| Baccari v KCOR, Inc. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 05865 [109 AD3d 856] |
| September 18, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Dean Baccari, Respondent, v KCOR, Inc., DoingBusiness as Rock Health and Fitness Club, Appellant. |
—[*1] Paris & Chaikin, PLLC, New York, N.Y. (Jason L. Paris of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals, aslimited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Butler, J.), dated July 18, 2012, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissingthe complaint.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs,and the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
The plaintiff, an experienced boxing instructor, commenced this action to recoverdamages for injuries he allegedly sustained when he stepped into a gap between pads thatwere located underneath the canvas surface of a boxing ring while training his girlfriendin his spare time. The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint,contending that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury and was barred from recovery bythe doctrine of primary assumption of risk. The Supreme Court denied the motion.
The doctrine of primary assumption of risk provides that "by engaging in a sport orrecreational activity, a participant consents to those commonly appreciated risks whichare inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from suchparticipation" (Morgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d 471, 484 [1997]). Thisincludes risks associated with any open and obvious conditions of the playing field,including risks arising from "less than optimal conditions" (Bukowski v Clarkson Univ.,19 NY3d 353, 356 [2012]; see Mattas v Town of Hempstead, 106 AD3d 884 [2013]).Thus, "when an experienced athlete . . . is aware of the existence of aparticular condition on the premises where the activity is to be performed, and actuallyappreciates or should reasonably appreciate the potential danger it poses, yet participatesin the activity despite this awareness, he or she must be deemed to have assumed the riskof injury which flows therefrom" (Joseph v New York Racing Assn., 28 AD3d 105, 111[2006]; see Sykes v County of Erie, 94 NY2d 912, 913 [2000]; Maddox vCity of New York, 66 NY2d 270, 274 [1985]).
Here, the defendant established, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matter[*2]of law. The defendant demonstrated that the plaintiffwas an experienced boxing instructor who had boxed in the subject boxing ring onnumerous occasions and knew of the gap between the pads. Indeed, the plaintiff hadcomplained to management about the gap between the pads (see Maddox v City ofNew York, 66 NY2d at 279), and witnessed one of his students step into it (seeBukowski v Clarkson Univ., 19 NY3d at 356-357).
In opposition to the defendant's prima facie showing, the plaintiff failed to raise atriable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant'smotion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see O'Connor vHewlett-Woodmere Union Free Sch. Dist., 103 AD3d 862, 864 [2013]). Dillon,J.P., Roman, Miller and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.