| Matter of Chakelton M. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 07484 [111 AD3d 732] |
| November 13, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Chakelton M., a Person Alleged to be aJuvenile Delinquent, Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Janet L. Zaleon ofcounsel; Ahson Azmat on the brief), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3,Chakelton M. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County(McElrath, J.), dated July 13, 2012, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court(Elkins, J.) dated May 8, 2012, made after a hearing, finding that he committed acts,which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of robbery in thesecond degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation fora period of 12 months. The appeal from the order of disposition brings up for review thefact-finding order.
Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed theappellant on probation for a period of 12 months is dismissed as academic, without costsor disbursements; and it is further,
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs ordisbursements.
The appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant onprobation for a period of 12 months has been rendered academic, as the period ofplacement has expired (seeMatter of Stanley F., 76 AD3d 1067, 1068 [2010]). Since, however, there maybe collateral consequences of the adjudication of delinquency, the appeal from so muchof the order of disposition as adjudicated the appellant a juvenile delinquent, and whichbrings up for review the fact-finding order, has not been rendered academic (seeFamily Ct Act § 783; Matter of Dorothy D., 49 NY2d 212 [1980];Matter of Stanley F., 76 AD3d at 1068).
The appellant was accused of having participated in the robbery of the complainant.Although the appellant admitted that he was present during the incident, he insisted thathe only watched and did not participate, and he claims on this appeal that the evidence ofhis participation was legally insufficient and that the fact-finding was against the weightof the evidence. We disagree.
"The evidence supporting a fact-finding in a juvenile delinquency proceeding islegally sufficient if, viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the presentmentagency, any rational trier of fact could have found the appellant's commission of all theelements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt" (Matter of Danielle B., 94AD3d 757, 758 [2012]; seeMatter of Imani [*2]Mc., 78 AD3d 705, 706[2010]; Matter of BrooklynB., 77 AD3d 934, 935 [2010]). The test is no different when the evidencesupporting the fact-finding is circumstantial (cf. People v Ficarrota, 91 NY2d244, 248-249 [1997]; People v Rossey, 89 NY2d 970, 971-972 [1997];People v Cabey, 85 NY2d 417, 421 [1995]). Although "[a] person's merepresence at the scene of the crime, even with knowledge of its perpetration, cannotrender him or her accessorially liable for the underlying criminal conduct" (Matter ofCarmelo N., 228 AD2d 682, 682 [1996]; see Matter of Leonel T., 78 AD3d 1188, 1189 [2010]), thecomplainant's testimony in this case, when viewed in the light most favorable to thepresentment agency, established the appellant's active participation in the incident.Accordingly, the evidence was legally sufficient (see Matter of Imani Mc., 78AD3d at 706; Matter of Stanley F., 76 AD3d at 1068). Moreover, in fulfilling ourresponsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Hasan C., 59AD3d 617, 617-618 [2009]; cf. CPL 470.15 [5]), we nevertheless accordgreat deference to the opportunity of the trier of fact to view the witnesses, hear thetestimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Stanley F., 76 AD3d at1068-1069; cf. People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], cert denied542 US 946 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Uponreviewing the record, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determinationwas not against the weight of the evidence (see Family Ct Act § 342.2 [2];Matter of Darnell C., 66AD3d 771, 772 [2009]; cf.People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
The Family Court has broad discretion in determining the appropriate disposition in ajuvenile delinquency proceeding, and its determination is accorded great deference (see Matter of Racheal M., 108AD3d 770, 771 [2013]; Matter of Paul T., 107 AD3d 726, 727 [2013]). Here, inlight of the nature of the appellant's participation in the incident, the Family Court did notimprovidently exercise its discretion in adjudicating him a juvenile delinquent(see Family Ct Act § 352.2), rather than directing an adjournment incontemplation of dismissal (see Matter of Racheal M., 108 AD3d at 771-772; cf. Matter of Jonathan M., 107AD3d 805, 807 [2013]). Mastro, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Lott, JJ., concur.