David v #1 Mktg. Serv., Inc.
2014 NY Slip Op 00477 [113 AD3d 810]
January 29, 2014
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 5, 2014


Jerome David et al., Appellants,
v
#1 MarketingService, Inc., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

—[*1]Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP, New York, N.Y. (Lisa E. Cleary, AdamBlumenkrantz, James Kerwin, Marla Dunn, Kristen L. Richer, and Maren Messing ofcounsel), and Jeanette Zelhof, New York, N.Y. (Tanya Kessler and Matthew Main ofcounsel), for appellants (one brief filed).

Michael and Swerdloff, LLC, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Swerdloff of counsel), forrespondents.

In an action, inter alia, for declaratory and injunctive relief, the plaintiffs appeal froman order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaughan, J.), dated June 20, 2012, whichgranted the motion of the defendants #1 Marketing Service, Inc., RYB Realty, LLC, Topof the Hob, Inc., 85 M.A., Inc., Yury Baumblit, Rimma Baumblit, and Elita Gershengornfor summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provisions thereofgranting those branches of the motion of the defendants #1 Marketing Service, Inc., RYBRealty, LLC, Top of the Hob, Inc., 85 M.A., Inc., Yury Baumblit, Rimma Baumblit, andElita Gershengorn which were for summary judgment dismissing the first, second, third,and fifth causes of action insofar as asserted against them, and substituting thereforprovisions denying those branches of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed,with costs to the plaintiffs.

The defendants #1 Marketing Service, Inc., RYB Realty, LLC, Top of the Hob, Inc.,85 M.A., Inc., Yury Baumblit, Rimma Baumblit, and Elita Gershengorn (hereinaftercollectively the respondents) are the operators of several three-quarter houses inBrooklyn and Queens. According to the complaint, the operation of three-quarter housesis a rapidly growing and highly profitable industry, which involves recruiting people withdisabilities and histories of substances abuse, as well as those living in shelters orre-entering the community after serving time in prison or jail, to join housing programswhich purportedly offer supportive services. Also according to the complaint, residentsof three-quarter houses commit their personal incomes or housing allowances to theoperators of these three-quarter houses, only to find themselves living in abject andovercrowded conditions with no support services on site.

The plaintiffs, who are current and former residents of the respondents' three-quarterhouses, commenced this action alleging five causes of action. In the first cause of action,the plaintiffs alleged that the respondents engaged in deceptive business practices inviolation of General Business Law § 349; in the second cause of action, theplaintiffs alleged that the respondents [*2]deceptivelyinduced them into signing unconscionable contracts of adhesion; in the third cause ofaction, the plaintiffs alleged that the respondents harassed and unlawfully evicted them inviolation of the Administrative Code of the City of New York (hereinafter theAdministrative Code); in the fourth cause of action, the plaintiffs alleged that therespondents violated the Rent Stabilization Code; and in the fifth cause of action, theplaintiffs alleged unjust enrichment.

Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the Supreme Court properly directed dismissalof the fourth cause of action, which alleged violations of the Rent Stabilization Code,insofar as asserted against the respondents. The respondents established, as a matter oflaw, that the plaintiffs are licensees, rather than tenants, and as such, the plaintiffs are notentitled to the protections of the Rent Stabilization Code (see generally 9NYCRR 2520.6 [d]).

The Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the respondents' motion whichwas for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action insofar as asserted againstthem. General Business Law § 349 "declares as unlawful '[d]eceptive acts andpractices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of anyservice in this state,' with no further elaboration of the prohibited conduct" (OswegoLaborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v Marine Midland Bank, 85 NY2d 20, 24[1995]). "A private action to recover damages under General Business Law § 349must be predicated on a deceptive act or practice that is consumer oriented" (Harmonv Major Chrysler Jeep Dodge, Inc., 101 AD3d 679, 682 [2012] [internalquotation marks omitted]). In addition to showing that the conduct was consumeroriented, "[a] prima facie case requires . . . a showing that [the] defendant isengaging in an act or practice that is deceptive or misleading in a material way and thatplaintiff has been injured by reason thereof" (Oswego Laborers' Local 214 PensionFund v Marine Midland Bank, 85 NY2d at 25). "Whether a representation or anomission, the test is whether the allegedly deceptive practice is 'likely to mislead areasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances' " (Wilner v Allstate Ins. Co., 71AD3d 155, 165 [2010], quoting Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund vMarine Midland Bank, 85 NY2d at 26).

Here, the respondents failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment asa matter of law by showing that they did not engage in acts or practices that weredeceptive or misleading in a material way when they recruited the plaintiffs to move intotheir houses. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of therespondents' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first cause ofaction insofar as asserted against them, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiffs'opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851,853 [1985]).

The Supreme Court also should have denied that branch of the respondents' motionwhich was for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action insofar asasserted against them. " 'A contract of adhesion contains terms that are unfair andnonnegotiable and arises from a disparity of bargaining power or oppressive tactics' " (Molino v Sagamore, 105AD3d 922, 923 [2013], quoting Matter of Love'M Sheltering, Inc. v County of Suffolk, 33AD3d 923, 924 [2006]). " 'A determination of unconscionability generally requires ashowing that the contract was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable whenmade' " (Simar Holding Corp. vGSC, 87 AD3d 688, 689 [2011], quoting Gillman v Chase ManhattanBank, 73 NY2d 1, 10 [1988]).

"In determining the conscionability of a contract, no set weight is to be given any onefactor; each case must be decided on its own facts" (State of New York vWolowitz, 96 AD2d 47, 68 [1983]). "However, [in general, it can be said that]procedural and substantive unconscionability operate on a sliding scale; the morequestionable the meaningfulness of choice, the less imbalance in a contract's termsshould be tolerated and vice versa" (Simar Holding Corp. v GSC, 87 AD3d at690 [internal quotation marks omitted]). " 'The determination of unconscionability is amatter of law for the court to decide' " (id., quoting Industralease Automated& Scientific Equip. Corp. v R. M. E. Enters., 58 AD2d 482, 488 [1977]). " 'Wherethere is doubt . . . as to whether a contract is fraught with elements ofunconscionability, there must be a hearing where the parties have an opportunity topresent evidence with regard to the circumstances of the signing of the contract, and thedisputed terms' setting, purpose and effect' " (Simar Holding Corp. v GSC, 87AD3d at 690, quoting Davidovits v De Jesus Realty Corp., 100 AD2d 924, 925[1984]). " 'However, [w]here the significant facts [*3]germane to the unconscionability issue are essentiallyundisputed, the court may determine the issue without a hearing' " (Simar HoldingCorp. v GSC, 87 AD3d at 690, quoting Scott v Palermo, 233 AD2d 869, 870[1996]). "Thus, on a motion for summary judgment, '[t]he question . . . thenis whether the record presents an issue as to the existence of unconscionability whichshould not be resolved without a hearing' " (Simar Holding Corp. v GSC, 87AD3d at 690, quoting State of New York v Wolowitz, 96 AD2d at 69).

Here, the respondents established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as amatter of law dismissing the second cause of action insofar as asserted against them bysubmitting proof that the subject agreements were not procedurally or substantivelyunconscionable. In opposition, the plaintiffs submitted, inter alia, affidavits of residentswho signed the agreements in question and who stated that they signed the subjectagreements under conditions that were procedurally unconscionable. Under thesecircumstances, a hearing was warranted on the issue of unconscionability, and as such,summary judgment should have been denied (see Simar Holding Corp. v GSC,87 AD3d at 690).

The Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the respondents' motion whichwas for summary judgment dismissing the third cause of action insofar as assertedagainst them. Administrative Code of the City of New York § 27-2005 (d),relating to harassment, provides that "[t]he owner of a dwelling shall not harass anytenants or persons lawfully entitled to occupancy of such dwelling" (seeAdministrative Code of City of NY § 27-2005 [d]). Administrative Code §26-521, relating to unlawful eviction, prohibits the eviction of an occupant who haslawfully occupied a dwelling for more than 30 days by, inter alia, force (seeAdministrative Code of City of NY § 26-521).

Here, the respondents established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as amatter of law dismissing the third cause of action insofar as asserted against them bysubmitting affidavits of residents who stated that they had never experienced orwitnessed any harassment or unlawful evictions. In opposition, the plaintiffs raised atriable issue of fact by submitting affidavits of residents who stated that they had, in fact,experienced and witnessed the respondents engaging in harassment and performingunlawful evictions.

The Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the respondents' motion whichwas for summary judgment dismissing the fifth cause of action insofar as asserted againstthem. A "cause of action alleging unjust enrichment . . . requires proof that(1) the defendant was enriched, (2) at the plaintiff's expense, and (3) that it is againstequity and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain what is sought to berecovered" (Stephan B. Gleich& Assoc. v Gritsipis, 87 AD3d 216, 223 [2011]).

The respondents established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter oflaw by submitting proof that it would not be against equity or good conscience to allowthem to keep the monthly payments they received from the plaintiffs. In opposition, theplaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact by submitting the affidavits of residents who statedthat they assigned their public benefits to the respondents each month, but they wereliving in substandard conditions and were not receiving the services that had beenpromised.

The respondents' remaining contentions are without merit. Eng, P.J., Dillon, Sgroiand Miller, JJ., concur.


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