Restuccio v City of Oswego
2014 NY Slip Op 00829 [114 AD3d 1191]
February 7, 2014
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 26, 2014


Julianne Restuccio et al., Appellants, v City of Oswego etal., Respondents.

—[*1]The Steele Law Firm, P.C., Oswego (Kimberly A. Steele of counsel), forplaintiffs-appellants.

Gogick, Byrne & O'Neill, LLP, New York City (Michael J. Byrne of counsel), fordefendants-respondents City of Oswego, Common Council of City of Oswego andHonorable Thomas W. Gillen, as Mayor of

City of Oswego.

Hiscock & Barclay, LLP, Syracuse (Mark Whitford of counsel), fordefendants-respondents Branch Development Oswego, LLC, Chris A. LaBarge andSteven W. Thomas.

Appeal from a judgment (denominated order and judgment) of the Supreme Court,Oswego County (Norman W. Seiter, Jr., J.), entered November 27, 2012. The judgmentgranted the motions of defendants for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Itis hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified on thelaw by vacating the provision dismissing the complaint and granting judgment in favorof defendants as follows:

It is adjudged and declared that the rezoning amendment is valid, and as modified thejudgment is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: In this declaratory judgment action challenging the rezoning ofproperty in defendant City of Oswego (City) to accommodate the construction of a hotel,plaintiffs appeal from a judgment granting defendants' motions for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint. We conclude that, contrary to plaintiffs' contention, defendantsestablished their entitlement to [*2]judgment and, inopposing the motion, plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of fact. We note at the outset,however, that Supreme Court erred in "dismissing the complaint rather than declaring therights of the parties" (Alexanderv New York Cent. Mut., 96 AD3d 1457, 1457 [2012], citing Maurizzio vLumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 73 NY2d 951, 954 [1989]), and we therefore modifythe judgment accordingly.

It is well settled that a zoning amendment enjoys a "strong presumption of validity"(Morgan v Town of W. Bloomfield, 295 AD2d 902, 903 [2002]; Matter ofRayle v Town of Cato Bd., 295 AD2d 978, 978 [2002]), and the decision ofdefendant Common Council of the City to amend the zoning ordinance should not bedisturbed where, as here, the amendment is in accordance with the City's comprehensiveplan (see General City Law § 28-a [12] [a]; Asian Ams. for Equality vKoch, 72 NY2d 121, 131 [1988]). Further, "[c]ompliance with the statutoryrequirement is measured . . . in light of the long-standing principle that onewho challenges such a legislative act bears a heavy burden" (Bergstol v Town of Monroe,15 AD3d 324, 325 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 701 [2005], citing Matterof Town of Bedford v Village of Mount Kisco, 33 NY2d 178, 186 [1973], reargdenied 34 NY2d 668 [1974]). " 'If the validity of the legislative classification forzoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control'" (Shepard v Village of Skaneateles, 300 NY 115, 118 [1949], quotingVillage of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, 388 [1926]; see De Senav Gulde, 24 AD2d 165, 169 [1965]). "Thus, where the plaintiff fails to establish aclear conflict with the comprehensive plan, the zoning classification must be upheld"(Bergstol, 15 AD3d at 325; see Infinity Consulting Group, Inc. v Town of Huntington, 49AD3d 813, 814 [2008], appeal dismissed 11 NY3d 781 [2008],reconsideration denied 11 NY3d 852 [2008]).

Here, defendants established not only that the rezoning of the subject property wasconsistent with the City's 2020 Vision Plan, but they also established that the B-1classification for that property conformed more closely to the comprehensive plan thanthe existing R-3 designation. The subject property falls within the area designated"Highway Commercial" in the "Future Land Use Map," which provides "a visualdepiction of the community's vision for Oswego's future," and plaintiffs do not disputethat a hotel would be an appropriate use in that proposed zone. In addition, defendantspresented evidence that the rezoning application underwent a thorough review, includingconsideration by the Common Council's Planning and Development Committee, the CityPlanning Board, and the County Planning Department before the Common Council actedon the revised petition (seeLittle Joseph Realty, Inc. v Town Bd. of Town of Babylon, 52 AD3d 478, 479[2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 706 [2008]; Matter of Save Our Forest ActionCoalition v City of Kingston, 246 AD2d 217, 222 [1998]).

The conclusion that the rezoning is consistent with the comprehensive plan leads tothe further conclusions that the rezoning does not amount to impermissible spot zoning(see Little Joseph Realty, Inc., 52 AD3d at 479; Rayle, 295 AD2d at979-980; see also Infinity Consulting Group, Inc., 49 AD3d at 814), and that itwas reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose, i.e., furtherance of theCity's planned development, and is thus constitutional (see Asian Ams. ForEquality, 72 NY2d at 131-132; see also Elstein v Board of Trustees of Vil. ofSkaneateles, 184 AD2d 1079, 1079-1080 [1992]).

We reject plaintiffs' further contention that the Common Council acted in an arbitraryand capricious manner when it initially denied the rezoning petition and then, at its nextmeeting, granted the rezoning petition. In support of their contention, plaintiffsmistakenly rely on cases holding that "[a] decision of an administrative agency whichneither adheres to its own prior precedent nor indicates its reasons for reaching adifferent result on essentially the same facts is arbitrary and capricious . . .and mandates reversal, even if there may otherwise be evidence in the record sufficient tosupport the determination" (Matter of c/o Matter of c/o Hamptons, LLC v Zoning Bd. ofAppeals of Inc. Vil. of E. Hampton, 98 AD3d 738, 739 [2012] [internalquotation marks omitted]). [*3]Here, the challengedaction of the Common Council was that of a legislative rather than an administrativebody, and "[n]o showing of a change of circumstances must be made for a legislativebody to rezone property" (Blumberg v City of Yonkers, 41 AD2d 300, 305[1973], appeal dismissed 32 NY2d 896 [1973], lv denied 33 NY2d 514[1973], citing Levitt v Incorporated Vil. of Sands Point, 6 AD2d 701 [1958],affd 6 NY2d 269 [1959]). In any event, defendants offered a plausibleexplanation for the change in vote by one of the Common Council members.

Finally, the record demonstrates that there was substantial and sufficient complianceof the Common Council with its own procedural requirements, and plaintiffs' contentionsto the contrary are " 'technical at best' " and do not warrant invalidating the rezoningdecision (Alscot Inv. Corp. v Laibach, 65 NY2d 1042, 1045 [1985]).Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Peradotto, Lindley and Sconiers, JJ.


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