Hilton v Jones
2014 NY Slip Op 01363 [114 AD3d 1113]
February 27, 2014
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 26, 2014


Danielle E. Hilton, Respondent, v Thomas Jones, as PoliceOfficer for the Village of Nassau et al., Appellants.

—[*1]Cook, Netter, Cloonan, Kurtz & Murphy, PC, Kingston (Robert D. Cook ofcounsel), for appellants.

Law Office of Edward P. Ryan, Albany (John T. Casey, Troy, of counsel), forrespondent.

Rose, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (McGrath, J.), entered January29, 2013 in Rensselaer County, which denied defendants' motion for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff was seriously injured when the vehicle in which she was a passengercollided with an unlicensed vehicle being pursued at high speed by defendant ThomasJones, a police officer with defendant Village of Nassau Police Department. Shecommenced this action seeking to recover damages for her injuries and, after joinder ofissue and discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.Finding issues of fact as to whether Jones acted with reckless disregard for the safety ofothers during the pursuit and whether such recklessness was a proximate cause of theaccident, Supreme Court denied the motion. Defendants appeal.

We cannot agree with defendants' argument that there can be no finding of recklessdisregard based on Jones' version of events. Jones testified that he observed a Jeep and aKia traveling together, and neither appeared to have rear license plates. He followedthem and, after confirming his initial observations, he activated his lights in order to pullthe two vehicles over. [*2]They both accelerated,however, and Jones also accelerated, pursuing them for 20 to 25 seconds over a distanceof approximately half a mile while he unsuccessfully focused on attempting to contactcentral dispatch on his radio. He testified that he looked up from switching channels onhis radio and saw the Kia "skid sideways" across the path of the oncoming vehicle inwhich plaintiff was a passenger. According to Jones, the closest he got to the Kia wastwo to three car lengths and his maximum speed was 50 to 60 miles per hour.

Plaintiff, on the other hand, testified that she saw the three vehicles approaching, alltraveling at the same high rate of speed. The police vehicle was "very close" to the Kia,"almost on its bumper," but she could not say if there was contact between them.According to plaintiff, the Kia suddenly made a 90-degree left turn in front of hervehicle, her vehicle then struck the Kia and the Kia exploded, killing its driver. A StatePolice accident reconstruction report concluded that the minimum speed of the Kia atimpact was 78 miles per hour. Plaintiff's expert engineer, John Serth, analyzed thepossible causes for the Kia's sudden 90-degree turn and concluded that, at that speed, theKia could not have turned as it did and traveled across the opposite lane in the mannerdescribed unless Jones' vehicle, a Chevrolet Tahoe equipped with a push bar, came intocontact with it.

Contrary to defendants' contention, Serth's opinion cannot be described as entirelyspeculative or devoid of factual support, inasmuch as his calculations regarding speedand the ability of a vehicle to turn in the manner described are based upon information hegleaned from the accident reconstruction report and the parties' descriptions of theaccident (see Soto v New YorkCity Tr. Auth., 6 NY3d 487, 494 [2006]; Pember v Carlson, 45 AD3d 1092, 1094 [2007];Aylesworth v Evans, 225 AD2d 850, 851-852 [1996]). Viewing this evidence ina light most favorable to plaintiff (see Fisher v Multiquip, Inc., 96 AD3d 1190, 1195 [2012]),there are triable issues of fact as to whether Jones acted with reckless disregard bystriking the vehicle he was pursuing and whether such conduct was a proximate cause ofthe accident (see O'Banner vCounty of Sullivan, 16 AD3d 950, 952 [2005]; Sweeney v Peterson, 1 AD3d650, 652 [2003]; Rouse v Dahlem, 228 AD2d 777, 779-780 [1996];compare King v Village of Cobleskill, 237 AD2d 689, 692 [1997]). Accordingly,Supreme Court properly denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. In light ofour determination, the parties' remaining contentions are rendered academic and we neednot resolve them.

McCarthy, J.P., Garry and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,with costs.


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