Matter of City of Hudson
2014 NY Slip Op 01361 [114 AD3d 1106]
February 27, 2014
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 26, 2014


In the Matter of the Foreclosure of Tax Liens by City ofHudson. First Church of God in Christ, Inc., Appellant; City of Hudson,Respondent.

—[*1]Waite & Associates, PC, Albany (Stephen J. Waite of counsel), for appellant.

Rapport Meyers, LLP, Hudson (Jessica K. DiFiore of counsel), forrespondent.

McCarthy, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (McGrath, J.), enteredJanuary 18, 2013 in Columbia County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in aproceeding pursuant to RPTL article 11, to set aside a judgment of foreclosure andtransfer of title concerning certain real property.

A 1985 deed purportedly conveyed a parcel of real property in the City of Hudson,Columbia County from petitioner, a religious corporation, to its then-minister, GodfreyForbes. The next month, and again three months after that, Forbes and his wife obtainedmortgages on the property.[FN1]Forbes apparently paid the real property taxes until 2008. After the taxes were not paidfor several years, respondent commenced a tax foreclosure proceeding listing Forbes asthe owner. Upon Forbes' default, County Court (Koweek, J.) issued a judgment offoreclosure against the property and transferred title to respondent (see RPTL1136).[*2]

More than a month after County Court'sjudgment was entered, petitioner commenced this proceeding to set aside the judgment offoreclosure and transfer title to the property to petitioner, on the grounds that the 1985deed was invalid, petitioner remained the lawful owner and petitioner had not receivedproper notice of the foreclosure proceeding. Respondent moved to dismiss. SupremeCourt (McGrath, J.) treated petitioner's application as a motion to vacate a defaultjudgment and denied the application as untimely, also noting that it would deny theapplication on the merits. Petitioner appeals.

Initially, Supreme Court erred in determining that petitioner's application wasuntimely. Unlike a motion to vacate a default judgment in a tax foreclosure proceeding,which "may not be brought later than one month after entry of the judgment" (RPTL1131; see Matter of County ofOtsego [Opalecky], 103 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2013]), a person or entitychallenging the validity of a deed transferred in connection with a tax foreclosureproceeding faces a two-year statute of limitations (see RPTL 1137; Panther Mtn. Water Park, Inc. vCounty of Essex, 40 AD3d 1336, 1338 [2007]). As petitioner was not a party tothe foreclosure proceeding and now seeks to set aside the judgment on the basis thatrespondent failed to provide notice to the rightful owner, the application was timely(see RPTL 1137).

The 1985 deed to Forbes was invalid. A religious corporation shall not sell "any ofits real property without applying for and obtaining leave of the court" pursuant toN-PCL 511 (Religious Corporations Law § 12 [1]; see Scher v Yeshivath MakowaCorp., 54 AD3d 839, 839 [2008]). Under N-PCL 511 (b), the Attorney Generalmust be notified before any sale may be finalized. Petitioner did not seek court approvalin 1985 or thereafter (see Religious Corporations Law § 12 [1], [9]), norwas the Attorney General notified of the transfer of the property. Where court approval isnot obtained for the transfer of real property from a religious corporation, the conveyanceis invalid (see CongregationYetev Lev D'Satmar of Kiryas Joel, Inc. v Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc., 9NY3d 297, 301 [2007]; Wiggs v Williams, 36 AD3d 570, 571 [2007]; see alsoChurch of God of Prospect Plaza v Fourth Church of Christ, Scientist, of Brooklyn,54 NY2d 742, 743-744 [1981]). Accordingly, the 1985 deed was invalid and Forbesshould not have had any legal right to the property.

Nevertheless, respondent provided the notice required by law for the tax foreclosureproceeding (see RPTL 1125). Notice of a tax foreclosure proceeding must besent by certified mail and ordinary first class mail to "each owner and any other personwhose right, title, or interest was a matter of public record as of the date the list ofdelinquent taxes was filed, which right, title or interest will be affected by the terminationof the redemption period, and whose name and address are reasonably ascertainable fromthe public record" (RPTL 1125 [1] [a], [b]). For purposes of that statute, the "publicrecord" consists of the tax rolls, as well as books kept by that county's Surrogate's CourtClerk and real property recording officer (see RPTL 1125 [1] [e]). "Where thenames and addresses of interested parties are known, due process requires 'noticereasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise' that party of theforeclosure action, so that party may have an opportunity to appear and be heard"(Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 9 [2003], quoting Mullane v CentralHanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306, 314 [1950]). There is no constitutionalrequirement that actual owners of the property receive personal notice of a foreclosureproceeding (see Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar v County of Sullivan, 59NY2d 418, 422 [1983]). If the taxing authority gives "reasonable notice to ascertainableinterested parties," notice may be sufficient even though "the owners of record were notthe true owners of the parcel and, as a result, said true owners did not receive personalnotice of the proceedings" (Maple Tree Homes, Inc. v County of Sullivan, 17 AD3d965, 966-967 [2005], [*3]appeal dismissed 5NY3d 782 [2005]).

It is undisputed that Forbes was served with notice by ordinary and certified mail.Respondent's treasurer, who is responsible for enforcing and collecting tax liens, averredthat Forbes was listed on the tax rolls as the owner of the subject premises. The recorddoes not indicate that any relevant information was available in the books of theSurrogate's Court Clerk. A search of the County Clerk's books would have revealed the1985 deed from petitioner to Forbes, indicating that Forbes had been the owner of recordfor almost 27 years. Thus, as Forbes was the only owner pursuant to the public record, hewas entitled to notice. Petitioner, which was not an owner according to the public record,was entitled to notice under the statute only if it had a "right, title, or interest [that] was amatter of public record" (RPTL 1125 [1] [a]).

Petitioner acknowledged in its petition that it attempted to convey the property toForbes, and that the conveyance was invalid because the parties to that deed wereunaware of the requirements under Religious Corporations Law § 12. Yetpetitioner did not renounce its intent to transfer the property to Forbes, and did nothing toregain title during the ensuing 27 years, until it commenced this proceeding after Forbeswas divested of title through the judgment of foreclosure. In 1985, Forbes and his wifeobtained two mortgages on the property. Petitioner asserts that it was not until 2011,when Forbes attempted to secure another mortgage, that a title searcher discovered theproblem with the 1985 deed. Petitioner's counsel avers that, prior to commencement ofthe foreclosure proceeding, respondent was placed on notice that the conveyance toForbes was invalid and petitioner was the true owner, but counsel's assertion isinsufficient because it is vague, devoid of facts—such as who provided the notice,to whom, and by what means—and unsupported by proof from anyone withfirst-hand knowledge (seeMadison Mut. Ins. Co. v Expert Chimney Servs., Inc., 103 AD3d 995, 996[2013]).[FN2]

While petitioner notes that no court order was filed with the 1985 deed, the statutedoes not strictly require that the court order approving of the conveyance be filed wherethe deed is recorded (see Religious Corporations Law § 12; seealso N-PCL 511). Even if such a filing requirement were statutorily mandated, it isunclear that someone untrained in the Religious Corporations Law or Not-For ProfitCorporations Law would be aware, from a review of books of deeds, that a deed from areligious or not-for profit corporation was invalid without court approval. Indeed, while atitle searcher noticed this problem with the 1985 deed in 2011, Forbes obtained twomortgages in 1985, apparently without anyone raising any concern regarding that samedeed. A taxing authority's enforcing officer is not required to be a lawyer, title searcheror have special expertise in ferreting out errors in recorded deeds, nor have courtsimposed unreasonable obligations on taxing authorities to perform burdensome researchto discover potential interested parties (see Mac Naughton v Warren County, 20 NY3d 252,257-258 [2012]; Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d at 10; see also Jones vFlowers, 547 US 220, 235-236 [2006]). On its face, the public record here did notdisclose that petitioner had any interest in the property (compare Matter of Barnes vMcFadden, 25 AD3d 955, 957 [2006], appeal dismissed 6 NY3d [*4]890 [2006]).

When determining the reasonableness of the taxing authority's attempts to providenotice to interested parties, the court may take into account the conduct of such parties(see Matter of Harner v Countyof Tioga, 5 NY3d 136, 140 [2005]). Here, petitioner indicated that it intended toconvey the property to Forbes—its then-minister[FN3]—in 1985 and was only unsuccessful due to their lack of legal knowledge.Additionally, petitioner did not take any action against Forbes to regain title, despite thedeed having been filed for nearly 27 years at the time the foreclosure proceeding wascommenced. Under the circumstances, including respondent's provision of properstatutory notice to the owner of record, respondent complied with due process andsatisfied its obligation of searching for interested parties, and petitioner has notdemonstrated that any additional steps or more exhaustive search was required here(see Mac Naughton v Warren County, 20 NY3d at 257-258; Kennedy vMossafa, 100 NY2d at 10; Matter of County of Sullivan [Fay], 79 AD3d 1409, 1411[2010], lv dismissed 17 NY3d 787 [2011]). Therefore, respondent was notrequired to provide notice to petitioner of the tax foreclosure proceeding.

Lahtinen, J.P., Garry and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote 1: The record does notdisclose whether those mortgages have been paid or remain liens on the property.

Footnote 2: The petition alleges,upon information and belief, that respondent was aware that Forbes was not the rightfulowner of the property, that title remained with petitioner and that respondent should haveknown that a conveyance from petitioner required court approval on notice to theAttorney General. The record does not contain any proof to support these allegations.

Footnote 3: It appears that Forbes isstill petitioner's minister.


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