| People v Milord |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 01634 [115 AD3d 774] |
| March 12, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Wilson Milord, Appellant. |
—[*1] Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Karla Lato of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County(Hudson, J.), rendered October 13, 2010, convicting him of grand larceny in the seconddegree, forgery in the second degree, and criminally negligent homicide (three counts),upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
"[T]he right to counsel, guaranteed by both the Federal and State Constitutions (USConst, 6th Amdt; CLS NY Const, art I, § 6), embraces the right of a criminaldefendant to be represented by counsel of his [or her] own choosing" (People vArroyave, 49 NY2d 264, 270 [1980]). A "necessary corollary" to that right is that adefendant must be accorded a reasonable opportunity to select and retain his or hercounsel (id. at 270, citing Chandler v Fretag, 348 US 3, 9-10 [1954]).The right to be represented by counsel of the defendant's own choosing is, however, notunlimited; it "is qualified in the sense that a defendant may not employ such right as ameans to delay judicial proceedings" (People v Arroyave, 49 NY2d at 271; see People v Griffin, 92 AD3d1, 5 [2011], affd 20 NY3d 626 [2013]). It "does not bestow upon a criminaldefendant the absolute right to demand that his [or her] trial be delayed while he [or she]selects another attorney to represent him [or her] at trial" (People v Arroyave, 49NY2d at 271). On the eve of, or during, trial, "public policy considerations against delaybecome even stronger, and it is incumbent upon the defendant to demonstrate that therequested adjournment has been necessitated by forces beyond his [or her] control and isnot simply a dilatory tactic" (id. at 271-272; see People v Allison, 69 AD3d 740, 741 [2010]). Further, adefendant may forfeit the right to counsel of his or her choosing by engaging in conductwith respect to counsel that is " 'calculated to undermine, upset or unreasonably delay theprogress of the trial' " (People vJames, 13 AD3d 649, 650 [2004], quoting People v McIntyre, 36 NY2d10, 18 [1974]; see People v Wilkerson, 294 AD2d 298, 298-299 [2002]).
Here, after the County Court had granted the defendant numerous adjournments overa long period of time to accommodate his requests to change counsel, the courtprovidently exercised its discretion in denying further adjournments for that purpose(see People v Allison, 69 AD3d at 741; People v Gloster, 175 AD2d 258,259-260 [1991]; People v Haqq, 164 AD2d 953, 956 [1990]; cf. People v Stevenson, 36AD3d 634, 634-635 [2007]). When the defendant hired his third retained counsel,more than [*2]a year had passed since the commencementof the criminal proceedings, yet the County Court granted another trial adjournment ofsix months to afford counsel time to prepare. The court had repeatedly warned thedefendant that no further trial adjournment would be granted for him to retain newcounsel, and, on one adjourned date, the defendant signed an affidavit acknowledgingthat he understood that June 1, 2010, was a "firm trial date" that would not be changed orrescheduled "regardless of who I have retained as my trial counsel or if I will proceedwith representing myself." Despite the court's repeated warnings, the defendantcontinued his dilatory conduct. Even then, the court granted further adjournments topermit the defendant to finalize arrangements with a prospective fourth retained counsel.It was only after the defendant failed to retain that attorney that the County Court deniedfurther trial adjournments for a change of counsel.
Given the defendant's repeated failure to make arrangements for trial counsel despitemore than ample time and opportunity to do so, and the court's repeated warnings of theconsequences should he fail to do so, the County Court properly determined that thedefendant had forfeited his right to counsel of his choosing by his dilatory actions (see People v Goodwine, 46AD3d 702, 702 [2007]).
Additionally, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in summarilydenying the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. The record demonstratesthat the defendant's plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently (see People v Haffiz, 19 NY3d883, 884-885 [2012]; People v Johnson, 97 AD3d 695, 695 [2012]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit or need not be addressed inlight of our determination. Eng, P.J., Balkin, Sgroi and Cohen, JJ., concur.