Fuller v Collins
2014 NY Slip Op 01149 [114 AD3d 827]
February 19, 2014
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 26, 2014


Victoria Fuller, Respondent,
v
Gary RobertCollins, Appellant.

—[*1]Callan, Koster, Brady & Brennan, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Arshia Hourizadeh ofcounsel), for appellant.

Alan J. Rich, LLC, Brooklyn, N.Y., for respondent.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendantappeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, KingsCounty (Schack, J.), dated June 4, 2012, as denied those branches of his motion whichwere to disqualify Alan J. Rich as the plaintiff's counsel and to dismiss the causes ofaction alleging a violation of the New York City Human Rights Law (AdministrativeCode of City of NY § 8-107), negligence, and breach of contract.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, (1) bydeleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the defendant's motion which wasto dismiss the plaintiff's fifth cause of action and substituting therefor a provisiongranting that branch of the motion, and (2) by deleting the provision thereof denying thatbranch of the defendant's motion which was to disqualify Alan J. Rich as the plaintiff'scounsel and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as somodified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

After the plaintiff's employment was terminated, she commenced an action in federalcourt alleging that she was discriminated against for taking a medical leave (seeVictoria Fuller v Interview, Inc., 2009 WL 3241542, 2009 US Dist LEXIS 93157[SD NY 2009, No. 07-CV-5728 (RJS) (DF)] [hereinafter the federal action]). Theplaintiff retained the defendant herein, a board certified forensic psychiatrist, as an expertin the federal action. The defendant subsequently resigned as the plaintiff's expert, andthe plaintiff commenced the instant action against him, alleging that the defendant failedto provide an expert report as contemplated by the parties' retainer agreement. Thecomplaint in the instant action alleged five causes of action: (1) breach of expresscontract; (2) breach of implied contract; (3) conversion; (4) negligence; and (5) violationof the New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of NY §8-107; hereinafter the NYCHRL). The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendantinterfered with her rights under the NYCHRL by failing to provide an expert report andresigning as her expert prior to the trial in the federal action, and thereby sabotaged herrights in the federal action.[*2]

The defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(1) and (7) to dismiss the complaint in its entirety and pursuant to rule 3.7 of the Rules ofProfessional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0) to disqualify Alan J. Rich as the plaintiff'scounsel. The Supreme Court denied those branches of the defendant's motion which wereto dismiss the causes of action to recover damages for breach of contract, negligence, anda violation of the NYCHRL, and to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel.

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss a pleading for failure to statea cause of action, the pleading must be liberally construed, the factual allegations must bedeemed true, and the pleading party must be accorded the benefit of every possibleinference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Kopelowitz & Co., Inc. vMann, 83 AD3d 793, 797 [2011]; Panish v Panish, 24 AD3d 642, 643 [2005]). Applying thisstandard to the allegations set forth in the complaint, the Supreme Court properlydetermined that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action to recover damages forbreach of contract (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; JP Morgan Chase v J.H. Elec. of N.Y., Inc., 69 AD3d 802,803 [2010]) and negligence (seeHealth Acquisition Corp. v Program Risk Mgt., Inc., 105 AD3d 1001,1004-1005 [2013]; Landon vKroll Lab. Specialists, Inc., 91 AD3d 79, 83 [2011], affd 22 NY3d 1[2013]).

Furthermore, the defendant was not entitled to dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(1) of the cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract, since he failed toconclusively establish as a matter of law a defense to that cause of action (see Goshenv Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. vDecoteau, 103 AD3d 761, 763 [2013]).

However, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant'smotion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the fifth cause of action,which alleged that the defendant violated the NYCHRL. The provisions of the NYCHRL"must be construed 'broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such aconstruction is reasonably possible' " (Nelson v HSBC Bank USA, 87 AD3d 995, 997 [2011],quoting Albunio v City of NewYork, 16 NY3d 472, 477-478 [2011]). Even given this liberal construction, theplaintiff's allegations against the defendant do not give rise to a cognizable theory underthe NYCHRL against the defendant. The plaintiff's theory that the defendant aided andabetted the plaintiff's employer, or discriminated against the plaintiff by allegedly failingto provide an expert report and resigning as an expert witness prior to trial, is not basedon a reasonable construction of the NYCHRL (see generally Albunio v City of New York, 16 NY3d 472[2011]).

Further, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant'smotion which was to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel pursuant to the advocate-witnessrules (see Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 3.7). Theadvocate-witness rules contained in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which hasbeen superseded by the Rules of Professional Conduct, provide guidance for the courts,but are not binding authority, in determining whether a party's attorney should bedisqualified during litigation (see S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. Partnership v 777 S. H.Corp., 69 NY2d 437, 444-445 [1987]). Rule 3.7 of the Rules of ProfessionalConduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0) provides that, unless certain exceptions apply, "[a] lawyershall not act as advocate before a tribunal in a matter in which the lawyer is likely to be awitness on a significant issue of fact" (Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR1200.0] rule 3.7 [a]). Here, since the plaintiff's attorney was the only person, other thanthe defendant, who had knowledge of any discussions regarding the terms of theagreement by which the defendant was retained as an expert witness and the actions oromissions which form the grounds for the plaintiff's causes of action alleging breach ofcontract and negligence, he is "likely to be a witness on a significant issue of fact" (Rulesof Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 3.7 [a]; see Falk v Gallo, 73 AD3d685, 686 [2010]; Matter of Stober v Gaba & Stober, 259 AD2d 554, 555[1999]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion indenying that branch of the defendant's motion which was to disqualify Alan J. Rich asthe plaintiff's counsel (see Friiav Palumbo, 89 AD3d 896, 897 [2011]; Kattas v Sherman, 32 AD3d 496, 497 [2006]; Matter ofStober v Gaba & Stober, 259 AD2d at 555). Rivera, J.P., Leventhal, Hall andRoman, JJ., concur.


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