defeat an amendment . . . must. . . be a showing of prejudice traceable not simply to the new matter soughtto be added, but also to the fact that it is only now being added. There must be somespecial right lost in the interim, some change of position or some significant trouble orexpense that could have been avoided had the original pleading contained what theamended one wants to add" (A. J. Pegno Constr. Corp. v City of New York, 95AD2d 655, 656 [1st Dept 1983] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also e.g.Valdes v Marbrose Realty, 289 AD2d 28, 29 [1st Dept 2001]). Defendants failed toshow such prejudice.
For example, defendants contend that they are prejudiced because they tailored theirextensive preparations during a year-long mediation to the claims that plaintiff hadasserted in his [*2]second amended complaint. However,plaintiff submitted evidence that the mediation did not require extensive preparation. Inany event, "[p]rejudice does not occur simply because a defendant . . . hasto expend additional time preparing its case" (Jacobson v McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharms., 68 AD3d652, 654 [1st Dept 2009]).
Defendants also contend that they will be prejudiced because they will be forced toconduct further discovery. However, "the need for additional discovery does notconstitute prejudice sufficient to justify denial of an amendment" (id.; seealso e.g. Smith, 124 AD2d at 414). According to plaintiff—and not denied bydefendants—the new claim that he seeks to add in the third amended complaint isbased on facts and documents within defendants' knowledge and possession. In anyevent, if defendants need discovery, they can obtain it (see e.g. Cherebin v EmpressAmbulance Serv., Inc., 43 AD3d 364, 365 [1st Dept 2007]; Adams v Hilton Hotels, 4AD3d 232, 232-233 [1st Dept 2004]).
Finally, the motion court apparently believed that plaintiff's proposed cause of actionfor distributions lacked merit because nominal defendant 99-105 Third Avenue Realty,LLC's liabilities exceeded its assets, and the operating agreement for nominal defendantsaid that no distributions could be made unless its assets exceeded its liabilities.However, the only support for the proposition that nominal defendant's liabilitiesexceeded its assets was an affidavit from defendant Steven Croman and an unauditedbalance sheet for nominal defendant, which showed numerous intercompany loans.Under the circumstances, plaintiff is not bound by these documents; he should bepermitted to probe the facts. Unlike Bishop v Maurer (83 AD3d 483, 485 [1st Dept 2011]), thisis not a case where "the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient to state a cause ofaction or is patently devoid of merit" (internal quotation marks omitted).Concur—Tom, J.P., Mazzarelli, Moskowitz and Gische, JJ.