| Matter of Wisniewski v Michalski |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 00828 [114 AD3d 1188] |
| February 7, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| In the Matter of Steven Wisniewski, Petitioner-Plaintiff, vJohn Michalski, Erie County Supreme Court Justice, et al.,Respondents-Defendants. |
—[*1] Frank A. Sedita, III, District Attorney, Buffalo, respondent-defendant pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Frank Brady of counsel), forrespondent-defendant pro se and for respondents-defendants Eric T. Schneiderman,Attorney General, Brian Fischer, Commissioner, New York State Department ofCorrections and Community Supervision and Andrea W. Evans, Chairwoman, New YorkState Board of Parole. John W. McConnell, Office of Court Administration, New York City, forrespondent-defendant Hon. John Michalski, Erie County Supreme Court Justice. Michael A. Siragusa, County Attorney, Buffalo (Michael J. Pacifico of counsel), forrespondent-defendant Erie County Department of Probation.
Proceeding/action pursuant to, inter alia, CPLR article 78, CPLR 3001 and CPLR7001 (initiated in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth JudicialDepartment pursuant to CPLR 506 [b] [1]) to, among other things, vacate thedetermination of the New York State Board of Parole. The determination denied therelease of petitioner-plaintiff to parole supervision.
It is hereby ordered that said amended petition/complaint is unanimously dismissedwithout costs.[*2]
Memorandum: Petitioner-plaintiff (petitioner)commenced this proceeding/action pursuant to, inter alia, CPLR article 78, CPLR 3001,and CPLR 7001 seeking various forms of relief, including his immediate release fromprison, in connection with a criminal conviction. We agree with respondents-defendantsthat the amended petition/complaint should be dismissed in its entirety. It is well settledthat "[a] CPLR article 78 proceeding is not the appropriate method to seek review ofissues that could be raised on direct appeal" or by a motion pursuant to CPL article 440(Matter of Tyler v Forma, 231 AD2d 891, 891 [1996]; see People ex rel. Smith vGraham, 109 AD3d 1113, 1113 [2013]). Here, to the extent that petitionercontends that Supreme Court abused its discretion in failing to adhere to the pleaagreement, that his pleas of guilty and waiver of the right to appeal were involuntary, andthat the People committed a Brady violation, we conclude that those contentionscould have been raised by a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction or by way of aCPL article 440 motion and thus are not properly the subject of a CPLR article 78petition (see Smith, 109 AD3d at 1113; Matter of Aarismaa v Bender, 108 AD3d 1203, 1204[2013]).
With respect to petitioner's claim for relief in the nature of mandamus compellingSupreme Court to correct the uniform sentence and commitment and to render a decisionon petitioner's pending CPL article 440 motion, we conclude that "the extraordinaryremedy of mandamus does not lie . . . because petitioner has failed toestablish a clear legal right to the relief sought or that the relief sought involves theperformance of a purely ministerial act" (Matter of Platten v Dadd, 38 AD3d 1216, 1217 [2007],lv denied 9 NY3d 802 [2007]). The determination of a postjudgment motion isnot a "ministerial act" and, further, petitioner has not demonstrated a "clear legal right tothe relief sought" (Matter ofUccio v Silber, 55 AD3d 615, 616 [2008]; see Matter of Legal Aid Socy. ofSullivan County v Scheinman, 53 NY2d 12, 16 [1981]). Petitioner likewise failed toestablish a clear legal right to "correction" of the uniform sentence and commitment (see generally Matter of Dolan vEfman, 94 AD3d 1116, 1116 [2012], appeal dismissed 19 NY3d 937[2012]; Uccio, 55 AD3d at 616) and, in any event, even assuming, arguendo, thatthe uniform sentence and commitment is inaccurate, we conclude that petitioner has anadequate remedy at law, thus rendering mandamus relief inappropriate (see Matter ofState of New York v King, 36 NY2d 59, 62 [1975]).
Petitioner's contention that the presentence investigation report (PSR) prepared inconnection with his 2009 conviction and the 2009 sentencing minutes should beexpunged from his institutional record is not properly before us inasmuch as he failed toexhaust available administrative remedies with respect to that contention (see Matterof Watkins v Annucci, 305 AD2d 889, 890 [2003]; cf. Matter of Brown v Goord,19 AD3d 773, 774 [2005]). To the extent that petitioner challenges the inclusion ofcertain information in the 2009 PSR, that challenge is likewise not properly before usinasmuch as it "should have been raised before the sentencing court, prior to sentencing"(Matter of Champion vBelmont, 12 AD3d 1152, 1152 [2004]; see Matter of Carter v Evans, 81 AD3d 1031, 1031-1032[2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 712 [2011]). In any event, petitioner has made noshowing that the information contained in the 2009 PSR is inaccurate (see People v Rudduck, 85AD3d 1557, 1557-1558 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 861 [2011]; cf. People v Freeman, 67AD3d 1202, 1202 [2009]).
Petitioner further seeks to vacate the determination of the New York State Board ofParole (Board) denying his release to parole supervision. Contrary to petitioner'scontention, the Board "was entitled to rely on the information contained in the [2009]presentence investigation report" and, as previously noted, "petitioner is foreclosed fromchallenging the accuracy of that report here, inasmuch as he failed to raise such achallenge before the sentencing court" (Carter, 81 AD3d at 1031). With respectto petitioner's remaining challenges to the parole determination, it is well settled that,"[w]here, as here, there is no 'showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety,' judicialintervention is not warranted" (Matter of Johnson v Dennison, 48 AD3d [*3]1082, 1083 [2008], quoting Matter of Russo v NewYork State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]; see Matter of Gaston vBerbary, 16 AD3d 1158, 1159 [2005]).
To the extent that petitioner challenges the determinations of the Board and/or theNew York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision with respect towork release, temporary release, presumptive release, merit time and merit release, thosechallenges are untimely inasmuch as they were not interposed "within four months afterthe determination[s became] final and binding" (Matter of Hayes v Evans, 98 AD3d 1207, 1208 [2012];see CPLR 217 [1]; Matter of Velez v New York State Div. of Parole, 104 AD3d1013, 1013 [2013]; Matterof Purcell v Dennison, 29 AD3d 1128, 1128-1129 [2006]). Moreover, petitionerfailed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the work release andpresumptive release determinations (see generally Watkins, 305 AD2d at 890).
Petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus is procedurally defective (seeCPLR 7004 [b]; People ex rel. Backus v Broome County Dept. of SocialServs., 240 AD2d 786, 787 [1997]; People ex rel. Doe v Beaudoin, 102AD2d 359, 362 [1984]) and, in any event, "[b]ecause the [amended] petition[/complaint]raises issues that [may be] raised on petitioner's direct appeal [or] by a CPL article440.10 motion, habeas corpus relief is unavailable" (People ex rel. Lyons v Conway, 32 AD3d 1324, 1324[2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007]; see People ex rel. Smith v Graham, 109 AD3d 1113[2013]).
Finally, we conclude that petitioner's remaining claims for relief are unavailableand/or are without merit. Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Peradotto, Lindley andSconiers, JJ.