| Matter of Curley v Klausen |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 06743 [110 AD3d 1156] |
| October 17, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Catherine Curley,Respondent, v Michael Klausen, Appellant. (And Three Other RelatedProceedings.) |
—[*1] Edward S. Haddad, Albany, for respondent.
McCarthy, J. Appeals from two orders of the Family Court of Fulton County (Skoda,J.), entered June 24, 2011 and January 31, 2012, which, among other things, dismissedrespondent's application, in four proceedings pursuant to Family Ct Act article 4, tomodify a prior order of support.
Petitioner (hereinafter the mother) and respondent (hereinafter the father) are theparents of a son (born in 1991) and a daughter (born in 1993). The parties' 1997 divorcedecree incorporated a stipulation that set forth, among other things, the father's childsupport obligations and the parties' obligations to contribute to the children's collegeexpenses. In 2010, the mother filed petitions seeking modification of a prior supportorder and alleging that the father violated an order by, among other things, failing tocontribute to college expenses. The father answered, asserting the defense of parentalalienation, and filed petitions alleging a violation of a prior court order and seeking tohave his child support obligation suspended. Family Court first held a hearing on thefather's defense and determined that the mother did not engage in parental alienation.Following a hearing addressing the remaining aspects of the proceedings, the court,among other things, dismissed the mother's petition seeking modification of support, butordered [*2]the father to pay 82% of the children'scollege expenses. The father appeals.[FN1]
Family Court did not err in dismissing the father's parental alienationdefense.[FN2] Despite the parental duty to support a child until age 21 (see Family Ct Act§ 413 [1] [a]), "where the noncustodial parent establishes that his or her right ofreasonable access to the child has been unjustifiably frustrated by the custodial parent,child support payments may be suspended" (Matter of Crouse v Crouse, 53 AD3d 750, 751 [2008]; see Matter of Dobies v Brefka,83 AD3d 1148, 1152 [2011]; Usack v Usack, 17 AD3d 736, 737-738 [2005]). Tosuspend payments, the father here was required to show that the mother "intentionally'orchestrated and encouraged the estrangement of [the father] from the children' or thatshe actively interfered with or deliberately frustrated his visitation rights" (Matter ofCrouse v Crouse, 53 AD3d at 752, quoting Usack v Usack, 17 AD3d at739).
While the father regularly called the children and sent them messages at the time ofthe hearing and for several years prior, he was absent from their lives for at least twoyears, has not made much effort to schedule or encourage visitation, and did not file apetition to enforce his visitation despite his claims that the mother has interfered forseveral years. The children both testified that the mother encouraged them to call thefather and acknowledge special occasions, but they often chose not to do so. Thedaughter rarely answered her phone when the father called and rarely responded to hismessages. The mother may have told the children to call the father and contacted him tohave a visit when she was near his home, but she mainly left it up to the children tocontact him and arrange visitation. Considering all of the testimony, it appears that thechildren's alienation from the father resulted from a "lack of effort by all concerned,"including the father and both children as well as the mother (Matter of Crouse vCrouse, 53 AD3d at 752). Accordingly, the father did not establish his defense andhe was not entitled to a suspension of his child support.
Family Court properly determined that the father must pay his proportionate share ofthe children's college expenses pursuant to the parties' stipulation of settlement. Thestipulation is a contract between the parties and must be interpreted by enforcing its plainlanguage if [*3]unambiguous, and otherwise bydiscerning the parties' intentions (see Matter of Frank v Frank, 88 AD3d 1123, 1124 [2011];Matter of Lerman v Haines,85 AD3d 1248, 1249 [2011]). The relevant terms of the stipulation provide: "[B]othparties agree they shall pay for a college education for their children based upon theirthen existing respective incomes, after the children exhaust all loan, grant andscholarship opportunities . . . Should the parties not be able to agree on thecollege that the children shall attend, either party reserves the right to apply to a court ofappropriate jurisdiction for the decision of the court and the amount of their respectivepayment." The father does not argue that he disagrees with the children's choices toattend certain colleges. He instead contends that he is relieved from paying collegeexpenses altogether because the mother did not confer and agree with him regarding thecolleges. The stipulation does not provide him with such relief (see Matter of Frank vFrank, 88 AD3d at 1124). The stipulation allows either parent to seek courtintervention concerning the college choice or amount of payment, if the parties are notable to agree. Despite the father being aware that the children were applying to andattending college, he did not seek such intervention, but the mother has done so in one ofthe instant proceedings. Thus, pursuant to the stipulation, the court was authorized todetermine the amount that each party should pay towards the college expenses (seeMatter of Lerman v Haines, 85 AD3d at 1249-1250).
The question then becomes whether Family Court correctly calculated the parties'respective obligations for the college expenses. In the oral stipulation, the mother'scounsel stated that the parties would pay such expenses "based upon their then existingrespective incomes." In a later clarification during the stipulation, however, the father'scounsel specified that "both parties are going to contribute to the college expenses astheir incomes allow," which the mother's counsel further clarified as "[b]ased upon thethen existing financial ability to pay." Unfortunately, these so-called clarifications createdconfusion, because "existing respective incomes" does not necessarily mean the samething as "as their incomes allow" or "existing financial ability to pay." We resolve thisambiguity by requiring the parties to pay college expenses based on their financial abilityto pay, as this was the last clarification placed on the record during the stipulation, andthe two clarifications evince the parties' intentions to contribute based on their ability topay, which takes into account more than just gross income.
In determining child support or related expenses, a court may impute income to aparent based on that party's failure to seek more lucrative employment that is consistentwith his or her education, skills and experience (see Matter of Bianchi v Breakell, 48 AD3d 1000, 1003[2008]; see also Matter ofRubley v Longworth, 35 AD3d 1129, 1130 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d811 [2007]). Imputed income more accurately reflects a party's earning capacity and,presumably, his or her ability to pay (see Matter of Kasabian v Chichester, 72 AD3d 1141, 1141[2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 703 [2010]). Thus, imputed income may be attributedto a party as long as the court articulates the basis for imputation and record evidencesupports the calculations (seePulver v Pulver, 40 AD3d 1315, 1318 [2007]).
Here, Family Court accepted the mother's income as $15,000, without imputing anyincome to her. She testified that she earned approximately that amount at her part-timejob as a tax preparer, but acknowledged that she has a Bachelor's degree in accountingand could work full time, yet chooses to work reduced hours out of loyalty to heremployer. Because we are basing the college expenses on the parties' ability to pay ratherthan their actual income, we will impute income to the mother based on herunderemployment and ability to earn more (compare Matter of Disidoro v Disidoro, 81 AD3d 1228,1230 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]). Using the mother's testimony thatshe earned approximately $15,000 working full time from [*4]January through April and two days per week for theremainder of the year, we can extrapolate a full-time salary for her at the same earningrate, resulting in an imputed income of $25,000.[FN3]
Family Court found that the record did not include a current financial affidavit of thefather or other proof to confirm his income, leading the court to rely on his $68,112income listed in a 2002 order. But the father testified that his annual income was in the"ballpark" of $110,000. The father contends that this proof of his income was onlyadmitted into evidence at a hearing that was limited to addressing the defense of parentalalienation, and not the hearing addressing the support petitions generally, leaving noproof of his income. As these proceedings were bifurcated to deal with a potentiallydispositive defense prior to reaching the merits of most of the petitions, it seems merely amatter of semantics to describe the testimony as part of two separate hearings as opposedto just one hearing held over the course of different days to address different aspects ofthe same petitions. In any event, the court could take judicial notice of the father'sadmission in his testimony given at a prior hearing in the same proceeding (see Matter of Benjamin vBenjamin, 48 AD3d 912, 914 [2008]; Matter of Anjoulic J., 18 AD3d 984, 986 [2005]; see also Matter of Xiomara D.[Madelyn D.], 96 AD3d 1239, 1239-1240 [2012]). Thus, we find that $110,000more accurately reflects the father's income and ability to pay. Using these incomefigures to recalculate the parties' pro rata shares of the children's college expenses, themother is responsible for 18.5% and the father is responsible for 81.5%.[FN4]
Peters, P.J., Stein and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal from the orderentered June 24, 2011 is dismissed, without costs. Ordered that the order entered January31, 2012 is modified, on the law and the facts, without costs, by reducing respondent'spro rata share of the children's college expenses to 81.5%, and, as so modified, affirmed.
Footnote 1: Although the father'sappeal from the June 2011 nonfinal order must be dismissed as that order is notappealable as of right (see Family Ct Act § 1112 [a]), his appeal from theJanuary 2012 final order brings up for review the issues raised on appeal from thenonfinal order (see Matter ofNathan O. v Jennifer P., 88 AD3d 1125, 1126 n [2011], appeal dismissedand lv denied 18 NY3d 904 [2012]).
Footnote 2: The father mistakenlyattempts to rely on a provision from a 2005 order that provides him with a basis to seekmodification of support if he "is not receiving meaningful expanded unsupervisedvisitation with the children through no fault of his own." He repeatedly omits theremainder of that sentence, which states "as per [the counselor who was overseeingtherapeutic visitation]." Because the record does not contain any recommendation of thecounselor regarding expanded visitation, and because the father bears at least some faultfor the lack of visitation, this provision is not helpful to him.
Footnote 3: We used a calculationof $15,000 = (X × 4) + (X × 8 × 2/5), with X representing the mother'smonthly earnings, the 4 and 8 representing the number of months and the 2/5representing a discount for her working only two days per week during the eight months.Under this equation, X = $2,083.33. Multiplying that amount times 12 months yields$24,999.96. We will thus impute an annual income of $25,000.
Footnote 4: Despite the largechanges in the income considered for each party, the overall percentage attributable toeach is only .5% different than that found by Family Court.