| Burnside 711 LLC v Amerada Hess Corp. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 05869 [109 AD3d 860] |
| September 18, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Burnside 711 LLC, Appellant, v Amerada HessCorporation, Respondent. |
—[*1] Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, New York, N.Y. (Jonathan K. Cooperman and JessicaL. Klarfeld of counsel) for respondent.
In an action, inter alia, pursuant to Navigation Law § 181 for a judgmentdeclaring that the plaintiff is entitled to indemnification and damages resulting from thedefendant's discharge of petroleum, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from somuch of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Marber, J.), entered February 9,2012, as granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (5) to dismissthe complaint on the ground of a defense founded upon documentary evidence andrelease.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs,and the motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (5) to dismiss the complaint is denied.
The plaintiff, the owner of the subject property, alleged that between 1964 and 1979the defendant operated a gas station on the property pursuant to a lease with a formerowner. It was later learned that underground gasoline tanks on the premises had leakedand contaminated the soil. The New York State Department of EnvironmentalConservation directed the plaintiff to remediate the site, and the remediation wascompleted in 2010. In 2011, the plaintiff commenced this action seeking, inter alia, adeclaration that it is entitled to indemnification and damages resulting from thedefendant's discharge of petroleum on the property. The defendant, relying on tworeleases executed in 1984 by the defendant and a former owner of the property, movedpursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (5) to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Courtgranted the defendant's motion.
Generally, a valid release completely bars an action on a claim that is the subject ofthe release (see Inter-Reco, Inc.v Lake Park 175 Froehlich Farm, LLC, 106 AD3d 955, 956 [2013]; Global Mins. & Metals Corp. vHolme, 35 AD3d 93, 98 [2006]). Principles of contract law govern theinterpretation of a release; "a release 'that is complete, clear, and unambiguous on its facemust be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms' " (Inter-Reco, Inc. vLake Park 175 Froehlich Farm, LLC, 106 AD3d at 956, quoting Alvarez v Amicucci, 82 AD3d687, 688 [2011]). Nonetheless, as the Court of Appeals has recognized with respectto a general release, "[t]here is little doubt . . . that its interpretation andlimitation by the parol evidence rule are subject to special rules. These rules are based[*2]on a realistic recognition that releases containstandardized, even ritualistic, language and are given in circumstances where the partiesare sometimes looking no further than the precise matter in dispute that is being settled.Thus, while it has been held that an unreformed general release will be given its fullliteral effect where it is directly or circumstantially evident that the purpose is to achievea truly general settlement (Lucio v Curran, 2 NY2d 157 [1956]), the cases aremany in which the release has been avoided with respect to uncontemplated transactionsdespite the generality of the language in the release form" (Mangini v McClurg,24 NY2d 556, 562 [1969]).
Further, "[t]he meaning and extent of coverage of a release 'necessarily depend, as inthe case of contracts generally, upon the controversy being settled and upon the purposefor which the release was actually given' " (Rotondi v Drewes, 31 AD3d 734, 735-736 [2006], quotingCahill v Regan, 5 NY2d 292, 299 [1959]). A general release may not beconstrued to cover matters that the parties "did not desire or intend to dispose of"(Cahill v Regan, 5 NY2d at 299; see Rotondi v Drewes, 31 AD3d at735).
Here, the two releases at issue, whether construed together or separately, areambiguous regarding whether the parties intended that they cover unknown claims forenvironmental contamination (see Gettner v Getty Oil Co., 226 AD2d 502, 503[1996]). Thus, the Supreme Court erred in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss thecomplaint on the basis of the releases pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5). Moreover,inasmuch as the releases did not "conclusively dispose" of the plaintiff's claims (Fontanetta v John Doe 1, 73AD3d 78, 83 [2010]), the Supreme Court likewise erred in granting that branch ofthe defendant's motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(1) (see Great Eagle Intl. Trade,Ltd. v Corporate Funding Partners, LLC, 104 AD3d 731, 731 [2013]; Midorimatsu, Inc. v Hui FatCo., 99 AD3d 680, 681-682 [2012]). Mastro, J.P., Balkin, Hall and Austin, JJ.,concur. [Prior Case History: 2012 NY Slip Op 30419(U).]