| People v Solis |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 07203 [111 AD3d 654] |
| November 6, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Jefferson Solis, Appellant. |
—[*1] Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano andJeanette Lifschitz of counsel; Lorrie A. Zinno on the brief), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Buchter, J.), rendered October 4, 2011, convicting him of assault in the first degree,upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Although the defendant validly waived his right to appeal, his claim with respect tothe voluntariness of the plea survives such a waiver (see People v Seaberg, 74NY2d 1, 10 [1989]; People vJoseph, 103 AD3d 665 [2013]; People v Cohen, 100 AD3d 919 [2012]). The defendant'smotion to withdraw his plea of guilty was properly denied. The record establishes thatthe defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered his plea of guilty afterbeing informed, through an interpreter, of the rights he would be forfeiting by pleadingguilty and the direct consequences of his plea (see People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9,16-17 [1983]; People vAndrea, 98 AD3d 627 [2012]; People v Lu Yang Tong, 238 AD2d 607[1997]). In support of his motion to withdraw his plea, the defendant's new attorneyalleged that the defendant's former counsel had advised the defendant that he would notprevail at trial and would be subject to a much greater sentence if convicted after trial.Even if these allegations are true, they do not constitute coercion on the part of hisformer attorney (see People vElting, 18 AD3d 770, 771 [2005]; People v Charles, 256 AD2d 472,473 [1998]; People v Samuel, 208 AD2d 776, 777 [1994]). Nor did the SupremeCourt's remarks regarding the defendant's sentence exposure in the event he were to beconvicted after trial constitute coercion (see People v Bravo, 72 AD3d 697, 698 [2010]). In anyevent, the defendant's claims of coercion are belied by his statements under oath on therecord acknowledging that no one had forced or coerced him to plead guilty and that hewas pleading guilty voluntarily (see People v Duncan, 78 AD3d 1193, 1194 [2010]; People v Turner, 23 AD3d503, 503-504 [2005]; People v Raymond, 3 AD3d 587 [2004]).
The defendant's waiver of the right to appeal precludes appellate review of anychallenge to the factual allocution of the plea (see People v Devodier, 102 AD3d 884 [2013]), and hisclaim that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel, except to theextent that the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel may have affected thevoluntariness of his plea (seePeople v Montalvo, 105 AD3d 774, 775 [2013]; People v Ramos, 77 AD3d773, 774 [2010]). Moreover, by pleading guilty, [*2]the defendant forfeited those claims of ineffectiveassistance of counsel that did not directly involve the plea bargaining process (see People v Perazzo, 65AD3d 1058, 1059 [2009]; People v Russell, 58 AD3d 759, 760 [2009]; People v DeLuca, 45 AD3d777 [2007]). The defendant's contention that his plea of guilty was coerced as aresult of the alleged ineffectiveness of his former attorney is belied by the record (seePeople v Perazzo, 65 AD3d at 1059; People v Gedin, 46 AD3d 701 [2007]). Furthermore, therecord reveals that the defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel,as his former attorney provided meaningful representation (see People v Ford, 86NY2d 397, 404 [1995]; People v Boodhoo, 191 AD2d 448, 449 [1993]). Dillon,J.P., Leventhal, Chambers and Miller, JJ., concur.