Lancaster Dev., Inc. v McDonald
2013 NY Slip Op 08572 [112 AD3d 1260]
December 26, 2013
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 29, 2014


Lancaster Development, Inc., et al., Appellants, v JoanMcDonald, as Commissioner of Transportation, et al.,Respondents.

—[*1]Couch White, LLP, Albany (Jeremy M. Smith of counsel), for appellants.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Owen Demuth of counsel), forrespondents.

Adams Bell Adams, PC, Rochester (Anthony J. Adams Jr. of counsel), for TheNational Black Chamber of Commerce, Inc. and others, amici curiae.

Brown & Weinraub, PLLC, Albany (Patrick E. Brown of counsel), for New YorkBuilding & Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO, amicus curiae.

Egan Jr., J. Appeal from an amended judgment of the Supreme Court (Zwack, J.),entered January 17, 2013 in Albany County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuantto CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, granted respondents' motion todismiss the petition/complaint.

In 2011, respondent Department of Transportation (hereinafter DOT) solicited bidsto reconstruct Exit 122 of State Route 17 in the Town of Wallkill, Orange County and, inconjunction therewith, elected to include a project labor agreement (hereinafter PLA) inthe bid specifications for the project.[FN1]Although petitioner Lancaster Development, Inc., a nonunion [*2]shop, submitted the lowest bid, DOT declared Lancaster'sbid to be "informal" based upon Lancaster's refusal to abide by the terms of thePLA.[FN2]In response, Lancaster commenced a combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and actionfor declaratory judgment to challenge the inclusion of the PLA in the 2011 bid. SupremeCourt (Teresi, J.) declared that the subject PLA violated the competitive bidding lawsand directed that the project be rebid.

In June 2012, DOT rebid the project as directed, and the bid specifications againincluded a PLA—one that was based upon a recently commissioned labor/costanalysis. Lancaster elected not to submit a bid and, instead, together with petitionerEmpire State Chapter of the Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. and petitioner LoriFlorian, commenced this combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratoryjudgment action seeking to challenge DOT's inclusion of a PLA in its 2012 bidspecifications. Respondents moved to dismiss contending, among other things, thatpetitioners lacked standing. Supreme Court (Zwack, J.) granted respondents' motion, andthis appeal by petitioners ensued.

To establish standing, Lancaster was required to demonstrate that it "suffered aninjury in fact, distinct from that of the general public[,] . . . [and] that theinjury claimed falls within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute challenged"(Matter of Transactive Corp. v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 92 NY2d579, 587 [1998]; see Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d761, 772-774 [1991]; see alsoMatter of Ricket v Mahan, 97 AD3d 1062, 1063 [2012]). This it failed to do. Asa starting point, inasmuch as the harm purportedly suffered by Lancaster was occasionednot by its failure to secure the winning bid for the project (compare Maraia v OrangeRegional Med. Ctr., 63 AD3d 1113, 1115 [2009]) but, rather, by its entirelyvoluntary decision to forgo submitting a bid at all, we are not persuaded that Lancasterhas suffered an injury in fact distinct from that of the public at large. Moreover, evenassuming that Lancaster met this aspect of the standing test, it is clear that any economicinjury or lost business opportunity suffered by Lancaster does not fall within the zone ofinterests to be protected by the competitive bidding statutes (see Matter ofTransactive Corp. v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 92 NY2d at 587-588),which were designed to "protect[ ] . . . the public fisc by obtaining the bestwork at the lowest possible price" and prevent "favoritism, improvidence, fraud andcorruption in the awarding of public contracts" (Matter of New York State Correctional Officers & PoliceBenevolent Assn., Inc. [New York State Dept. of Civ. Serv.], 70 AD3d 240,243-244 [2009] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter ofConduit & Found. Corp. v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 66 NY2d 144, 148 [1985]).Such statutes are not intended to benefit individual bidders (see Matter of Conduit &Found. Corp. v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 66 NY2d at 148; Matter of NewYork State Ch., Inc., Associated Gen. Contrs. of Am. v New York State ThruwayAuth., 207 AD2d 26, 30-31 [1994], affd 88 NY2d 56 [1996]), and "[t]he factthat certain nonunion contractors may be disinclined to submit bids" where, as here, aPLA is included in the contract specifications does not preclude competition such thatthe "competitive bidding mandate" is offended (Matter of New York State Ch., Inc.,Associated Gen. Contrs. of Am. v New York State Thruway Auth., 88 NY2d 56,71[*3][1996]). We therefore conclude that Lancasterfailed to demonstrate that it has standing under the traditional two-prong test (cf.Matter of Transactive Corp. v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 92 NY2d at587-588).

Although a limited exception indeed has been carved out where the nonbiddingentity can demonstrate that it was precluded from submitting any bid at all (seeMatter of Kick v Regan, 110 AD2d 934 [1985], lv denied 66 NY2d 601[1985]; Albert Elia Bldg. Co. v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 54 AD2d 337[1976]), these cases are readily distinguishable[FN3]and Lancaster's attempt to fall within the exception is unpersuasive. Simply put, neitherthe alleged illegality of the PLA itself (an issue we do not address) nor its inclusion in the2012 bid specifications deprived Lancaster of the opportunity to bid on theproject.[FN4]Lancaster may have elected not to submit a bid because, as a nonunion shop, itconsidered the PLA to be inconsistent with its business model and practices or becausethe inclusion of the PLA otherwise made the project less attractive, but the PLA itself didnot preclude Lancaster from bidding altogether—as evidenced by, for example,Lancaster's participation in the prior round of bidding. Accordingly, Supreme Courtproperly concluded that Lancaster lacked standing to maintain this proceeding/action.

Petitioners' remaining contentions do not warrant extended discussion. In light of ourdetermination that Lancaster—as Empire's contractor member—lacksstanding in its own right, Empire's organizational standing claim necessarily must fail (see Matter of New York PropaneGas Assn. v New York State Dept. of State, 17 AD3d 915, 916 [2005]).Similarly, inasmuch as a review of Florian's affidavit reveals that she is challengingDOT's decision to include a PLA in the underlying contract and not the unlawfulexpenditure of any funds disbursed pursuant thereto, Supreme Court properly declined toafford her taxpayer standing under State Finance Law § 123-b (see Matter of Vector Foiltec, LLCv State Univ. Constr. Fund, 84 AD3d 1576, 1578 [2011], lv denied 17NY3d 716 [2011]; Matter ofHumane Socy. of U.S. v Empire State Dev. Corp., 53 AD3d 1013, 1016 [2008],lv denied 12 NY3d 701 [2009]; compare Saratoga County Chamber ofCommerce v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801, 813-814 [2003], cert denied 540 US1017 [2003]). Finally, we agree with Supreme Court that inasmuch as a losing biddercould have commenced suit to challenge the inclusion of the PLA in the bidspecifications, petitioners failed to demonstrate the existence of an impenetrable barrierto judicial review (see Matter of Transactive Corp. v New York State Dept. of SocialServs., 92 NY2d at 589; Matter of Vector Foiltec, LLC v State Univ. Constr.Fund, 84 AD3d at 1578-1579). Accordingly, there is no basis upon which to affordpetitioners common-law taxpayer standing.

Rose, J.P., Spain and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the amended judgment isaffirmed, without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote 1: "[A] PLA is a prebidcontract between a construction project owner and a labor union (or unions) establishingthe union as the collective bargaining representative for all persons who will performwork on the project" (Matter of New York State Ch., Inc., Associated Gen. Contrs. ofAm. v New York State Thruway Auth., 88 NY2d 56, 65 [1996]).

Footnote 2: An "informal" bid is, inessence, a bid that does not conform to the underlying bid specifications.

Footnote 3: In Kick, weconcluded that the corporate petitioner had standing to maintain the subject proceedingbecause it would have bid on the project had the underlying request for proposal not beenwithdrawn (see Matter of Kick v Regan, 110 AD2d at 935). Similarly, inElia, the Fourth Department permitted the petitioner, a nonbidding entity, tochallenge the municipality's decision to award additional work to the successful bidderbecause the municipality, by awarding such work pursuant to a contract change order,circumvented what otherwise should have been a competitive bidding process, therebyprecluding the petitioner from submitting a bid in the first instance (see Albert EliaBldg. Co. v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 54 AD2d at 341-342).

Footnote 4: Indeed, the PLAexpressly provided that "all [c]ontractors . . . shall be eligible to competefor contracts and subcontracts without regard to whether they are otherwise parties to anexisting collective bargaining agreement" and, further, precluded the collectivebargaining agent from discriminating in job referrals based upon "the applicant's unionmembership, or lack thereof."


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