| Downie v McDonough |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 03048 [117 AD3d 1401] |
| May 2, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| Danielle Downie, Respondent, v Shawn T.McDonough, Appellant. |
Rupp, Baase, Pfalzgraf, Cunningham & Coppola LLC, Buffalo (Cory J. Weberof counsel), for defendant-appellant.
William K. Mattar, P.C., Williamsville (Ashley Fasso of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Niagara County (Catherine R. NugentPanepinto, J.), entered February 6, 2013. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied inpart the motion of defendant for summary judgment.
It is hereby ordered that the order insofar as appealed from is reversed on the lawwithout costs, the motion is granted in its entirety, and the complaint is dismissed.
Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries sheallegedly sustained when the vehicle she was driving collided with a vehicle operated bydefendant. In her bill of particulars, plaintiff alleged that, as a result of the accident, shesustained a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use, significantlimitation of use, and 90/180-day categories set forth in Insurance Law§ 5102 (d). Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint on the ground that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaningof those categories, and Supreme Court granted the motion only with respect to the90/180-day category. We agree with defendant that the court should have granted themotion in its entirety.
Defendant met his initial burden of establishing that plaintiff did not sustain a seriousinjury under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation ofuse categories, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Heller v Jansma, 103 AD3d1160, 1161 [2013]; Carfi vForget, 101 AD3d 1616, 1617 [2012]). In support of his motion, defendantsubmitted the affirmed report of an orthopedic surgeon who examined plaintiff less thanthree months after the accident, reviewed her medical records, and concluded that therewas no objective evidence to substantiate plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain or towarrant further orthopedic treatment. He concluded instead that plaintiff sustained only acervical spine sprain or strain as a result of the accident, which had resolved by the timeof the examination (see Herbst v Marshall [appeal No. 2], 49 AD3d 1194, 1195[2008]). The orthopedic surgeon noted that plaintiff exhibited no palpable spasm, motordeficits, or objective sensory deficits, and had full range of motion in her cervical spine.Defendant also submitted copies of plaintiff's medical records, including an X ray reportfrom the date of the accident. The X rays revealed no [*2]fractures, disc herniations, subluxations, soft tissueswelling, or any other abnormalities in her cervical, thoracic, or lumbosacral spine. Inaddition, defendant submitted excerpts from plaintiff's deposition, in which plaintifftestified that she returned to her physically demanding job as a full-time house cleanerless than two months after the accident, and that she performed the same duties bothbefore and after the accident. Plaintiff further testified that there are no activities inwhich she is unable to participate because of the accident, although she is somewhatlimited in "[r]ock climbing [and] some physical sports."
In opposition to the motion, plaintiff submitted, inter alia, the certified records of hertreating chiropractor, which included an MRI report reflecting the existence of bulgingdiscs in plaintiff's cervical spine. Even assuming, arguendo, that the report is inadmissible form, we conclude that it is insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to seriousinjury. It is well settled that "[p]roof of a herniated [or bulging] disc, without additionalobjective medical evidence establishing that the accident resulted in significant physicallimitations, is not alone sufficient to establish a serious injury" (Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d566, 574 [2005]; see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345, 353 n 4[2002]; Carfi, 101 AD3d at 1618). "Whether a limitation of use or function is'significant' or 'consequential' (i.e., important . . .) relates to medicalsignificance and involves a comparative determination of the degree or qualitative natureof an injury based on the normal function, purpose and use of the body part" (Dufel vGreen, 84 NY2d 795, 798 [1995]; see Accurso v Kloc, 77 AD3d 1295, 1296 [2010]).
Here, plaintiff relies on mild to moderate range of motion limitations in her cervicalspine exhibited the day after the accident. "[W]hile a significant limitation of use of abody function or member need not be permanent in order to constitute a serious injury,. . . any assessment of the significance of a bodily limitation necessarilyrequires consideration not only of the extent or degree of the limitation, but of itsduration as well" (Lively vFernandez, 85 AD3d 981, 982 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Griffiths v Munoz, 98AD3d 997, 998 [2012]). The records of plaintiff's own chiropractor reflect that, lessthan four months after the accident, plaintiff exhibited normal flexion, extension, andright lateral bending, with restrictions of approximately 10% to 11% in left lateralbending and bilateral rotation. Those limitations are "minor, mild or slight" and thus areproperly characterized as "insignificant" or inconsequential within the meaning of thestatute (Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230, 236 [1982]; see e.g. Il Chung Lim vChrabaszcz, 95 AD3d 950, 951 [2012]; Canelo v Genolg Tr., Inc., 82 AD3d 584, 585 [2011]; Sarkis v Gandy, 15 AD3d942, 943 [2005]).
Finally, we agree with defendant that the court erred in concluding that plaintiffraised an issue of fact based upon her complaints of headaches. Although plaintiffsubmitted excerpts from her deposition in which she testified that "basically every day Iwould have some type of headache," it is well settled that "subjective complaints of painor headaches are insufficient to establish 'serious injury' " (Kivlan v Acevedo, 17 AD3d321, 322 [2005]; see Licari, 57 NY2d at 238-239; Smith v Reeves, 96 AD3d1550, 1552 [2012]). Here, the record contains no objective basis for plaintiff'sheadache complaints (see Smith, 96 AD3d at 1551; Grayer v Jerez, 192AD2d 637, 637 [1993]; Solarzano v Power Test Petro, 181 AD2d 631, 631[1992], lv denied 80 NY2d 759 [1992]). Moreover, plaintiff "offered no proofthat [her] headaches in any way incapacitated [her] or interfered with [her] ability towork or engage in activities at home" (Licari, 57 NY2d at 239; see Wiegand vSchunck, 294 AD2d 839, 840 [2002]).
All concur except Whalen, J., who dissents and votes to affirm in the followingmemorandum.
Whalen, J. (dissenting). I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion thatplaintiff's complaints of headaches were insufficient to create an issue of fact regardingwhether she sustained a serious injury. I therefore dissent, and would affirm theorder.
[*3] Initially, I note that it is of coursewell established that "subjective complaints of occasional, transitory headaches" areinsufficient to qualify as a serious injury (Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230, 238[1982]). In Licari, the Court of Appeals noted that the injured plaintiff offered noproof that his headaches in any way incapacitated him or interfered with his ability towork or engage in activities at home. There, the plaintiff testified that his headachesoccurred only once every two or three weeks and were relieved by aspirin. The Courtconcluded that "the subjective quality of an ordinary headache" does not fall within thedefinition of serious injury (id. at 239). However, our case is different and therule from Licari should not act as a bar to a potential recovery for plaintiffherein.
In the case now before us, plaintiff testified that every day since the accident she hasheadaches. She also testified that they are not getting any better. Plaintiff did not testifyto having occasional or transitory headaches that are of the type described inLicari. Importantly, the orthopedic surgeon who examined plaintiff ondefendant's behalf noted in his report that plaintiff complained of headaches and that thiscomplaint "is out of the scope of my specialty as an orthopedist" and that he would "defercomment on treatment for the head to the neurologist." He also causally related plaintiff'sinjuries to the accident. Additionally, he opined that a neurological exam was necessaryto assess the headaches, and yet defendant did not have plaintiff examined by aneurologist. The orthopedic surgeon had access to plaintiff's medical records and couldhave opined that plaintiff was suffering from the type of minor, transitory headachescontemplated by Licari that would not qualify as a serious injury. However, hedid not offer such an opinion. In fact, he did just the opposite. He thought, afterreviewing the medical records, that plaintiff should see a neurologist for the types ofheadaches she was experiencing. Thus, because the only proof in the record is thatplaintiff was having headaches every single day since the accident that were notimproving, and because defendant did not have plaintiff examined by a neurologist,defendant failed to meet his initial burden on his motion (see Alvarez v ProspectHosp., 68 NY2d 320, 325 [1986]). I note that there is evidence in the record thatplaintiff could not go to see a neurologist on her own because she did not have anyinsurance, which is a reasonable excuse for not seeking treatment (see Alexander vGuevara, 2008 NY Slip Op 33473[U], *5 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2008], citing Francovig v Senekis CabCorp., 41 AD3d 643 [2007]).
Additionally, I respectfully disagree with the majority that plaintiff offered no proofthat the headaches incapacitated her or interfered with her ability to work or engage inactivities at home. Again, I note that it was defendant's initial burden on the summaryjudgment motion to establish that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury. The physicianwho examined plaintiff on defendant's behalf stated in his report that plaintiff wasworking at the same job "with limitations," and there is a notation in the medical recordsthat plaintiff quit her job as a house cleaner due to pain. Thus, viewing the facts in thelight most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party (see generally Ortiz v VarsityHoldings, LLC, 18 NY3d 335, 340 [2011]), I conclude that there is evidencethat plaintiff's headaches interfered with her activities and that summary judgment fordefendant is improper with respect to the two remaining categories of serious injury.Present—Scudder, P.J., Centra, Peradotto, Lindley and Whalen, JJ.