| Matter of Village of Haverstraw (AAA Electricians,Inc.) |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 01332 [114 AD3d 955] |
| February 26, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Village of Haverstraw,Appellant-Respondent.AAA Electricians, Inc., Respondent-Appellant. |
—[*1] Goldstein, Rikon, Rikon & Houghton, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Michael Rikon ofcounsel), for respondent-appellant. C. Scott Vanderhoef, New City, N.Y., amicus curiae Rockland County Executive,pro se.
In a condemnation proceeding, the condemnor, Village of Haverstraw, appeals, aslimited by its brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County(La Cava, J.), entered May 9, 2012, as, upon a decision of the same court enteredDecember 16, 2011, made after a nonjury trial, awarded the condemnee the principal sumof $6,500,000 as just compensation for the taking of the condemnee's real property, andthe condemnee, AAA Electricians, Inc., cross-appeals, as limited by its brief, from somuch of the same judgment on the ground of inadequacy.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from,without costs or disbursements.
In a case involving the taking of property, "[t]he measure of damages must reflect thefair market value of the property in its highest and best use on the date of the taking,regardless of whether the property is being put to such use at the time" (Matter of Board of Commr. ofGreat Neck Park Dist. of Town of N. Hempstead v Kings Point Hgts., LLC, 74AD3d 804, 805 [2010]; see Matter of Rochester Urban Renewal Agency[Patchen Post], 45 NY2d 1, 8 [1978]; Matter of County of Suffolk [Firester],37 NY2d 649, 652 [1975]; Chester Indus. Park Assoc., L.P. v State of New York, 103AD3d 827 [2013]; Matterof Metropolitan Transp. Auth. [Washed Aggregate Resources, Inc.], 102 AD3d787, 789-790 [2013]; NewYork Cent. Lines, LLC v State of New York, 101 AD3d 966, 967 [2012]; Matter of Village of Dobbs Ferry vStanley Ave. Props., Inc., 95 AD3d 1027, 1029 [2012]; Gyrodyne Co. of Am., Inc. v Stateof New York, 89 AD3d 988, 989 [2011]). Where an increment is added to thevalue of vacant land to reflect its development potential, "the specific increment which isselected and applied must be based on sufficient evidence and be satisfactorilyexplained" (Matter of County of Suffolk [Firester], 37 NY2d at 653; seeMatter of Breitenstein v State of New York, 245 AD2d 837, 839-840 [1997]).Moreover "[i]t is [*2]necessary to show that there is areasonable possibility that the property's highest and best asserted use could or wouldhave been made within the reasonably near future, and a use which is no more than aspeculative or hypothetical arrangement may not be accepted as the basis for an award"(Matter of Village of Dobbs Ferry v Stanley Ave. Props., Inc., 95 AD3d at 1029;see Matter of MetropolitanTransp. Auth., 86 AD3d 314, 320 [2011]; see also Broadway Assoc. v State of New York, 18 AD3d687, 688 [2005]; Matter of Estate of Haynes v County of Monroe, 278AD2d 823, 824 [2000]).
"[A] condemnee may not receive an enhanced value for its property where theenhancement is due to the property's inclusion within a redevelopment plan" (Matterof Queens W. Dev. Corp., 289 AD2d 335, 336 [2001]; see Matter of Village of PortChester [Bologna], 95 AD3d 895, 897 [2012]). Thus, for example, propertyzoned for industrial use "should be valued in accordance with the industrial zoningdesignation which would apply if the redevelopment plan did not exist," for "[a]condemnee is only entitled to compensation for what it has lost, not for what thecondemnor has gained" (Matter of Queens W. Dev. Corp., 289 AD2d at 336).
Here, the Supreme Court properly accepted the conclusion of the condemnee'sappraiser that the property's highest and best use was for multi-family residentialdevelopment. The condemnee's appraiser sufficiently and credibly explained the basis forhis selection of comparable properties and relevant adjustments made to the valuation ofthese properties. In contrast, the condemnor, the Village of Haverstraw, did notdemonstrate that, absent the urban redevelopment plan, which encompassed the subjectproperty, the property would have been suitable only for light industrial development(see Gyrodyne Co. of Am., Inc. v State of New York, 89 AD3d at 989; cf.Matter of City of New York [Broadway Cary Corp.], 34 NY2d 535, 536 [1974];Broadway Assoc. v State of New York, 18 AD3d at 688). Contrary to theVillage's contention, the court's decision does not indicate that it improperly incorporatedthe enhancement to the subject property's value which resulted from the village's urbanredevelopment project (see Matter of Village of Port Chester [Bologna], 95AD3d at 897; Matter of Queens W. Dev. Corp., 289 AD2d at 336).
Although the Supreme Court made certain changes to the final results presented inthe condemnee's appraisal, it adequately explained its reasons for making those changes.Thus, the court's determination was within the range of expert testimony and adequatelysupported by the record (see Chester Indus. Park Assoc., L.P. v State of NewYork, 103 AD3d at 828; Gyrodyne Co. of Am., Inc. v State of New York, 89AD3d at 989; Matter of Board of Commr. of Great Neck Park Dist. of Town of N.Hempstead v Kings Point Hgts., LLC, 74 AD3d at 805-806; Matter of Town of E. Hampton[Windmill II Affordable Hous. Project (9 Parcels)], 44 AD3d 963, 964 [2007];Rockland Dev. Assoc. v State ofNew York, 15 AD3d 381, 381-382 [2005]).
Contrary to the condemnee's contention, the Supreme Court did not err in valuing thesubject property on a per-acre basis rather than on the basis of how many units could bedeveloped thereon (see Matter of County of Suffolk [Firester], 37 NY2d at 653;Matter of Breitenstein v State of New York, 245 AD2d at 839-840).
The parties' remaining contentions need not be reached in light of our determination,or are without merit. Rivera, J.P., Leventhal, Hall and Roman, JJ., concur.