People v Harrison
2013 NY Slip Op 08660 [112 AD3d 967]
December 26, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 29, 2014


The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Antwan Harrison, Appellant.

[*1]Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (David G. Lowry of counsel), for appellant.

Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Jodi L.Mandel of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a resentence of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Brennan, J.), imposed June 4, 2012, upon his conviction of assault in the first degree(two counts) and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, the resentencebeing a period of postrelease supervision in addition to the determinate term ofimprisonment previously imposed on October 24, 2000.

Ordered that the resentence is affirmed.

"[A] defendant has the constitutionally guaranteed right to be defended by counsel ofhis own choosing" (People v Arroyave, 49 NY2d 264, 271 [1980]; see People v Martin, 41 AD3d616, 616 [2007]; People vStevenson, 36 AD3d 634, 634 [2007]). However, "this right is qualified in thesense that a defendant may not employ such right as a means to delay judicialproceedings" (People v Arroyave, 49 NY2d at 271). The question of whether acontinuance should be granted to afford a defendant the opportunity to retain counsel ofhis or her choosing is a matter largely within the discretion of the court (see id.)."[W]hether a defendant has been denied his right to retain counsel of his own choosingcan only be answered by examining the particular facts of each case" (id.).Contrary to the defendant's contention, under the particular circumstances of this case,the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant'srequest, made as resentencing commenced (see generally id.; People v Allison, 69 AD3d740, 741 [2010]; People vCampbell, 54 AD3d 959, 959-960 [2008]; People v Goodwine, 46 AD3d 702, 702 [2007]; Peoplev Persad, 306 AD2d 359, 359 [2003]), in effect, for an adjournment to retain privatecounsel.

"Inasmuch as the defendant had not yet completed serving his originally imposedsentence of imprisonment when he was resentenced, his resentencing to a term includingthe statutorily required period[s] of postrelease supervision did not violate the doublejeopardy and due process clauses of the United States Constitution" (People v Hernandez, 110AD3d 918, 919 [2013]; seePeople v Lingle, 16 NY3d 621, 630-632 [2011]; People v Jiggetts, 108 AD3d641, 641 [2013]; People vWheeler, 108 AD3d 646, 646 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1078 [2013];People v Dawkins, 87AD3d 550, 550 [2011]; People v Harris, 86 AD3d 543, 543-544 [2011]).[*2]

The resentence imposed was not excessive(see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]). Dickerson, J.P., Hall, Cohen andMiller, JJ., concur.


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