| Popovits v New York City Hous. Auth. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 01444 [115 AD3d 657] |
| March 5, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Ruth Popovits, Respondent, v New York CityHousing Authority, Appellant. |
—[*1] Sullivan Papain Block McGrath & Cannavo, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Stephen C.Glasser and Gabriel A. Arce-Yee of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from anorder of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Minardo, J.), dated July 9, 2012, whichdenied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motionfor summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
The plaintiff alleged that she sustained injuries on December 20, 2009, when sheslipped and fell on snow and ice on a sidewalk adjacent to property owned by thedefendant. The complaint further alleges that the plaintiff was "caused to slip and fall asa result of the uncleared and/or improperly cleared accumulated snow and ice on thesidewalk." The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, andthe Supreme Court denied the motion.
Under the "storm in progress" rule, a property owner will not be held responsible foraccidents caused by snow or ice that accumulates on its premises during a storm "until anadequate period of time has passed following the cessation of the storm to allow theowner an opportunity to ameliorate the hazards caused by the storm" (Cotter v Brookhaven Mem. Hosp.Med. Ctr., Inc., 97 AD3d 524, 524 [2012], quoting Marchese v Skenderi, 51AD3d 642, 642 [2008]; seeSmilowitz v GCA Serv. Group, Inc., 101 AD3d 1101, 1101-1102 [2012]; Weller v Paul, 91 AD3d945, 947 [2012]; see alsoOlivieri v GM Realty Co., LLC, 37 AD3d 569 [2007]; Rapone v Di-Gara RealtyCorp., 22 AD3d 654, 655 [2005]). Here, the defendant established its primafacie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by producing evidence that the plaintiffslipped and fell on snow and ice that was deposited by a storm, and that it had not had anadequate period of time after the cessation of the storm to allow it to ameliorate thehazardous condition (seeWilliams v KJAEL Corp., 40 AD3d 985, 986 [2007]; Coyne v Talleyrand Partners,L.P., 22 AD3d 627, 628 [2005]).
In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Espinal vMelville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 142-143 [2002]; Smilowitz v GCA Serv.Group, Inc., 101 AD3d at 1102; [*2]Coyne vTalleyrand Partners, L.P., 22 AD3d at 628; see also Quintanilla v State of New York, 94 AD3d 846[2012]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant's motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Espinal v Melville SnowContrs., 98 NY2d at 138; Knee v Trump Vil. Constr. Corp., 15 AD3d 545, 546[2005]; Karalic v City of New York, 307 AD2d 254, 255 [2003]).
In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendant's remainingcontention. Eng, P.J., Balkin, Sgroi and Cohen, JJ., concur.