| Kuris v El Sol Contr. & Constr. Corp. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 02268 [116 AD3d 675] |
| April 2, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Ruthi Kuris, Respondent, v El Sol Contracting andConstruction Corp. et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Law Office of Alex Klein, PLLC, Brooklyn, N.Y., for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from anorder of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (McMahon, J.), dated January 28, 2013,which granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiff's motionfor summary judgment on the issue of liability is denied.
The plaintiff's vehicle was stopped in traffic when it was struck in the rear by avehicle owned by the defendant El Sol Contracting and Construction Corp., and operatedby the defendant Patrick Pranel. The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damagesfor personal injuries allegedly sustained in the accident. In the order appealed from, theSupreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue ofliability.
"The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than isreasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the trafficupon and the condition of the highway" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129 [a]; see Gifford v Consolidated EdisonCo. of N.Y., 103 AD3d 773, 774 [2013]; Sehgal v www.nyairportsbus.com, Inc., 100 AD3d 860[2012]; Napolitano vGalletta, 85 AD3d 881, 882 [2011]). Hence, a rear-end collision with a stoppedor stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of theoperator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference ofnegligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision (see Martin v Cartledge, 102AD3d 841 [2013]; Kerteszv Jason Transp. Corp., 102 AD3d 658 [2013]). In chain collision accidents, theoperator of the middle vehicle may establish prima facie entitlement to judgment as amatter of law by demonstrating that the middle vehicle was struck from behind by therear vehicle and propelled into the lead vehicle (see Raimondo v Plunkitt, 102 AD3d 851, 852 [2013]; Hill v Ackall, 71 AD3d829 [2010]; Katz v MasadaII Car & Limo Serv., Inc., 43 AD3d 876 [2007]).
Here, in support of her motion, the plaintiff submitted evidence including thedeposition testimony of the defendant driver, who testified that an unidentified vehiclestruck his [*2]vehicle in the rear, causing his vehicle tomove forward and strike the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle. This testimony revealed theexistence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant driver was at fault in thehappening of the accident (see Raimondo v Plunkitt, 102 AD3d at 852; Hill v Ackall, 71 AD3d829 [2010]; Katz v MasadaII Car & Limo Serv., Inc., 43 AD3d 876 [2007]). Since the plaintiff failed toestablish her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, her motion should have beendenied without regard to the sufficiency of the defendants' opposition papers (seeWinegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Accordingly, theSupreme Court should have denied the plaintiff's motion. Dillon, J.P., Leventhal,Chambers and LaSalle, JJ., concur.