Baumann Realtors, Inc. v First Columbia Century-30,LLC
2014 NY Slip Op 00017 [113 AD3d 1091]
January 3, 2014
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 5, 2014


Baumann Realtors, Inc., Appellant,
v
FirstColumbia Century-30, LLC, et al., Respondents.

—[*1]Blair & Roach, LLP, Tonawanda (David L. Roach of counsel), forplaintiff-appellant.

Lewndowski & Associates, West Seneca (Ashley J. Litwin of counsel), fordefendants-respondents.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Timothy J. Walker, A.J.),entered March 12, 2013. The order granted the motion of defendants to dismiss thecomplaint.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on thelaw without costs, the motion is denied and the complaint is reinstated.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action alleging that defendant FirstColumbia Century-30, LLC (Columbia) breached a broker commission agreement withplaintiff, that defendant HealthNow New York, Inc. (HealthNow) tortiously interferedwith that agreement and that, as a result of such breach and tortious interference, plaintiffsustained damages as a third-party beneficiary of a lease. Defendants moved to dismissthe complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), and Supreme Court granted the motion.We reverse.

Pursuant to a 2001 broker commission agreement, Columbia recognized plaintiff as"the exclusive leasing agent" for HealthNow and agreed to pay plaintiff a commission"for the initial term of the lease" and an additional commission if HealthNow "renew[ed]or extend[ed] the term of the lease." Thereafter, in 2001, HealthNow and Columbiaentered into a 10-year lease with an option to renew for two five-year terms "upon all ofthe [same] terms and conditions" if HealthNow provided notice of renewal a year "priorto expiration of the then current term." In 2011, HealthNow, using its own broker,entered into a new lease with Columbia that contained different terms and conditions andpurportedly superseded the 2001 lease.

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, pleadings are to be liberallyconstrued . . . The court is to accept the facts as alleged in the [pleading] astrue . . . [and] accord [the proponent of the pleading] the benefit of everypossible favorable inference" (Ramos v Hughes, 109 AD3d 1121, 1122 [2013] [internalquotation marks omitted]). A motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) will begranted if the documentary evidence "resolves all factual issues as a matter of law, andconclusively disposes of the [plaintiff's] claim[s]" (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Zahran, 100 AD3d 1549, 1550[2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 861 [2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]).[*2]

Contrary to the court's conclusion, thedocumentary evidence does not conclusively establish as a matter of law that the 2011lease was a new lease, as opposed to a renewal or extension of the 2001 lease. Weconclude that plaintiffs are entitled to discovery on the issue whether the 2011 lease wasa renewal or extension of the 2001 lease (see Ernie Otto Corp. v Inland Southeast Thompson Monticello,LLC, 91 AD3d 1155, 1157 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 802 [2012];cf. Stern v Satra Corp., 539 F2d 1305, 1310 [1976]). Present—Smith, J.P.,Fahey, Carni, Valentino and Whalen, JJ.


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