| People v Tieman |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 08671 [112 AD3d 975] |
| December 26, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Steven Tieman, Appellant. |
—[*1] Francis D. Phillips II, District Attorney, Middletown, N.Y. (Ryan A. Greenbaum,Lauren E. Grasso, and Andrew R. Kass of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County(Freehill, J.), rendered December 5, 2011, convicting him of reckless endangerment inthe second degree, driving while ability impaired by alcohol in violation of Vehicle andTraffic Law § 1192 (1), criminal possession of a controlled substance in theseventh degree, resisting arrest, unlawful fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle in thethird degree (two counts), and reckless driving, upon a jury verdict, and imposingsentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches ofthe defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and evidenceof the defendant's refusal to submit to a chemical test.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The County Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motionwhich was to suppress physical evidence recovered from his vehicle. "Pursuant to theautomobile exception to the warrant requirement, a warrantless search of a vehicle ispermitted when the police have probable cause to believe the vehicle containscontraband, a weapon, or evidence of a crime" (People v Vargas, 89 AD3d 771, 772 [2011]; see Peoplev Blasich, 73 NY2d 673, 678-679 [1989]; People v Baptiste, 248 AD2d 625[1998]). Here, the police had probable cause to search the defendant's vehicle based,inter alia, on the observations of a police officer who observed what appeared to be ahand-to-hand narcotics transaction inside that vehicle in an area known for drug activity(see People v Jones, 90 NY2d 835, 837 [1997]; People v Herndon, 75 AD3d1083 [2010]; People v Gonzalez, 277 AD2d 328 [2000]).
The County Court also properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibusmotion which was to suppress evidence of his refusal to submit to a chemical test. Theevidence at the hearing demonstrated that the defendant had glassy eyes, slurred speech,and the odor of alcohol on his breath, and had driven his vehicle erratically. Thisevidence established that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant for aviolation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (see People v Troche, 162AD2d 483 [1990]; People v Blajeski, 125 AD2d 582, 582-583 [1986]), therebyproviding the predicate for the request for the defendant to submit to a chemical test(see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [2] [a] [1]; People v Poje,270 AD2d 649, 650 [2000]; People v Daniger, 227 AD2d 846, 847-848 [1996]).
The defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial because the Peoplefailed to disclose certain Rosario material (see People v Rosario, 9 NY2d286 [1961]), is unpreserved for [*2]appellate review(see CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event, the defendant's contention is without merit.There is no evidence in the record that the material in question, state police radio logspertaining to the subject incident, actually existed (see People v Young, 61 AD3d 786, 786 [2009]; Peoplev Pines, 298 AD2d 179, 180 [2002]; see also People v Smith, 33 AD3d 462, 464 [2006];People v Melendez, 259 AD2d 500 [1999]; People v Ray, 224 AD2d 722[1996]).
The People correctly concede that the defendant's medical records were improperlyredacted to omit the results of the defendant's blood alcohol test (see CPLR 4518[c]; Rodriguez v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 276 AD2d 769 [2000]).However, the error was harmless, since the evidence of the defendant's guilt of drivingwhile ability impaired by alcohol was overwhelming, and there is no reasonablepossibility that the error might have contributed to the defendant's conviction of thatoffense (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the imposition of consecutive sentences wasnot illegal (see Penal Law § 70.25 [2]). The defendant's act of possessing acontrolled substance in the vehicle was a complete crime, and a separate and distinct actfrom the other offenses of which he was convicted (see People v Truesdell, 70NY2d 809, 811 [1987]; Peoplev Salamone, 89 AD3d 961, 962-963 [2011]; People v Gucla, 18 AD3d 478, 479 [2005]; People vSamwell, 287 AD2d 663, 663-664 [2001]). Moreover, the sentence imposed was notexcessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Dillon, J.P., Roman, Millerand Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.