| Robayo v Aghaabdul |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 05889 [109 AD3d 892] |
| September 18, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Miguel Robayo, Appellant, v Sami K. Aghaabdul,Respondent. |
—[*1] Brand, Glick & Brand, P.C., Garden City, N.Y. (Andrew B. Federman of counsel),for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from anorder of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Rosengarten, J.), entered January 3, 2013,which denied his motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiff's motionfor summary judgment on the issue of liability is granted.
The plaintiff commenced this action alleging that while in the right lane of theGeorge Washington Bridge, his vehicle was struck in the rear by the defendant's vehicle.Prior to the completion of discovery, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on theissue of liability. The Supreme Court denied his motion.
A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case ofnegligence with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on thatoperator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation forthe collision (see Xian HongPan v Buglione, 101 AD3d 706 [2012]; Zdenek v Safety Consultants, Inc., 63 AD3d 918 [2009])."A claim that the driver of the lead vehicle made a sudden stop, standing alone, isinsufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence" (Jumandeo v Franks, 56 AD3d 614, 615 [2008] [internalquotation marks omitted]).
Here, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter oflaw by submitting evidence that the defendant's vehicle struck his vehicle in the rear asthe plaintiff's vehicle was slowing down for traffic in front of it (see Xian Hong Panv Buglione, 101 AD3d at 706). In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triableissue of fact. "[V]ehicle stops which are foreseeable under the prevailing trafficconditions, even if sudden and frequent, must be anticipated by the driver who follows,since he or she is under a duty to maintain a safe distance between his or her car and thecar ahead" (Shamah v Richmond County Ambulance Serv., 279 AD2d 564, 565[2001]). In his affidavit, the defendant acknowledged that he was traveling slowly due tothe volume of traffic on the bridge. Because the lane in which both vehicles weretraveling was closed ahead of them, the plaintiff's vehicle began to move into theadjacent lane, and then stopped suddenly. Under these [*2]circumstances, the defendant's conclusory assertion that theplaintiff's vehicle stopped suddenly was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as towhether the plaintiff negligently contributed to the happening of the accident, as thedefendant should have anticipated that the plaintiff might have to make a sudden stop (see Sayyed v Murray, 109AD3d 464 [2013]; Staton vIlic, 69 AD3d 606, 607 [2010]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiff's motion forsummary judgment on the issue of liability. Angiolillo, J.P., Chambers, Sgroi and Cohen,JJ., concur.