| Sarcona v J & J Air Container Sta., Inc. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 07955 [111 AD3d 914] |
| November 27, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Thomas Sarcona, Appellant, v J & J Air ContainerStation, Inc., et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Glynn Mercep and Purcell, LLP, Stony Brook, N.Y. (Timothy B. Glynn of counsel),for respondents.
In an action to recover on a promissory note, the plaintiff appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Pitts, J.), dated October 18, 2012, which granted thedefendants' motion to vacate a judgment of the same court dated April 23, 2012, which,upon an order dated August 29, 2011, granting the plaintiff's unopposed motion forsummary judgment on the complaint, and upon an order dated February 15, 2012,granting that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to modify the prior order datedAugust 29, 2011, was in favor of him and against the defendants in the total sum of$505,285.59.
Ordered that the order dated October 18, 2012, is affirmed, with costs.
To vacate the judgment entered upon their failure to oppose the plaintiff's motion forsummary judgment, the defendants were required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse fortheir default and a potentially meritorious opposition to the motion (see CPLR5015 [a] [1]; Herrera v MTABus Co., 100 AD3d 962, 963 [2012]; Tsikotis v Pioneer Bldg. Corp., 96 AD3d 936 [2012]; Walker v Mohammed, 90AD3d 1034 [2011]). The Supreme Court may, in its discretion, accept law officefailure as a reasonable excuse (see CPLR 2005) where that claim is supported bya detailed and credible explanation of the default at issue (see Swensen v MV Transp.,Inc., 89 AD3d 924, 925 [2011]; Remote Meter Tech. of NY, Inc. v Aris Realty Corp., 83 AD3d1030, 1032 [2011]; Henryv Kuveke, 9 AD3d 476, 479 [2004]). Under the circumstances of this case, andbased on the evidence in the record, the defendants demonstrated that their failure tooppose the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the complaint was due to theirformer attorney's law office failure (see Muir v Coleman, 98 AD3d 569, 570 [2012]; L&L Auto Distribs. & SuppliersInc. v Auto Collection, Inc., 85 AD3d 734, 735 [2011]; Gironda v Katzen, 19 AD3d644, 645 [2005]; Belesi v Gifford, 269 AD2d 552 [2000]). Furthermore,while the defendants' former attorney failed to appear at a court conference that resultedin the issuance of an order dated February 15, 2012, upon which the subject defaultjudgment was subsequently entered, there is no evidence that the defendants were placedon notice that their former attorney was not going to appear or that he was no longerrepresenting them (see CPLR 321 [b] [2]). Moreover, the defendants moved tovacate the subject default judgment shortly after it was entered and they obtained newcounsel, and they demonstrated a potentially meritorious opposition to the plaintiff'smotion for summary judgment on the complaint (see Gruder v Gruder, 38 AD2d587 [1971]; cf. Sacco v Sutera, 266 AD2d 446, 447 [1999]; Phillips vCioffi, 204 AD2d 94, 95 [1994]; Inter Bus. Mktg. v Kronengold, 135 AD2d474 [1987]). Accordingly, [*2]the Supreme Courtprovidently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants' motion to vacate thesubject default judgment. Dillon, J.P., Leventhal, Chambers and Miller, JJ., concur.